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ABSTRACT

NATURAL LAW, THE OBJECT OF THE ACT, AND DOUBLE EFFECT: MORAL
METHODOLOGY FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE ETHICS

By
Travis R. Stephens
December 2019

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Gerard Magill
Pope John Paul II’s Encyclical Veritatis Splendor is the first and only magisterial
document that systematically articulates a moral methodology for Catholic moral theology. This
dissertation makes explicit the methodological connection between Vatican teaching and the
United States Bishops’ Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. The
thesis of the dissertation explains the systematic connection between Natural Law, the Moral
Object of the Act, and the Principle of Double Effect and by extension the ethical Principle of
Cooperation. Second, the thesis applies this complex moral method of official teaching to health
care ethics.
Following the introduction, chapter two discusses the moral method of Natural Law and
the Moral Object. Chapter 3 relates this explanation to the Principle of Double Effect. The
subsequent chapters apply this moral method of official Catholic teaching to Catholic health care
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ethics, focusing on several emerging topics to emphasize the relevance of the theoretical
approach. Chapter 4 discusses Health Care Ethics Consultations, especially engaging the
Principle of Cooperation (enlightened by the Principle of Double Effect) with regard to
prohibited health care services in Catholic health care. Chapter 5 considers the use of the
Principle of Double Effect to justify bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation
carriers and the uses of contraception for victims of sexual assault. Chapter 6 discusses the use of
sex reassignment therapies for gender dysphoria and the use of contraceptive methods for noncontraceptive benefits.
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION
There is longstanding discourse in Catholic moral theology regarding the relation
between Natural Law, the Moral Object of an act, and the Principle of Double Effect and
Cooperation. Thomas Aquinas produces the first comprehensive and systematic account of
Natural Law and the Moral Object of the act in his Summa Theologica.1 In accord with Aquinas,
official Catholic teaching holds that certain Moral Objects are intrinsically evil. 2 In addition,
Aquinas also introduces the first formulation of the Principle of Double Effect, which combines
discourse on Natural Law and the Moral Object of an act to explain the legitimacy of an action
with a good and bad effect. 3 Similar to the Principle of Double Effect, the Catholic moral
tradition uses the Principle of Cooperation to determine when and to what extent one’s actions
may contribute to the immoral action of another. Not surprisingly, robust debate continues over
the meaning and relevance for morality of each of these concepts.
The most comprehensive account in Catholic official teaching of Natural Law, the Moral
Object of an act, and their relevance for the Principle of Double Effect and the Principle of
Cooperation can be found in Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Veritatis Splendor. This is the first
and only Papal encyclical that explores moral theology from a systematic perspective. As a
result, Pope John Paul II reaffirms the existence of intrinsically evil acts, 4 yet continues to
approve the complex ethical principles of double effect and of cooperation.
The Catholic Church in the United States adopts this stance of Pope John Paul II to
articulate its official teaching on health care ethics in the Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Care Services.5 Surprisingly, however, the United States Bishops do not adopt
the moral method Pope John Paul II articulates in Veritatis Splendor. This dissertation discusses
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the connection between the method of Veritatis Splendor and the United States bishops’ Ethical
and Religious Directives.
The thesis of the dissertation has two related goals. First, the thesis explains the
systematic connection between Natural Law, the Moral Object of the Act, and the Principle of
Double Effect and by extension the ethical Principle of Cooperation. Insofar as cooperation
effectively adopts the standards of double effect reasoning, the thesis title only lists the Principle
of Double Effect. Second, the thesis applies this complex moral method of official teaching to
health care ethics.
Insofar as the Ethical and Religious Directives apply this approach to many well-known
issues, a consideration of the relevance of the Church’s moral method for emerging issues
(referred to in the analysis), in health care is undertaken. A major emerging issue deals with
ethics consultations that, although commonly undertaken in Catholic health systems, is not
addressed at length in the Ethical and Religious Directives. The dissertation relates this topic
with the ethical Principle of Cooperation that is adopted to resolve disputes in ethics
consultations regarding the provision (or not) of particular commonly accessible health services.
Another two major emerging issues are becoming increasingly problematic for Catholic health
systems, yet are not addressed explicitly in Ethical and Religious Directives: oophorectomies and
sex reassignment surgeries, each related to issues regarding contraception. Each of these
emerging issues are discussed in the applied chapters of the dissertation.
The sequence of the analysis in the chapters of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 1
provides an Introduction. Chapter 2 discusses the moral method of Natural Law and the Moral
Object of the Act. Chapter 3 relates this explanation to the Principle of Double Effect. The
subsequent chapters apply this moral method of official Catholic teaching to Catholic health care
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ethics, focusing on several emerging topics to emphasize the relevance of the theoretical
approach. Chapter 4 discusses Health Care Ethics Consultations, especially engaging the
Principle of Cooperation (enlightened by the Principle of Double Effect) with regard to
prohibited health care services in Catholic health care. Chapter 5 considers the use of the
Principle of Double Effect to justify bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation
carriers and the uses of contraception for victims of sexual assault. Chapter 6 discusses the use of
sex reassignment therapies for gender dysphoria and the use of contraceptive methods for noncontraceptive benefits.
CHAPTER TWO – NATURAL LAW AND THE MORAL OBJECT
Chapter two explains the role of Natural Law and the Moral Object of the Act in the
moral method of Catholic teaching. Each section focuses on the scholarship of two contemporary
ethicists—John Finnis and Martin Rhonheimer—who have made a pivotal contribution to the
debate on this approach.
2A. Natural Law
The first section addresses the role of Natural Law in Catholic moral theology including
divergent formulations.
i. Natural Law
a. Law
In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas discusses Natural Law in the context of law. 6 This
subsubsection analyzes Aquinas’s understanding of law, from the perspective of Martin
Rhonheimer’s Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomistic View of Moral Autonomy.7 Most
importantly, for Rhonheimer, the precept of reason is an act of the will expressed not in word,
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but action.8 One derives the normative principles of Natural Law, which are speculative in
nature, by reflecting on the process of practical reason in action.9
b. Eternal Law and Natural Law
Natural law is the eternal law of God written on the heart of each human person. 10 All
creatures participate in the law which God promulgates, but humans participate in the law
uniquely insofar as they also providentially govern. 11 John Finnis explains Aquinas’s
understanding of participatio in his Natural Law and Natural Rights. 12
c. Self-Evidence of Practical Reason
Just as the first principle of metaphysics is self-evident, so the first principle of practical
reason is self-evident.13 R. A. Armstrong in Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic
Natural Law Teaching identifies what Aquinas means by self-evident.14 Using Kevin L.
Flannery’s Acts Amid Precepts, I highlight a parallel between the ordering of theoretical knowing
and practical knowing in Aquinas. 15 For Grisez, in “The First Principles of Practical Reason: A
Commentary on the Summa theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2,” self-evident principles are
not mere tautologies, that is, restatements of what is already given. 16 Finnis relates the concept of
the self-evidence of principles or precepts of Natural Law to the rationality of the notion that any
state of affairs may exist without further explanation. 17
d. Happiness, Natural Inclinations and Reason
In The Perspective of Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics,
Rhonheimer highlights the difference between an authentic eudemonistic ethic and one that only
seems oriented toward happiness, but really constitutes hedonism. 18 For Rhonheimer, action
concerns appetition, that is, striving for a good that corresponds to the substantive form of the
human person, which is both body and soul. 19 The inclinations for the good correspond to each
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aspect of the human condition—inanimate, animate, and rational. 20 Insofar as the soul consists of
both intellect and will, happiness is that which one rationally wills for its own sake. 21
e. Principles of Natural Law and Basic Human Goods
Each principle of Natural Law corresponds to the natural inclinations in humans, which
corresponds to all three of the above-mentioned classes of inclinations. 22 Armstrong relates the
principles of practical reason to human inclinations, 23 while Finnis relates it to basic human
values.24 Perspectives diverge on the above depending on one’s perspective regarding the
Naturalistic Fallacy.
ii. Naturalistic Fallacy and Natural Law
The Naturalistic Fallacy originates in G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, where, building on
David Hume’s assertion that “ought statements” do not derive from “is statements,” 25 he argues
that moral good is not physical good. 26
a. Ergon Argument
In Fundamentals of Ethics, Finnis takes issue with Aristotle’s “ergon argument,” in the
Nicomachean Ethics that is, where he argues that insofar as the human person’s function is to
reason, they ought to act in accord with reason. 27 Finnis insists that since this argument is
theoretical, not practical in nature it contributes nothing substantial to Aristotle’s ethics.28 Ralph
McInerny29 and Martin Rhonheimer 30 both take issue with Finnis’s dismissal of Aristotle’s
function argument, which I further elucidate here.
b. Essentialist Understanding of Morality
Rhonheimer rejects what he calls an essentialist understanding of morality, of which
Heinrich Rommen, 31 Joseph Pieper, 32 Ralph McInerny, 33 Steven Jensen, 34 R. Hittinger, 35 and
Steven A. Long36 are leading proponents. 37 They conflate metaphysics with morality, contending
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that morality perfects being. Their methodology is no different than that of the proportionalists
they reject including: Peter Knauer, 38 Josef Fuchs, 39 Louis Janssens, 40 Bruno Schuller, 41 and
Richard McCormick. 42 Avoiding the Naturalistic Fallacy places moral decision making in the
first-person perspective.
iii. Natural Law and the Perspective of the Acting Person
a. The Primacy of the First-Person Perspective
Rhonheimer, in “The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of
Subjectivity,” upholds the subjective primacy of the Natural Law. 43 Rhonheimer rebuts critics
such as Jean Porter who assert that he falls into spiritualism, 44 rooting actions in the human
person that is a substantial union of body and soul. 45
b. First-Person Perspective in Veritatis Splendor
John Paul II, following Aquinas, understands Natural Law to be a divine light of reason,
which God imprints on humanity in creation. 46 This subsubsection follows John Paul II’s
articulation of the subjective nature of the Natural Law in Veritatis Splendor. A first-person
perspective on the Natural Law best explains the Catholic Church’s argument concerning the
immorality of contraception.
iv. Contraception and Natural Law
a. Inseparability Principle
Paul VI, in Humanae Vitae establishes the inseparable connection between the unitive
and procreative significance of the marital act in Natural Law.47 Rhonheimer, in Ethics of
Procreation and the Defense of Human Life: Contraception, Artificial Fertilization and Abortion
establishes this connection between the Natural Law and the Inseparability Principle. 48
b. Responsible Parenthood and Chastity
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Following Paul VI’s lead, 49 Rhonheimer connects the Church’s prohibition against
contraception to the virtue of chastity, insisting that periodic continence, a substantive part of
responsible parenthood, is the inherent means for growth in it. 50 This line of reasoning concurs
with John Paul II in Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body.51
The Natural Law is foundational to how the practical intellect formulates the good in the
Object of the Act, which the following section elucidates.
2B. Moral Object
This section addresses the role of the Object of the Act for Catholic Morality.
i. Aquinas’s Action Theory
a. Intrinsically Evil Acts
This subsubsection follows the development of the concept of intrinsically evil acts,
which Servais Pinckaers, in “A Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts,” traces
beginning with Augustine and continuing through Peter Abelard, Peter Lombard, and
culminating in Aquinas. 52
b. Intention to Action
This subsubsection follows Finnis’s interpretation of Aquinas’s action theory in Question
11-20 of the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae, in his Aquinas: Moral, Political and
Legal Theory.53 Above all, Finnis highlights the distinction between choosing (electio) and
intending (intentio), which correspond to distinct aspects of willing, the proximate end and the
ultimate end, respectively. 54 In concert with the will, Rhonheimer observes that the intellect acts
in extension when engaging in practical reason. 55 The proximate end corresponds to the Object
of the Act.
c. External Act: Materia Circa Quam and Proximate End
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Joseph Pilsner, in The Specification of Human Actions in Saint Thomas Aquinas holds
that Aquinas uses the relationship between form and matter in a substantial being to illustrate the
analogous relationship that ends have for action. 56 Once again, the identification of the Object of
the Act with the proximate end and the materia circa quam, which Sousa-Lara illustrates is
helpful for understanding the distinct properties of the external act. 57 Just as one’s position on the
Naturalistic Fallacy affects the formulation of the Natural Law, so it affects the formulation of
the Object of the Act.
ii. Naturalistic Fallacy
a. Genus Moris Versus Genus Naturae
According to Rhonheimer, the greatest mistake of consequentialists is the presumption
that morality is reducible to technical decision making, 58 which, for Finnis, amounts to reducing
doing to making. 59 In this regard, many Thomistic ethicists mistakenly presume that morality
derives from metaphysics, which constitutes the Naturalistic Fallacy. 60
b. Manualism and Proportionalism
Precisely insofar as the manualists and proportionalists subscribe to the Naturalistic
Fallacy—presuming that ethics derives from nature—they constitute two sides of the same
consequentialist coin. Servais Pinckaers, in The Sources of Christian Ethics demonstrates that
Ockham’s nominalism is the source of the Naturalistic Fallacy, rather than authentic Thomism. 61
Proportionalists, such as, Peter Knauer reduce moral evil to causing evil in the world, 62 which
constitutes eventism for Rhonheimer 63 and Finnis. 64 Failing to avoid the Naturalistic Fallacy
precludes a first-person perspective for morality. The following subsection addresses these
deficiencies.
iii. Moral Object and the Perspective of the Acting Person
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a. Avoiding Eventism
Rhonheimer, in “‘Intrinsically Evil Acts’ and the Moral Viewpoint: Clarifying a
Central Teaching of Veritatis Splendor,” argues that eventistic morality reduces the Object of the
Act to intention, rendering choice insignificant. 65
b. The Socratic Principle
The Socratic Principle contends that it is better to suffer evil than to do. 66 Insofar as
proportionalism does not pass the test of the Socratic Principle, Finnis and Rhonheimer reject
it.67
c. Personalism in Veritatis Splendor
This subsubsection follows the personalistic approach to morality in John Paul II’s
Veritatis Splendor.68 John Paul II rejects the proportionalistic approach precisely because it
denies a personalistic approach. 69 Accordingly, he reaffirms the existence of intrinsically evil
acts.70 Only a first-person account of the Object of the Act provides an adequate perspective for
defining the Object of the Act of contraception.
iv. Object of Contraception
a. Manualism
John T. Noonan Jr., in Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic
Theologians and Canonists demonstrates that the manualists reject contraception on the
physicalistic objection that the Object of the Act constitutes onanism. 71 Pius XI’s rejection of
contraception follows similar lines of reasoning. 72
b. Proportionalism
Proportionalists such as Peter Knauer have no problem with contraception so long as a
commensurate reason exists for intending it in the physical world. 73
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c. Rhonheimer
Rhonheimer contends that Humanae Vitae only makes sense according to a personalistic
approach to morality, that is, one that grounds morality in the human person, a composite of
body and soul. 74 Accordingly, Rhonheimer defines the Object of the Act of marital union as
loving bodily union. 75 With reference to chastity, he defines the Object of the Act of
contraception as a choice against the natural means for growth in chastity, which periodic
continence, a constitutive part of responsible parenthood affords. 76 The Object of the Act is an
important criteria of the Principle of Double Effect, which the following chapter examines.
CHAPTER THREE – PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT
This chapter analyzes the Principle of the Double Effect in light of the preceding
articulation of the Natural Law and the Object of the Act.
3A. Double Effect from Aquinas to Knauer
This section traces the historical development of the Principle of Double Effect beginning
with Thomas Aquinas and concluding with the proportionalist Peter Knauer.
i. Aquinas and Double-Effect Reasoning
The first subsection explicates Thomas Aquinas’s use of Double-Effect Reasoning in the
Summa Theologiae where he uses it to explain killing in self-defense.77 In accord with
Augustine, Aquinas objects to one intending to kill another person, for any reason, since this
violates an exceptionless moral norm. 78 For Aquinas, the death of an assailant is praeter
intentionem, that is, beside the intention of the agent, which in this case is self-defense.79
Aquinas’s formulation concerns proportionality, which reflects one’s intention both in terms of
the proximate end and ultimate end. In addition, Aquinas uses Double-Effect Reasoning in his
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discussion of scandal 80 and adorning dress. 81 Commentators on Aquinas develop divergent
interpretations of the Principle of Double Effect.
ii. Antoninus to Gury
The second subsection of this paper follows the development of the Principle of Double
Effect through the commentaries of theologians that follow Aquinas up to Jean Pierre Gury. The
analysis begins with Antoninus’s development of Double-Effect Reasoning concerning scandal
and alluring dress in his Summa Theologica Moralis.82 Following Joseph T. Mangan’s influential
analysis of the Principle of Double Effect, “An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double
Effect,” 83 I consider Cajetan’s contribution. 84 The Dominican Vitoria restricts Aquinas’s
understanding of intention in the passage pertaining to killing in self-defense, contradicting the
broad interpretation of intention that includes the proximate end—Object of the Act—as well as
the ultimate end. 85 Suarez neglects any discussion of the proximate end altogether. 86 J. Ghoos, in
“L’Act a Double Effet Ètude de Théologie Positive,” holds that John of Saint Thomas is the first
to put the Principle of Double Effect into its modern form. 87 Many of the adaptations in the
Principle of Double Effect from the Thomistic commentators influence Gury’s formulation.
iii. Jean Pierre Gury
Jean Pierre Gury, in his Compendium theologiae moralis is the first to apply the Principle
of Double Effect to the rest of moral theology. 88 Christopher Kaczor observes that for Aquinas
the proportionality criterion consists of weighing acts, while for Gury it involves weighing
effects.89 This demonstrates the casuistic devolution of the Principle of Double Effect up to
Gury. Proportionalists such as Peter Knauer adopt Gury’s formulation of the Principle of Double
Effect.
iv. Peter Knauer
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The final section analyzes Peter Knauer’s use of the Principle of Double Effect in “The
Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect.” 90 In accord with the casuistic
formulation of Gury, Knauer understands the proportion criteria to involve weighing effects. In
addition, however, Knauer understands the proximate end to be the effect, that is, the ultimate
end.91 To justify an action which causes a negative effect, one must have “commensurate
reason.” 92 John Paul II, in Veritatis Splendor rejects the proportionalistic articulation of the
Object of the Act. 93 In part, this motivates ethicists to formulate non-consequentialist versions of
the Principle of Double Effect, which the following section explores.
3B. Contemporary Formulations of the Principle of Double Effect
This section analyzes the use of the Principle of Double Effect by contemporary ethicists.
i. Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle: Defending Craniotomy
a. Eight Cases that Illustrate Intention
John Finnis, Germain Grisez, and Joseph Boyle, in “‘Direct’ and ‘indirect’: A Reply to
Critics of Our Action Theory,” offer eight cases that illustrate the complexity of the first-person
perspective of action in their action theory. 94 These eight examples highlight the distinct roles of
intention regarding the first person perspective, notwithstanding the tendency to conflate its role
in ethics and law, especially under the influence of Jeremy Bentham. 95 Moreover, these examples
highlight errors in the precise formulation of the Object of the Act, the first criteria for the
Principle of Double Effect.
b. Perspective of the Acting Person
Finnis, in Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, demonstrates the distinction that
Aquinas highlights in his On Evil between the broad and narrow sense of intention. 96 Broadly
speaking, intention includes the Object of the Act, which one can only know from the
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perspective of the acting person. 97 In accord with Augustine in his Contra mendacium,98 Finnis,
in Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth contends that exceptionless moral norms do
exist that one ought never to violate. 99
c. Debunking Unsound Arguments against Craniotomies
Finnis et al. reject seven unsound arguments against craniotomies that reduce morality to
cause-effect reasoning.100 Put another way, these arguments reduce the genus moris to the genus
naturae.101 In addition, they reaffirm their acceptance of the Church’s prohibition against direct
killing.102
d. Defending Craniotomies
Finnis et al., reject Kevin F. Flannery’s argument that the means of a craniotomy contains
the death of a child. 103 In addition, they refute Jean Porter’s argument in “‘Direct’ and ‘Indirect’
in Grisez’s Moral Theory,” that their theory depends on the indivisibility of performance. 104 The
physical circumstances of an act, including its consequences are not negligible to the
determination of the Object of the Act. The following subsection accounts for this without
relegating the derivation of the Object of the Act to the physical.
ii. A Thomistic Response to Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle
Cavanaugh argues that Finnis et al.’s argument relegates moral decision making to the
conceptual. 105 For Cavanaugh one communicates intention not only by words, but actions as
well.106 Duarte Sousa Lara, in “Aquinas on Interior and Exterior Acts: Clarifying a Key Aspect
of His Action Theory,” articulates a distinction within the exterior act that accounts for the
connection between the physical act and that which the agent chooses, the latter corresponding to
the Object of the Act. 107 Another way to distinguish the physical from the moral is the distinction
between intending and foreseeing.
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iii. Intended and Foreseen in T. A. Cavanaugh
a. Double-Effect Terminology
Although several formulations of the Principle of Double Effect exist to distinguish what
one intends versus what one does not intend, Cavanaugh contends that the intended and foreseen
distinction is the best, because it they avoid confusions that others do not. 108
b. Intention/Foreseen Distinction
For Cavanaugh, it is impossible to conceive of certain actions without an evil intention,
for example euthanasia, terror bombing, and craniotomies. 109 To determine intent for actions that
do not necessarily include an evil intent, James Sterba recommends asking if the foreseen
negative effect helps explain why one is choosing a particular action, thus connecting intention
to the Object of the Act. 110 Following the distinction that G. E. M. Anscombe makes between
practical and speculative knowledge, 111 Cavanaugh holds that intention is practical, while
foreseen effects are speculative. 112 The following subsections apply the intending/foreseeing
distinction to concrete ethical dilemmas, beginning with the distinction between euthanasia and
terminal sedation.
iv. Euthanasia Versus Terminal Sedation
a. The Catholic Church: Euthanasia and Terminal Sedation
Ethicists often use the Principle of Double Effect to differentiate in health care ethics
between euthanasia and terminal sedation. In Declaration on Euthanasia, the Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith condemns intentionally killing another person by an act of omission or
commission to relieve pain or suffering. 113 At the same time, the Church acknowledges that
circumstances exist where pain relievers that medical clinicians use to treat pain, foreseeably, but
unintentionally, expedite the dying process by depressing the respiratory system. 114 More current
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research indicates that when done properly, continuous, deep sedation does not shorten life. 115
Insofar as the Church prefers for patients to be awake to spiritually prepare for death, Double
Effect justifies sedation when the patient experiences great distress.
b. Joseph Boyle: Euthanasia and Terminal Sedation
In “On Killing and Letting Die,” Joseph M. Boyle, Jr. formulates an argument defending
the moral distinction attributable to the Object of the Act and the Principle of Double Effect
between killing and letting die. 116 Boyle rejects claims by Michael Tooley in “A Defense of
Abortion and Infanticide,” that there is no moral distinction between killing and letting die, 117
insisting that the distinction centers on intention. 118 When killing in euthanasia, one intends the
death of the person to relieve pain, whereas by allowing one to die, one does not necessarily
intend the person’s death, even if one foresees it.
c. Intention/Foreseen Distinction: Euthanasia and Terminal Sedation
Using the intention/foreseen distinction, Cavanaugh emphasizes that in euthanasia, the
physician chooses the death of the patient as a means to relieving pain. 119 Relieving the patient’s
pain does not suffice—as it does in terminal sedation. Thus, in euthanasia, the Object of the Act
is murder, whereas in terminal sedation it is relieving pain. The following subsection highlights
the connection between circumstances (including consequences) for the Object of the Act.
v. Hysterectomy Versus Craniotomy
a. Direct Killing in Abortion
The Church clearly prohibits direct abortion, that is, killing an unborn child either as a
means or an end to one’s action. 120 At the same time, circumstances arise where, for
proportionate reasons, a physician may perform an indirect abortion, for example by performing
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a hysterectomy on a woman with a gravid cancerous uterus. 121 This is a classic application of the
Principle of Double Effect.
b. Defending Craniotomies
According to four criteria, Grisez 122 and Boyle123 argue that craniotomies do not
constitute direct killing. This position, they argue is consistent with that of H. L. A. Hart’s. 124
Cavanaugh asserts that Boyle and Grisez so narrowly define craniotomy that it excludes the
death of a child, however, R. A. Duff insists that it is impossible to define craniotomy without
the death of a child. 125
c. Craniotomies and Hysterectomies
Using the Intention/Foreseen distinction, Cavanaugh holds that the craniotomy, unlike the
hysterectomy of a gravid cancerous uterus, inexorably entails the death of the child, which means
that one cannot avoid intending the death of the child by intentionally performing a
craniotomy.126 Thus, Cavanaugh objects to their narrow, conceptual definition of the Object of
the Act for a craniotomy. The distinction between terror bombing provides another opportunity
to clarify the distinction between intending/foreseeing.
vi. Terror Bombing Versus Tactical Bombing
a. Traditional Just War Theory
Here, I explicate the criteria for just war theory according to James F. Childress in “JustWar Theories: The Bases, Interrelations, Priorities, and Functions of Their Criteria,” 127 which
has recourse to the Principle of Double Effect to justify collateral damage.
b. Just War, Terrorism and Nuclear Deterrence
Finnis et al., in Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism argue that the United States
ought to abandon the nuclear arms proliferation race for the common good of the people of the
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Soviet Union, even though they are not likely to reciprocate. 128 This is because deterrence
involves the retaliatory killing of innocent civilians, which violates an exceptionless moral norm,
the Object of the Act of mass murder.129
c. Terror Bombing and Tactical Bombing
Cavanaugh uses the intention/foreseen distinction to further highlight the immorality of
terror bombing in contrast to discriminate tactical bombing. 130 The terror bomber intends to
maim civilians as a means to achieving the end of victory, whereas the tactical bomber destroys
an enemy’s ability to wage war by strategically targeting combat installations, foreseeing, but not
intending to harm non-combatants.131 Thus, the Principle of Double Effect justifies the
unintended, yet foreseen death of non-combatants.
The preceding chapters provide a theoretical foundation in Catholic moral method to
discuss applied topics emerging in health care ethics, which in turn further elucidate the
abovementioned theory. The next chapter examines the ethical principles that guide health care
ethics consultations. Then, it correlates the implications of this chapter’s definition of the
Principle of Double Effect with the similar Principle of Cooperation.
CHAPTER FOUR – HEALTH CARE ETHICS CONSULTATIONS AND COOPERATION
Chapters five and six of this dissertation apply the normative theory discussed in chapters
two and three. This chapter provides a procedural bridge between the normative and applied
chapters. The discussion concerning health care ethics consultations explains the procedure or
process of decision making that connects theory to application. Although normative, given its
link to the Principle of Double Effect, the Principle of Cooperation analogously applies theory to
practice, providing an opportunity for organizations with conflicting missions to work together.
4A. Health Care Ethics Consultations
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This section evaluates the ethical method that guides health care ethics consultations.
i. Health Care Ethics Consultations
In accord with the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities 132 and the Veterans
Health Administration, 133 this subsection delineates health care ethics consultations that are case
based and non-case based. American Society for Bioethics and Humanities advocates a
facilitation approach to health care ethics consultations, since it empowers people to act on wellarticulated values. 134 The size and nature of the health care ethics consultations depends on
various factors that I further articulate here. 135
a. Proficiencies
American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the Veterans Health Administration
provide proficiencies, which I enunciate here. 136 These consist of knowledge, skills, and
attributes.137
b. Veterans Health Administration
This subsubsection first elucidates practical skills for leading health care ethics
consultations according to the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities. 138 Next, it
explains the Veterans Health Administration approach for leading ethics consultations. 139 I use
Albert R. Jonsen et al.’s Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach to Ethical Decisions in Clinical
Medicine to illuminate the Veterans Health Administration’s approach. 140 The next subsection
explores the moral method of principlism that is foundational for health care ethics consultations
and its implications for Catholic health care.
ii. Principles and Topics for Health Care Ethics Consultations
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This subsection uses Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress’s book Principles of
Biomedical Ethics141 and Jonsen et al.’s above mentioned text to explicate the four foundational
principles of health care ethics: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.
a. Autonomy
For Beauchamp et al., autonomy consists of liberty and agency. 142 I discuss three
concepts that depend on autonomy: competence, informed consent, and confidentiality. 143
b. Non-Maleficence and Beneficence
Beauchamp et al., offer four norms that proceed from the two principles of nonmaleficence—do no harm—corresponds to beneficence—act helpfully, which I elucidate in this
subsection. 144 Questions relating to quality of life, associated with non-maleficence, sometimes
lead to support for euthanasia. Following May, I explain the anthropology that underlies such
reasoning145 and defend the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s prohibition against
euthanasia.146
c. Justice
In this subsection, I discuss four rules that Beauchamp et al. correlates with beneficence;
which inexorably relates to justice. 147 Next, I elucidate ten questions pertaining to justice. 148
Having discussed the correlation between principles of health care ethics and the moral method
of Catholic health care ethics, the following section discusses the principle of cooperation, which
helps ethicists in establishing health care alliances.
4B. Principle of Cooperation
This section explicates the role of the Principle of Cooperation for Catholic health care
ethics.
i. Principle of Cooperation
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a. Cooperation and Double Effect
Ethicists often highlight the similarities between the Principle of Double Effect and the
Principle of Cooperation. 149 Traditional formulations of the Principle of Double Effect have four
or five conditions that correspond to similar conditions in the Principle of Cooperation. 150
Beginning with Alphonsus Liguori’s articulation, this section outlines the parallels between the
two principles. 151 Just as one’s understanding of the Natural Law and the Object of the Act
influence one’s construct of the Principle of Double Effect, so they affect how one uses the
Principle of Cooperation.
ii. Cooperation and Sterilization
a. Sterilization
In the face of pressure to perform procedures such as sterilizations and abortions, which
the Church argues violates exceptionless moral norms, 152 that is, an immoral Object of the Act,
they use the Principle of Cooperation to delineate degrees of cooperation. 153 This subsection
traces this history of the Church’s use of the Principle of Cooperation to address cooperation
with institutions that perform sterilizations.
b. The United States Bishops’ and Cooperation
This subsection explores the development of United States bishops’ use of the Principle
of Cooperation, in particular, in the various editions of the Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Care Services.154 In particular, I use Kevin O’Rourke’s insightful article to shed
light on the changes that occur in the Ethical and Religious Directives. 155
c. The Object of the Cooperator
O’Rourke contends that the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith finds fault with
the United States bishops’ formulation of Cooperation. 156 I contend that this is because they fail
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to maintain the distinction between the Object of the Act of the cooperator and that of the
principal agent. Peter J. Cataldo in “Models of Health Care Collaboration” offers four
characteristics for licit collaboration between Catholic and non-Catholic health care entities,
which I also elucidate. 157
d) The United States 2018 Articulation of Cooperation
This subsubsection discusses the changes to the Unites States Bishops’ sixth edition of
the Ethical and Religious Directives in which they articulate a less consequentialist version of
Cooperation.158 The following subsection demonstrates that a consequentialist definition of the
Object of the Act makes it difficult to maintain the difference between the Object of the
cooperator and that of the principal agent. Moreover, the Principle of Appropriation further
clarifies this difference.
iii. Contemporary Contributions to Cooperation
a. Rejecting the ‘No Difference Argument’
Christopher Kutz, in Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age demonstrates how
consequentialists’ emphasis on outcome results in problematic dilemmas, 159 which Luke
Gormally calls the “‘no difference’ argument.” 160 This subsection reveals the connection this has
to the Principle of Cooperation.
b. M. Cathleen Kaveny’s Appropriation of Evil
In “Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation’s Mirror Image,” M. Cathleen Kaveny argues for
a mirror principle to the Principle of Cooperation, appropriation of evil, what I call the Principle
of Appropriation. 161 This subsection unveils the connection between the two principles.
c. Double Effect and Appropriation
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Just as a tenuous parallel exists between the Principle of Double Effect and the Principle
of Cooperation, so one exists between the Principle of Double Effect and the Principle of
Appropriation. 162 This subsection highlights the connection between the two.
d. Appropriation and Fetal Tissue Remains of Elective Abortion
The United States Bishops forbid material cooperation in abortion.163 In accord with
Kaveny’s contention, I demonstrate that the Principle of Appropriation proscribes appropriation
of aborted fetuses for research. 164 Having discussed health care ethics consultations and the
Principle of Cooperation, the next chapter analyzes two other applied topics: oophorectomies and
emergency contraception.
CHAPTER FIVE – OOPHORECTOMIES AND EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION
This chapter uses Natural Law, the Object of the Act and the Principle of Double Effect
to justify procedures that physically-defined are sterilizing and contraceptive, respectively.
5A. Risk Reducing Bilateral Salpingo-oophorectomies
This section applies the above-mentioned moral method to a prophylactic procedure to
prevent cancer in women that foreseeably renders them sterile.
i. Clinical Explanation
a. Discovering BRCA1 and BRCA2
Both BRCA1 and BRCA2 are tumor suppressor genes, some mutations of which
significantly increase one’s risk for developing breast, ovarian, or prostate cancer. 165 This
subsection explores the milestones in research that lead to the discovery of these genes,
especially highlighting the work of Mary-Claire King.166
b. Cancer Inhibition
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Especially using Kiyotsugu Yoshida and Yoshio Miki review article, “Role of BRCA1
and BRCA2 as Regulators of DNA Repair, Transcription, and Cell Cycle in Response to DNA
Damage,” I elaborate on the respective roles that BRCA1 and BRCA2 play in DNA repair,
transcriptional response to DNA damage and cell cycle check pointing. 167
c. Prophylactic Treatments
55 to 65 percent of women with a deleterious BRCA1 mutation and 45 percent of women
with a harmful BRCA2 mutation develop breast cancer by the age of 70, 168 39 percent of women
who inherit the BRCA1 mutation and 11 to 17 percent of women who inherit the BRCA2
mutation develop ovarian cancer by the age of 70. 169 This subsection discusses the risks and
benefits of risk-reducing bilateral mastectomies and risk-reducing bilateral salpingooophorectomies—the removal of the ovaries and Fallopian tubes.170 Having an accurate
understanding of the physical circumstances that concern this ethical decision, the discussion
focuses on the moral method, especially focusing on the Principle of Double Effect and the
Object of the Act.
ii. Double-Effect Reasoning
a. Totality
Despite the Church’s teaching against sterilization, 171 this subsection demonstrates that
the Principle of Totality, which Aquinas first articulates in the Summa Theologica,172 and Pius
XII further develops, 173 justifies the use of bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA1 and 2
mutation carriers.
b. Double-Effect Reasoning
This subsection discusses Aquinas’s use of Double-Effect Reasoning in the Summa
Theologica,174 with particular focus on the broad meaning of intention that Finnis attributes to
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his articulation. 175 In addition, this subsection further elucidates a non-consequentialist
understanding of praeter intentionem for the Principle of Double Effect. 176
c. Object of the Act
With a clear understanding of the distinction between the proximate end and the ulterior
end, I delineate the precise Object of the Act of using bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for
BRCA mutation carriers. In particular, I emphasize the importance of maintaining the distinction
between the genus moris and the genus naturae, which is important because the latter does not
differ for an act of sterilization. Keeping the Object of the Act in the genus moris enables one to
differentiate the foreseen physical act which sterilizes from the intentional moral act that
prevents cancer. The following subsection raises other ethical issues that concern this topic.
iii. Health Care Ethics Consultations
a. Genetic Testing
Antonella Surbone, in “Social and Ethical Implications of BRCA Testing,” defines
genetic testing as “any analysis to detect genotypes, genetic mutations or chromosomal changes,
not including analysis of proteins or metabolites directly related to a manifest disease,” which
can lead to genetic exceptionalism, that is, treating patients with genetic disorders differently
than patients with other diseases. 177 This subsection highlights the complexity of identifying
mutations, but also the implications of those mutations for patients.
b. Genetic Discrimination
Some women are reluctant to get genetic testing, not only because of the ambiguity
regarding results, but also because of fear of discrimination by insurance companies or health
care providers. 178 This subsection discusses this dilemma in greater detail including the
implications of the 2008 Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act. 179
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c. Confidentiality
In the United States, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
delimits confidentiality in healthcare. 180 This subsection weighs the principles of confidentiality
against that of non-maleficence, especially concerning implications for family members that may
share genetic similarities. 181 This subsection highlights ethical concerns that genetically-based
prophylactic procedures raise. The following subsection demonstrates the difference between
contraception and this risk reducing procedure.
iv. Catholic Health Care Policy
a. Prohibiting Sterilization
Although bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers renders patients
sterile, the Object of the Act and the purpose are distinctly different from a contraceptive choice.
In accord with Rhonheimer’s definition of contraception, 182 this subsection defines the Object
the Act of using bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers as unique.
b. Non-BRCA Mutation Carriers
Although some ethicists advocate for bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for non-BRCA
mutation carriers, 183 I concur with the National Catholic Bioethics Center that the situation does
not warrant such practice, 184 since this is not medically indicated. 185 The prophylactic procedure
discussed in this chapter needs recourse to the Principle of Double Effect, because it must justify
the negative effect of sterilization; however, the following section discusses the use of
emergency contraception to prevent conception after sexual assault. A non-consequentialist
definition of the Object of the Act does not need further recourse to the Principle of Double
Effect.
5B. Emergency Contraceptive for Victims of Sexual Assault
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The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, in the Ethical and Religious
Directives assert that women have the right to defend themselves from conception in cases of
sexual assault. 186 Because of the Church’s strict prohibition of abortion, 187 which begins from the
moment of fertilization, the United States Bishops insists that the method must not remove,
destroy, or interfere with a conceptus. 188
i. Clinical Analysis
a. Menstrual-Ovulatory Cycle
Contraceptives interfere with the menstrual-ovulatory cycle, thereby preventing
conception from occurring. This subsection explores the complex physiology of this cycle to
better understand the impact that contraceptives have on it. In particular, it follows the
articulation that Marc A. Fritz and Leon Speroff provide in Clinical Gynecologic Endocrinology
and Infertility, 8th edition.189
b. Physiology of Contraceptives
This subsection explicates the mechanism of action for commonly prescribed emergency
contraceptives, including copper intrauterine device, oral contraceptive pills combining estrogen
and progestin, ulipristal acetate, and progestin-only levonorgestrel. 190 In particular, it highlights
controversy over the precise mechanism of action for levonorgestrel and its ethical
implications.191
ii. Principle of Double Effect
a. Object of the Act
This subsection defines the object of the act from a non-consequentialist perspective as
the proximate end, formulated by practical reason, thus of the genus moris, which the will
chooses (electio). This subsection delves deeply into the development of Aquinas’s
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understanding regarding the role of the will in action, especially as it relates to intending
(intentio) and choosing.192
b. Nominalism, Manualism, and Proportionalism
This subsection reveals the impact that William of Ockham’s nominalism has on
manualism and proportionalism. In particular, it highlights the extrinsic nature of morality for
them.193
c. The Object: Contraception and Self-Defense
In accord with Rhonheimer’s non-consequentialist definition of the Object of the Act of
contraception,194 this subsection defines the use of emergency contraception as an act of selfdefense, which he articulates in Ethics of Procreation.195
d. Genus Moris
A consequentialist articulation of the object of the act, which conflates the genus moris
with the genus naturae gives the impression that one must use the Principle of Double Effect to
justify emergency contraception to defend against sexual assault. However, as I demonstrate in
this subsection, a non-consequentialist description of the object of the act precludes the necessity
of recourse to the Principle of Double Effect. The following chapter discusses two other topics
that ethicists use the Principle of Double Effect to justify.
CHAPTER SIX – SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY AND CONTRACEPTION
This chapter discusses the application of the Principle of Double Effect to two procedures
that render the patient sterile or infertile. In both cases the intention is not to sterilize; however,
this constitutes an unintended, yet foreseen consequence.
6A. Sex Reassignment Surgery for Gender Dysphoria
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Some ethicists argue that the Principle of Double Effect and the Principle of Totality and
Integrity justify the use of sex reassignment surgery in patients diagnosed with gender
dysphoria.196 In accord with Church teaching, I argue against gender ideology and sex
reassignment therapies. 197
i. Sex, Gender, and Gender Dysphoria
This first subsection uses contemporary medical literature to define sex, gender, gender
dysphoria, and sex reassignment therapies.
a. Defining Sex
Defining sex biologically as male or female is not as easy as it may at first appear. In
accord with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5 th Edition, I analyze the
physiological criteria that define sex, including: genetic, gonadal, ductal, and phenotypic or
genital. 198 In addition, I explicate the variety of intersex conditions. 199
b. Defining Gender
In this subsection, I enunciate the definition of gender. 200 In addition, I discuss the social
constructionist origins of gender ideology, first attributable to Simon de Bouvoir, 201 Ann
Oakley,202 Suzaane J. Kessler and Wendy McKenna, 203 Gayle Rubin204 and Judith Butler. 205
c. Gender Dysphoria
Here, I reveal the evolution of the concept of gender dysphoria, especially as the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4 th Edition 206 and Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5 th Edition207 articulate it.
d. Sex Reassignment Therapies
Some advocate for sex reassignment therapies to address gender dysphoria. This
subsection briefly expounds on these treatment options. 208 The definitions in this subsection
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contrasts with the medical, philosophical, and theological positions of Catholic health care that
the following subsection explains.
ii. Objections to Sex Reassignment Therapies
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Committee on Doctrine objects to sex
reassignment therapies on three grounds that I explicate further in this section: medical,
philosophical, and theological. 209
a. Medical
Lawrence S. Mayer and Paul R. McHugh in “Gender Identity” examine scientific
research and find little to no evidence that medical procedures to change gender have any
psychological benefit. 210 They contest the plasticity of gender that social constructionists
advocate. At the same time, they counter contradictory arguments that suggest gender is
biological. Carl Elliott in “A New Way to Be Mad,” finds similarities between body dysmorphic
disorder and gender dysphoria. 211
b. Philosophical
In this subsection, I attribute the ideology of gender to three philosophical trends that I
expound: anthropological dualism, physicalistic determinism, and existential voluntarism.
Anthropological dualism I connect with Rene Descartes’ “Cogito, ergo sum.”212 Physicalistic
determinism I attribute to British Empiricism. 213 Existential voluntarism I link to Scotus, 214
Schopenhauer, 215 and Nietzsche. 216
c. Theological
Contrary to Enlightenment philosophy, Christian anthropology presumes ontological and
epistemic realism. This subsection articulates Christian anthropology with the presumption that
the human person is a substantial unity of body and soul. 217 At the same time, it avoids
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essentialism, which contends that sexual difference abides in the soul. 218 The illumination of
Catholic medicine, philosophy, and theology informs its objection to the use of the Principle of
Totality or the Principle of Double Effect to justify sex reassignment therapies.
iii. Totality and Double Effect
a. The Principle of Totality and Integrity
Becket Gremmels argues in “Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Catholic Moral
Tradition: Insight from Pope Pius XII on the Principle of Totality,” that one struggling with
gender dysphoria may meet the three criteria for the Principle of Totality and Integrity that Pius
XII proposes to justify sex reassignment surgery. 219 In this subsection, I elucidate Pius XII’s
version of the Principle of Totality and Integrity, 220 and contend with John Brehany that Totality
does not justify sex reassignment surgery. 221
b. Principle of Double Effect
Carol Bayley, in “Transgender Persons and Catholic Healthcare,” argues that the
Principle of Double Effect justifies the use of sex reassignment surgery in persons with gender
dysphoria.222 After articulating the Object of the Act of sex reassignment surgery for gender
dysphoria I demonstrate how it is contrary to Catholic anthropology. It is not merely because sex
reassignment surgery renders the person sterile that Catholic ethicists object to its use, but
because it contradicts the Christian understanding of the sexual human person. The following
section discusses the use of another physically contraceptive procedure.
6B. Non-Contraceptive Benefits of Contraceptives
This section analyzes the ethical use of physically contraceptive methods for noncontraceptive benefits.
i. Clinical Analysis
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a. Intrauterine Devices as a Contraceptive
This subsubsection begins by providing the historical development of intrauterine
devices,223 including stem pessaries, metallic rings, 224 copper intrauterine devices,225 and the
levonorgestrel-releasing intrauterine system, marketed as Mirena ® and manufactured by
Schering-Oy.226
b. Long-Acting Contraceptives
There are two unique long-acting contraceptives available for market in the United
States: implants and depot-medroxyprogesterone (Depo-Provera). 227 In this subsubsection, I
discuss the history and contraceptive mechanism of these two contraceptives.
c. Non-Contraceptive Benefits of Contraceptives
In this subsubsection, I discuss the non-contraceptive side effects of both intrauterine
devices and long-acting contraceptives. In particular, I focus on their use to treat
endometriosis228 and abnormal uterine bleeding.229 Having an awareness of the physical
circumstances of the act, the next subsection explores the Moral Object of the Act of
contraception.
ii. Object
a. Contraception, Casti Cannubii and the Manualist
This subsubsection briefly outlines the historical development of the Church’s precarious
relationship with contraception. 230 In particular, it demonstrates the physicalistic definition of the
Object of the Act according to Jean Pierre Gury, 231 which influences the rejection of
contraception in Pius XI Casti Cannubii.232
b. Proportionalistic Reformation of the Moral Object
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Here I demonstrate the methodological continuity between the manualists and the
proportionalists in such authors as Louis Janssens 233 and Peter Knauer. 234 More precisely, their
physical definition of the Object of the Act.
c. Keeping the Object of the Act in the Genus Naturae
In this subsubsection, I demonstrate how the action theory of Finnis 235 and
Rhonheimer, 236 true to Aquinas, keeps the Object of the Act in the genus moris, which is not
derivable from the genus naturae, thereby avoiding the Naturalistic Fallacy. This is contrary not
only to the action theory of the proportionalists, but Ralph McInerny as well. 237
d. The Object of Contraception
In accord with Aquinas, Rhonheimer contends that Paul VI presumes that the Object of
the Act of contraception is in the genus moris.238 At the same time, insofar as it constitutes an
intrinsically evil act, it violates the norm of Natural Law, the Inseparability Principle. 239 Situating
his definition of the Object of the Act of contraception in the context of virtue, Rhonheimer
describes it as a circumvention of chastity. 240
e. The Object of Using Contraceptives for Non-Contraceptive Benefits
Since the Object of the Act exists on the moral order, not the physical order, one must
take the first-person perspective to determine what the person chooses in using a contraceptive
method. It is possible to formulate a practical syllogism that includes the choice to use a
contraceptive for non-contraceptive benefits. 241 Although using contraceptives for noncontraceptive benefits does not constitute an immoral Object of the Act, it does have at least one
evil consequence—infertility—which necessitates recourse to the Principle of Double Effect.
iii. Principle of Double Effect
a. Thomistic Formulation of Double-Effect Reasoning
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This subsubsection articulates a non-consequentialist formulation of the Principle of
Double Effect. 242 Even if one cannot rule the use of contraceptives for non-contraceptive
benefits, it may still be possible to rule out its use based on the disproportionate evil associated
with such a choice.
b. Intention
The first-person perspective of intention gives clarity not only to the Object of the Act,
but also the ulterior end, that is, the reason why one chooses a particular act. 243 This section
highlights the importance of not only having an ethically sound intention concerning the
proximate end of the act, but also concerning the ulterior end.
c. Proportionality and Abortifacient Risk
Grisez weighs the non-contraceptive benefits of contraceptives against the injustice of
abortifacient activity consequent to an embryo should breakthrough ovulation and conception
occur.244 Although some authors conclude that levonorgestrel-releasing intrauterine systems
definitely do not have abortifacient properties, 245 Edward Furton demonstrates that this debate
remains open. 246 Thus, Grisez concludes that one must have a very serious reason to choose a
contraceptive for non-contraceptive benefits.247 A contraceptive that acts as an abortifacient is
likely disproportionate to the benefit, however, one that does not act as an abortifacient is
proportionate. The two preceding chapters apply the aforementioned moral method for Catholic
health care ethics.
CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSION
This chapter is a brief summary of the implications of the abovementioned theory and
application.
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CHAPTER TWO – NATURAL LAW AND THE MORAL OBJECT
This chapter analyzes the concepts of Natural Law and the Moral Object of the Act that
Aquinas provides a comprehensive and systematic formulation of in his Summa Theologica.
Each section focuses on the scholarship of two contemporary ethicists—John Finnis and Martin
Rhonheimer.
2A: Natural Law
Thomas Aquinas articulates his understanding of Natural Law in the context of his
discussion of law itself, which he identifies as a measure and rule of reason. 1 Unlike the laws of
nature, which constitute a passive participation in the eternal law of God, Natural Law properly
speaking involves an active participation of the human person in formulating norms according to
practical reason. Since the human person formulates the dictates of Natural Law, one must
adequately account for the distinct aspects of human nature, without over or underemphasizing
the physical or spiritual dimension. Thus, an adequate account avoids the pitfalls of either
physicalism or spiritualism.
This section articulates Finnis and Rhonheimer’s interpretation of Aquinas’s Natural Law
avoiding the abovementioned pitfalls. The first subsection describes the various components of
Natural Law. The second addresses the Naturalistic Fallacy, which presumes that the genus
moris derives from the genus naturae. The third subsection highlights the uniquely personal
dimension of Natural Law, without falling into spiritualism. Finally, the last subsection
illustrates the contribution that such a deep understanding of Natural Law makes to the
controversial prohibition of contraception.
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i. Natural Law
For Rhonheimer, it is essential to maintain the distinction between the concrete working
of practical reason and one’s reflection upon it, which constitutes moral philosophy. 2 Natural
Law does not first consist of normative statements that one discovers and then applies to one’s
life.3 Rather, first, on the level of action, one follows precepts in accord with or conceived of by
practical reason. 4 Afterwards, or even in the midst of the whole complex process of acting
through practical reasoning, one may reflect upon this and formulate so-called ought statements. 5
The reflection on the process of practical reasoning is not practical in nature itself, but theoretical
or speculative. 6 At the same time, one may apply the product of one’s theoretical reflection—
which Rhonheimer identifies with the activity of moral philosophy—to practical decision
making.7 In this sense, the prescriptive formulations of moral philosophy become practical
insofar as they guide one’s conscience in practical matters. 8
a. Law
Aquinas discusses Natural Law in the context of law. 9 Law relates to the dictates of
reason.10 In fact, laws are the measure and rule of action.11 Insofar as the word law originates
from ligare, which means to bind, it conveys the notion of compelling action. 12 In other words,
laws govern action. Aquinas relates this concept of reason to human nature, insisting that it
directs one to his or her end or ends.13 Rhonheimer, following Aquinas, understands law to be
the ordering of reason to action. 14 Moreover, Aquinas understands law to be a proposition
(propositio), not however in the theoretical sense, but in the logical sense insofar as it constitutes
a judgment, rather than a statement, therefore, leading to a command or precept (praeceptum).15
In addition, law is not merely a judgment, but also constitutes a dictate of reason (dictamen
rationis).16 Ultimately, for Rhonheimer, the precept of reason is an act of the will expressed not
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in word, but action. 17 Only in reflection on practical reason in act is one able to formulate
theoretically a normative statement in words. 18 For Rhonheimer, it is only with this distinction
between theoretical and practical in mind that one can understand properly Aquinas’s statement:
“the Natural Law is something constituted by reason, just as the propositio is a work of the
reason.” 19 With this important distinction in mind, one avoids the tendency toward spiritualistic
dualism or the Naturalistic Fallacy. 20
Aquinas distinguishes between law that is essential and law that is by participation. 21
Essential law constitutes reason alone, while law by participation is that which the law measures
and rules.22 Put another way, law may be understood from two perspectives: the one ruling and
the one whom the law measures and rules. 23 Law is a work of reason, so strictly speaking,
wherever reason does not exist law does not exist, except by similarity. 24 Therefore, the law of
reason acts upon irrational beings—inanimate and animate—insofar as behavior is in accord with
reason.25 In this sense, they participate in the law.
Having established that law is an ordinance of reason, Aquinas further relates it to the
common good. 26 Just as every part relates to the whole in a body, so all the laws relate to the
common good. 27 For Aquinas, the common good is the common end of humanity, which is
eternal happiness. 28 In addition, legitimate authority must promulgate law.29 Legitimate authority
constitutes one that has the common good of all in mind, whether a single person or a
conglomerate of leaders. 30 Authority must promulgate, that is, make the law known, otherwise it
has no binding force. 31
b. Eternal Law and Natural Law
Natural Law is the eternal law of God written on the heart of each human person. 32
Insofar as legitimate authority promulgates law, God, as the provident ruler of the universe
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governs through the divine reason. 33 The eternal, divine law is not distinct from God, because it
has no other end than God. 34 Insofar as all things have their origin in God, they participate in the
eternal law of God. 35 In other words, all creatures receive the eternal law insofar as the divine
reason is a measure and rule for them.36 Humans, however, participate in the divine law in an
even more excellent way insofar as they have a share in the providential role of God. 37 The
divine law not only measures and rules people like it does for all other creatures, but human
persons also have a role in measuring and ruling.
Finnis explicates Aquinas’s understanding of participatio in his Natural Law and Natural
Rights. 38 Finnis explains that Aquinas means two things: one causality and similarity. 39
Something causes a similar quality in one being when it has that quality in a more excellent and
less dependent way. 40 To illustrate, Finnis explains that humans have intelligence that is far
inferior to what may be understood as a more superior and perfect intelligence in the separate
intellect of God. 41 As light illuminates the act of seeing, so the divine intellect illuminates the
human intellect in understanding. 42 As such, the divine law does not merely measure and rule
humans as it does irrational creatures, but just as God measures and rules creatures according to
the divine law, so humans in a less perfect way measure and rule nature according to Natural
Law, which constitutes a quality of similarity to the divine law and caused by it. 43
c. Self-Evidence of Practical Reason
The first principle of practical reason is like the first principle of metaphysics insofar as it
is self-evident truth. 44 The statement itself suffices to demonstrate that it is true. 45 R. A.
Armstrong in Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching identifies
what Aquinas means by self-evident.46 First, Armstrong outlines Aquinas’s argument in the
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Commentary on the Sentences.47 The self-evident knowledge constitutes a substratum of
knowledge for all subsequent knowledge. 48
In Acts Amid Precepts, Kevin L. Flannery highlights a parallel between the ordering of
theoretical and practical knowledge in Aquinas. 49 Both begin with apprehension: in theoretical
knowing, the person apprehends being, while in practical knowing one apprehends good.50
Aquinas holds that regarding self-evident knowledge a habitus abides within the person. 51 For
speculative knowing, Aquinas calls this intellectus principiorum, while for practical knowing he
calls this synderesis.52 For habitus, Armstrong uses the English word “capacity,” rather than skill
or habit, because humans have this ability in virtue of their nature. 53
While Aquinas insists that these principles or precepts—practical principles for
Flannery—are self-evident, he does not believe that they are innate, in the sense that one can
know them without sensation or memory. 54 To the contrary, one must have both in order to
ascertain these principles or precepts. 55 In De Veritate, Aquinas, using an argument by reductio
ad absurdum, insists that some principles must be permanent and unchanging otherwise nothing
could be known certainly. 56 Moreover, Aquinas insists that there can be no err regarding
synderesis.57
Armstrong indicates that the self-evidence of the first precepts of Natural Law are
analogous to the self-evidence of first principles of demonstration in speculative knowing, which
implies some degree of difference. 58 Aquinas highlights this difference in the Prima Secundae
where he indicates that something may be self-evident in two ways: one, in itself and two, in
relation to us.59 Armstrong and Flannery find the examples illustrative of the difference. 60 What
can be known in relation to us (per se quoad nos) constitutes an analytic proposition insofar as
the predicate is contained in the subject.61 Put another way, so long as one understands the terms,
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the truth of the statement is undeniably true. For example, the statement: “every whole is greater
than its parts,” is knowable by all and constitutes an analytic statement known per se quoad
nos.62
Germain Grisez in “The First Principles of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the
Summa theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2,” insists that the dichotomous distinction between
analytic and synthetic originating with Kant have no meaning for Aquinas. 63 Rather, Aquinas
understands the subject and predicate as complementary elements of unified knowledge of a
single knowable reality. 64 Put another way, the intelligibility of the predicate belongs to that of
the subject.65 Grisez understands intelligibility to be all that is included in a word used
correctly.66 Suffice it to say that for Aquinas, self-evident principles are not mere tautologies,
that is, restatements of what is already given. 67
Unlike the first set of self-evident principles that are knowable and undeniable to all so
long as one understands the definition of the terms, the second set of self-evident principles are
knowable only to a few—self-evident in itself (per se secundum se).68 In this class of self-evident
principles, the terms are more complex, but so long as one understands the terms, their truth also
becomes self-evident. To illustrate, Aquinas uses the example of “man is a rational animal.” 69
Not everyone knows the truth of the proposition, because not everyone knows that the very
meaning of man entails rational being, however, if one does know the definition of man, one
knows the truth of the proposition. 70
The principle of non-contradiction and the first principle of Natural Law are
foundational, but not in the sense that one may deduce more particular principles or precepts
from them as though they were general premises. 71 Rather, both constitute directive principles
insofar as one must formulate more particular principles and precepts in accord with them. 72
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Finnis relates the concept of the self-evidence of principles or precepts of Natural Law to
the rationality of the notion that any state of affairs may exist without further explanation. 73
Contrary to rationalists of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Finnis insists that it is
possible for a state of affairs to exist that has no further explanation for its existence outside of
itself.74 This he identifies as an uncaused cause. 75 More precisely, it is not to say that this entity
has no explanation, but that its explanation is itself. 76
For Finnis the self-evidence of practical principles means that they are indemonstrable,
and un-inferable.77 The principles of practical reasoning do not stand in need of demonstration. 78
Moreover, their validity is not a matter of convention or inferring from observation; rather, it is
objective.79 While it is possible to deny them, it is not possible to be reasonable and deny them. 80
Contrary to the modern criteria, feelings of certitude do not validate these truths. 81 Although
understanding a principle of practical reason is not like understanding a principle of logic or
mathematics, it is no less true. 82
d. Happiness, Natural Inclinations, and Reason
In The Perspective of Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics,
Rhonheimer highlights the difference between an authentic eudemonistic ethic and one that only
seems oriented toward happiness, but really constitutes hedonism.83 Both ethical theorists argue
that happiness is the end or goal of action; however, hedonism not only defines happiness more
basely as a state of contentment, but also understands this as the motive for action. 84 Rhonheimer
recalls Augustine’s warning not to follow God for a reward, because God is the reward. 85
Rhonheimer is most critical of Kant who ultimately advocates for hedonism, understanding God
as a divine giver of pleasure, but not in this world; therefore, he evacuates all happiness as a
motive for action in this life basing all morality on duty. 86 While one may understand happiness
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as the ultimate end of action, this never constitutes the motive for concrete acting. 87 Rather, the
good, which practical reason formulates as good to be done, motivates concrete action. 88 It is
only in this sense that one may say that the will strives for happiness. 89
For Rhonheimer, practical reason not only constitutes striving for happiness, but also “is
the reasoning that cognitively directs intentional action.” 90 Put another way, practical reasoning
concerns the person’s intending of means and ends in action. 91 Rhonheimer asserts that action is
a phenomenon of appetition. 92 Individuals act because they are seeking or striving for a good. 93
Moreover these inclinations toward the good correspond to one’s substantial form. 94 The
substantial form of human beings is a rational soul; therefore, human appetition or striving
corresponds to the rational soul. 95 For humans the soul consists of the two faculties of the
intellect and will. Accordingly, Rhonheimer explains that willing is an appetition guided by
reason.96
For Aristotle, happiness, as the ultimate goal, constitutes what one rationally wills for its
own sake.97 This end does not take the form of a goal for the sake of which, but a goal through
which.98 In other words, it is an activity that is unique to rational humans. 99 This activity is also
the activity, which the virtuous person delights in the most. 100 Aristotle identifies this with life
according to the intellect; at the highest level a life of contemplation; and at the next level a life
lived according to virtue, according to reason. 101
Aquinas discusses natural inclinations in relationship to the classes of forms: 1) purely
natural appetites constituting inanimate beings such as plants; 2) sensitive appetites
corresponding to animate beings such as animals; and 3) rational appetites, such as humans. 102
Moreover, each class of beings corresponds with a type of apprehension or knowledge of the
good. Beings with natural appetites merely tend toward the good with no apprehension of it
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whatsoever. 103 Beings with sensitive appetites apprehend the good only in particular things, but
not in a general sense. 104 Finally, rational beings such as humans apprehend the good not only in
particular things, but also in a general sense, as in universals. 105 Moreover, the rational
apprehension of the good is intentional. 106
To each of these classes corresponds a degree of necessity regarding action. Inanimate
beings follow natural inclinations of necessity. 107 Animate beings follow natural inclinations
when they perceive objects of desire as useful. 108 And rational beings only desire the good in
general by necessity, but not with necessity any particular good, enabling one to freely choose a
particular good among options. 109
The good to which natural inclinations tend corresponds to the end of the being in
question.110 Aquinas adapts Aristotle’s ‘ergon argument’ to make his point that the good for
each being corresponds to the substantial form of the being in question. 111 The ‘ergon argument,’
which I discuss in greater detail in the following subsection, determines that the primary function
or activity of humans consists in the use of reason. 112 Rhonheimer recalls that action is an agent
of appetition or striving for an object that is good. 113
Reason formulates every human act, regardless of the origin of the desire—whether
natural, sensitive, or rational. 114 Germain Grisez understands Aquinas’s explanation for the
diversity of Natural Law precepts to be precisely due to “the different inclinations objects,
viewed by reason as ends for rationally guided efforts.” 115 While inclinations, which originate
from nature play an important role as raw datum, they themselves do not constitute the Natural
Law.116 This corresponds with the dictum that laws of nature do not constitute Natural Law. 117
Grisez explains that the tendencies of natural inclinations provide reason with the beginnings of
proposed ends. 118 The precepts that conform inclinations in action constitute the Natural Law. 119
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Just as it is impossible for reason to err regarding synderesis, so it is impossible for
reason to err regarding its judgment of the good. 120 Saying that reason does not err, does not
mean that people do not make mistakes, but that mistakes are not attributable to failure of the
intellect’s perception of good, which subsequently measures action. 121 In the De Anima, Aristotle
holds that since err is not attributable to the intellect with regard to reason, it must reside in
appetition or imagination. 122 In addition, false opinions, emotions or passions, and the will may
disturb reason. 123 Sin occurs when these other factors inhibit reason’s measure of good and bad
in action.124 Put another way, one sins when the lower, nonrational appetitions dominate the
appetition of reason. 125 Ultimately, this is because the freedom of reason “guarantees the an
encounter with the good for man qua man.” 126
As a faculty, Rhonheimer explains that the will, not already rational by itself, pursues
what the judgment of reason presents to it. 127 Contrary to Kant’s formulation of the will, it is not
pure spontaneity; rather, reason thoroughly determines it. 128 Insofar as reason is able to reflect
upon its own judgments, thereby becoming the object of an act of judgment, it is free. 129 It can
have multiple conceptions of the good. 130 This Rhonheimer identifies as freedom of
specification, which constitutes a freedom of the will due to reason. 131
However, the will may also be free in execution; that is, choosing or not choosing means
that are in concert with one’s goal or intention. 132 Freedom of execution is the source of freedom
of choice.133 If one does not want to do something, it does not happen.134 Ultimately, reason
alone does not suffice as a motivating principle for action; the will can pursue other motivating
factors, such as feelings, or pure self-willing.135

e. Principles of Natural Law and Basic Human Goods
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Each principle of Natural Law corresponds to the natural inclinations in humans, which
corresponds to all three of the above-mentioned classes of inclinations. 136 While the principles of
Natural Law are not the inclinations themselves, they are nonetheless “an ordering of the reason
in relation to or in the natural inclinations,” taking the form of a practical judgment ‘p is
good.’ 137 Finnis indicates that the principles of Natural Law are not moral judgments, but the
substratum for moral judgments. 138 Moreover, Natural Law concerns the acts of practical
understanding in which one grasps the basic values of human existence. 139
Finnis understands the good not as a desirable objective, but as a form of good with an
indefinite number of means or occasions for one to participate in or realize, which he uses value
to identify.140 As such, unless one engages in reflection on the presuppositions of one’s practical
reasoning, one is not likely to formulate these principles in one’s arguments concerning
particular goods. 141 Again, the self-evidence of these principles means not only that they are
indemonstrably true, but also that they stand in no need of justification. 142 These principles are
not derivable or inferable. 143
Armstrong relates the principles of practical reason to human inclinations,144 while Finnis
relates it to basic human values. 145 To the first natural human inclination is that of selfpreservation, which Armstrong formulates as: although a hierarchy of life exists, one ought to
respect and preserve human life and where possible other life as well. 146 This, Aquinas argues is
self-evident in itself, but not to all. 147 Finnis correlates the principle of self-preservation with the
basic human value of life. 148
The second basic human inclination, shared by other animals is the inclination to sexual
union and the rearing of offspring. 149 Armstrong following Maritain, insists that certain
limitations must exist for sexual union, considering how special a place it has in engendering
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children.150 In addition, the family group ought to comply with a particular pattern. 151 Finnis
relates this principle to life also. 152 At the same time, he recognizes that the education and rearing
of children includes other basic human values, such as sociability and truth. 153
The third basic human inclination corresponds with rational nature. 154 This, according to
Aquinas, involves the inclination for relationship with God and to live in society. 155 Insofar as
humans need assistance from other people to exist, the principle to live in society following
certain rules and prohibitions is self-evident.156 For Finnis, this corresponds to the basic human
value of knowledge. 157 In so far as this inclination extends to sociability and religion, it
corresponds to these goods as well. 158 In addition, the rational inclination relates to the basic
human values of play, practical reasonableness, and the aesthetic experience. 159
Having introduced the concept of Natural Law, the following subsection highlights the
importance of avoiding the critical error of the Naturalistic Fallacy.
ii. Naturalistic Fallacy and Natural Law
The concept of the Naturalistic Fallacy originates with G. E. Moore in Principia Ethica,
in which he argues that the moral good is not merely a conglomeration of physical goods. 160 He
builds on the concept from David Hume that an ‘ought statement’ never derives from an ‘is
statement.’ 161 Unfortunately, Hume throws the baby out with the bath water, further insisting that
morality has nothing to do with reason; instead, insisting that it depends on moral sense or
feeling.162 While both Rhonheimer and Finnis concur with Hume that ‘ought statements’ do not
derive from ‘is statements,’ they do not agree that this means that ethics is unreasonable. 163 In
fact, this merely demonstrates the underivability of ethics from metaphysics.

a. Ergon Argument
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In Fundamentals of Ethics, John Finnis argues that Aristotle and Aquinas would agree
with his thesis that reasoning concerning human goods is primarily practical, not theoretical. 164
He offers four reasons why they are often misunderstood as proposing that practical knowledge
is derivative of theoretical. 165 One, Aristotle seeks a holistic explanation of biology with
cosmology. 166 Two, Aquinas utilizes analogies between different natures to elucidate
concepts.167 Three, interpreters of Aristotle and Aquinas often over-simplify concepts in an effort
to systematize. 168 Four, Finnis takes issue with Aristotle’s so-called ‘ergon argument,’ which
translates as function or activity that is proper to humans. 169
In the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle argues that the unique function of
humans is the activity of the soul in accord with reason, therefore, a good person acts in accord
with reason.170 Aristotle argues that just as with a flute player or sculptor the good resides with
the function, so the good of humans must reside in their function. 171 Of course, humans share
several functions with other organisms, such as, growth and sensation; however, the function that
typifies human beings must be unique to them. 172 For Aristotle, a rational principle characterizes
human activity. 173 In particular, it constitutes a function of the soul. Above all, for Aristotle, what
sets humanity apart is its activity in conformity with reason.
Finnis insists that since this argument is theoretical, not practical in nature it contributes
nothing substantial to Aristotle’s ethics. 174 Moreover, because of this, Finnis argues that it is not
only uncharacteristic of Aristotle, but does not properly belong to his ethics. 175 Furthermore, it
contributes to the mistaken notion that ethics derives from physics and metaphysics. 176 Once
again, Finnis holds that practical knowledge does not derive from theoretical knowledge. 177
Insofar as the genus moris and the genus naturae differ, one’s grasp of the good in practical
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reasoning—constitutive of the genus moris—does not depend on or derive from the genus
naturae.
Ralph McInerny178 and Rhonheimer 179 both take issue with Finnis’s dismissal of
Aristotle’s function argument. McInerny disagrees with Finnis’s argument that practical
knowledge is radically independent of theoretical knowledge. 180 He reasons that since there is
one intellect that knows both speculatively and practically (by extension)—knowing being
speculatively before knowing the good practically—practical knowing depends on speculative
knowing.181 Indeed, for him, practical knowing constitutes the knowing of a good being. 182 In
other words, for one to judge that ‘X is good for me,’ one must know what X is. 183 Consequently,
for McInerny, practical knowledge does derive from speculative knowledge. 184
Rhonheimer agrees with McInerny that Finnis should not discount the significance of
Aristotle’s ‘ergon argument’ for ethics, but he does not think that this is because practical
knowledge derives from speculative knowledge. 185 For Rhonheimer, McInerny fails to
distinguish between the initial grasp of first principles and the subsequent reflection upon action,
which is substantially speculative. 186 For Rhonheimer this is the content of moral philosophy,
which gives rise to normative statements. 187
For Rhonheimer, it is essential to maintain the distinction between theoretical knowledge
and practical knowledge, because their founding principles are unique. 188 The object of practical
knowledge is the good and constitutes the Natural Law. 189 However, one’s reflection upon the
act of practical reasoning is descriptive, also called theoretical. It is only in the latter that one
discovers the Natural Law, which Rhonheimer identifies as moral philosophy. 190 It is precisely
by reflecting on the practical knowing that one derives normative statements or commands. 191
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Although this appears to contradict what Rhonheimer says above, namely that ‘ought
statements’ do not derive from ‘is statements’; it does not, because for Rhonheimer, one is
observing human reason in action. 192 In other words, moral philosophy is not merely a social
science experiment or survey, but reflection on how the human person uses reason to act. Since
one does not merely observe how one acts, but maintains the connection to practical reason, the
commands that one formulates remain constitutive to practical reasoning. 193
Finnis and McInerny presume that the ‘ergon argument’ attempts to justify the foundation
of practical reasoning through speculative knowledge. Consequently, Finnis rejects the argument
altogether,194 while McInerny subscribes to it as a confirmation of his presumption that practical
knowledge does derive from speculative knowledge. 195 While Rhonheimer agrees with McInerny
that Finnis should not reject the ‘ergon argument’ altogether, he does not agree with McInerny’s
interpretation and conclusion. 196 Rhonheimer understands McInerny to be rejecting a red herring
insofar as McInerny creates or presumes a dilemma that does not really exist.197
In Praktische Vernunft und Vernunftigkeit der Praxis: Handlungstheorie bei Thomas von
Aquin in Ihrer Entstehung aus dem Problemkontext der Aristotelischen Ethik, Rhonheimer
explains that Finnis fails to see that the ‘ergon argument’ relates to ethical reflection, not
practical reasoning. 198 Therefore, while the argument does nothing for the foundation of practical
reasoning, it is indispensable for a metaphysical-anthropological interpretation and justification
of the normative function of practical reason. 199 Rhonheimer not only rejects McInerny’s
conclusion that practical knowledge derives from speculative knowledge, he also insists that
practical knowledge plays an essential role in elucidating human nature; in fact, one that cannot
be merely chalked up to ethical reflection, that is speculative. 200
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b. Essentialist Understanding of Morality
Rhonheimer rejects what he calls an essentialist understanding of morality, of which
Heinrich Rommen, 201 Joseph Pieper, 202 Ralph McInerny, 203 Steven Jensen, 204 R. Hittinger, 205 and
Steven A. Long206 are leading proponents. 207 Such proponents conflate metaphysics with
morality insofar as they insist that actions perfect being. 208 Although ethicists often attribute this
to Aquinas, Rhonheimer insists that this is not what Aquinas proposes. 209 Above all, for
Rhonheimer, such a theory poses an epistemic contradiction: it is impossible to know what to do
until one has perfected one’s being through action. 210
Essentialists fail to recognize an important distinction in Aquinas between moral being
(esse morale) and essential being (esse essentiale), which he discusses in De Veritate.211 For
Aquinas moral goodness constitutes the perfection of moral being, not essential being. 212
Aquinas insists that creatures cannot fail to be good with regard to essential goodness, but when
it comes to accidental goodness, it may or may not be good, by participation. 213 Being is good in
its essence insofar as it exists.214 However, with the exception of God, who is good in the
absolute sense, creatures are morally good insofar as they participate in goodness in an
accidental sense, that is, insofar as this goodness is super-added to the essential goodness of the
individual.215 Put another way, creatures are morally good in relation to the one who is goodness
itself, that is, God. 216 Rhonheimer asserts that any attempt to ground morality in natural teleology
is caught in a vicious circle. 217
Essentialism relates to another misconception held by proportionalists that moral evil
merely constitutes the causing of physical evil. 218 This is the position held by proportionalists
such as Peter Knauer, 219 Josef Fuchs,220 Louis Janssens, 221 Bruno Schuller, 222 and Richard
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McCormick.223 Janssens, for instance, in “Ontic Evil and Moral Evil,” maintains that one
commits moral evil whenever one causes ontic evil in the world. 224 Following this understanding
of moral evil, both Knauer and Janssens evacuate the Moral Object of its intentional content and
reduce it to the material component of action. 225
Therefore, in one sense, proportionalists make the same mistake of essentialists, insofar
as they constitute moral evil as the causing of physical evil. Once again, they fail to maintain the
important distinction between orders of the genus naturae versus the genus moris. For the
proportionalists, however, the moral is not merely derivative of the ontological, but
constitutively the same. Ironically, this relative equivocation gives rise to a radical dualism that
centers on the person. Since the Moral Object is materially constituted, morality centers on the
intention as ends, without regard for the intentional content of the Moral Object. Moreover, as
the next subsection highlights, proportionalist morality is eventistic, rather than personalistic,
focusing more on consequences than the deliberate will.
iii. Natural Law and the Perspective of the Acting Person
a. The Primacy of the First-Person Perspective
In “The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity,”
Rhonheimer explains the dualistic fallacy as a deficient understanding of the Natural Law that
presumes a dichotomy between the natural order (objective) and reason (subjective). 226
Accordingly, the Natural Law consists of a pre-packaged normative statement in nature, which
the soul simply identifies. 227 Put another way, the Natural Law simply consists of a law of nature
that one identifies. In contrast, Rhonheimer insists that Natural Law is primarily subjective since
it originates within the person and constitutes the openness of the subject to true moral
goodness.228 The whole process whereby one knows the good—to be pursued—and evil—to be
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avoided—itself constitutes practical reason and is part of human nature. As such, it is impossible
to know human nature before one knows the good through practical reason, which is a
constitutive part of human nature itself. Consequently, for Rhonheimer, ethics and the Natural
Law do not begin with human nature; rather, one knows human nature insofar as one knows the
good through practical reason. 229
One advantage to establishing the Natural Law on human nature is that it provides an
objective foundation that does not vacillate, as a subjective foundation seems to do, at least from
a modern perspective. 230 Both Pope Leo XIII and Pope John Paul II avoid this whimsical basis
by connecting it to God through the eternal law. 231 Insofar as God creates rational beings and
implants the light of reason within their heart, the Natural Law is the eternal law that guides
humans to their ends, formulated by human reason. 232 Not only is the Natural Law a reflection of
the divine law, but also human autonomy is a participation in the divine autonomy, which
Rhonheimer calls theonomy: “participation and self-possession of the eternal law.” 233 For
Rhonheimer, the participatory nature of the Natural Law in the eternal law may provide
motivation for following its dictates, especially in difficult circumstances. 234 Insofar as the
eternal law is immutable, the Natural Law’s connection to the former provides an unequivocal
foundation, and though subjective it remains unwavering.
Much criticism against Rhonheimer centers on the role of inclinations in relationship to
human reason. In fact, critics often accuse him of connecting reason too closely to
inclinations,235 falling victim of physicalism or so disjoining reason from the inclinations that he
commits spiritualism. 236 Jean Porter accuses Rhonheimer of the latter critique in “Review of
Natural Law and Practical Reason by Martin Rhonheimer,” 237 to which Rhonheimer responds in
“The Moral Significance of Pre-Rational Nature in Aquinas: a Reply to Jean Porter (and Stanley
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Hauerwas).”238 Essentially, Rhonheimer avoids both physicalism and spiritualism by rooting the
acts of practical reason in the person as a substantial unity of body and soul rather than in either
the body or the soul. 239
Rhonheimer rejects the notion that human persons are embodied souls, because such
terminology implies a Cartesian dualism—the soul, equivalent to the person being trapped in the
body.240 Instead, Rhonheimer reaffirms Boethius’s definition of the human person as a rational
animal.241 Accordingly, the body contributes natural inclinations with proper goods and ends like
its irrational counterparts. Moreover, these inclinations too participate in and reflect the eternal
law, but in a passive, rather than active way. 242 Natural inclinations follow an order determined
by nature with proper operations and goals. 243 Natural law presupposes that natural inclinations
follow the natural order. 244 The natural inclinations become properly human through the
regulation of practical reason, which takes a uniquely active role in ordering goods and ends in
accord with the eternal law. 245
Rhonheimer highlights three important points that Aquinas makes regarding the Natural
Law.246 First, as a work of practical reason, Natural Law does not derive from speculative
reason, which, as in the first principle of practical reason, the underivability of the practical
copulas of—prosecutio or fugo—from the theoretical copulas—is or is not—demonstrates. 247
Second, the person, using the intellect in extension, spontaneously understands the ends and
goods of natural inclinations, and according to practical reason formulates practical precepts,
which constitute Natural Law. 248 Third, insofar as the human person as a substantial unity of
body and soul regulates these goods and ends of natural inclinations, they constitute Natural
Law.249
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Rhonheimer avoids the pitfalls of physicalism or spiritualism by placing the role of active
agent not in the faculties of the soul or the body, but the human person, who constitutes a
substantial unity of both. The human person utilizes the unique components of his or her one
nature—body and soul—to formulate the Natural Law.
b. First-Person Perspective of Natural Law in Veritatis Splendor
John Paul II, following Aquinas, understands the Natural Law to be a divine light of
reason, which God imprints on humanity in creation. 250 This reason, which promulgates the
Natural Law, is not merely part of irrational nature, but distinctly part of human nature. 251
Humans do not merely read off the divine law immanently written on the human heart; rather,
they have an active participation in the ordering function of the divine reason. 252 In other words,
God does not formulate and promulgate it, but human reason does. 253 God does not externally
impose the Natural Law; rather, insofar as humans use reason to formulate the dictates of reason,
it is uniquely autonomous and internal. 254 Humans, created in the image of God, are uniquely
free and rational, which enables them to discern between good and evil. 255
At the same time that both Rhonheimer and John Paul II emphasize the role of human
reason in formulating and promulgating Natural Law, they also hold that individuals do not do so
with absolute freedom. 256 John Paul II, in accord with Leo XIII, understands the Natural Law to
be a mirror of a higher divine reason. 257 Again, the Natural Law is the divine law implanted
within rational beings inclining them to right action. 258 Of course, people remain free to conform
themselves to this law or not. Because it originates with the divine, Rhonheimer understands
human autonomy to be a participated theonomy; formulating Natural Law according to human
reason that God infuses. 259
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John Paul II rejects dualistic understandings of the human person including both
spiritualism and physicalism that emphasize the spiritual or corporal aspect of humanity over the
other, respectively. 260 The previous subsection demonstrates how important it is to avoid a
naturalistic understanding of Natural Law and the human person. In “The Moral Signficance of
Pre-Rational Nature in Aquinas: A Reply to Jean Porter (and Stanley Hauerwas),” Rhonheimer
not only explicitly denies that his theory is spiritualistic, but also shows the defects of such a
theory.261 For John Paul II, humans are by nature body and soul.262 The soul constitutes the
source of unity as the human form, but it is not exclusively the human person. 263 Nor is the body
raw matter for the soul to form. 264 Rhonheimer insists that one’s corporality ought not to oppose
one’s rational will as though the former is nature and the latter reason, rather, human nature
constitutes a substantial unity of being that is both body and soul. 265
Thus human morality pertains to both the bodily and spiritual dimensions of the human
person.266 Rhonheimer illustrates using the marital act. 267 The body provides sexual attraction
between the sexes that serves procreation, which human reason naturally receives. 268 The light of
reason reveals the marital act as love and communion between two persons making a gift of self
to the other for transmission of life. 269
Insofar as the human person is a substantial unity of body and soul, both contribute to
human morality. 270 The body contributes natural inclinations that the soul regulates using human
reason.271 Of course, the soul contributes inclinations to the good as well. 272 To the extent that
reason regulates these inclinations—of the body or the soul—they constitute Natural Law. 273
Since the intellect, a faculty of the soul formulates these dictates of reason, an outside observer
cannot see this; rather, one must have the perspective of the person. 274 Rhonheimer reminds the
reader that the formulation of Natural Law is properly a reflexive act of the soul. 275 Therefore,
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following Lehu and John Paul II, Rhonheimer insists that one does not know Natural Law
through human nature, but one does come to know human nature through the Natural Law. 276
The next subsection demonstrates the value of a personalistic conception of Natural Law.
iv. Contraception and Natural Law
The search for an explanation for the immorality of contraception in the twentieth century
is a catalyst for a deeper understanding of the Natural Law. The material and superficial rejection
of contraception on the basis that condoms—and other contraceptives—physically interrupt the
natural process of the marital act, thereby preventing the possibility of conception does not
account for anovulants as contraception. 277 Put another way, the physical act of preventing
conception does not provide sufficient grounds for deriving a proscription against the act of
contraception. Pope Paul VI’s bases his prohibition of contraception on two important principles:
1) The Inseparability Principle and 2) responsible parenthood. Before articulating how
Rhonheimer explains the role of Natural Law that avoids both physicalism and spiritualism, I
highlight an important distinction between contraception and licit birth control. 278
In Humanae Vitae, Paul VI prohibits “any action which either before, at the moment of,
or after sexual intercourse, is specifically intended to prevent procreation—whether as an end or
as a means.”279 This exclusion does not make any specific reference to the method, but rather to
intention. Rhonheimer rejects the terminological distinction between artificial contraception and
so-called natural methods of contraception, because Paul VI declares contraception immoral,
that is, the intention of preventing conception. 280 This does not mean that he rejects responsible
parenthood, which sometimes involves couples abstaining from the marital act as a means of
avoiding pregnancy. To the contrary, as the following demonstrates, both Paul VI and
Rhonheimer, assert that periodic continence, unlike contraception, respects and maintains the
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inseparability of the procreative and unitive significance of the marital act, and provides a means
for growth in chastity. 281
a. Inseparability Principle
To understand the immorality of contraception, one must understand the good and end
that it contradicts. In particular, Rhonheimer connects it to the precept of Natural Law relating to
the marital act. 282 For the sake of analysis he distinguishes between the spiritual and bodily
contributions to human nature, beginning with the bodily, natural inclination common to other
animals for male and female to join for the transmission of life. 283 The connection of the soul to
the human person—substantial unity—raises the physical act of copulation arising from the
natural inclination to a new level when reason regulates it and it occurs between husband and
wife, which Rhonheimer identifies as married love. 284 He insists that one resist the temptation to
neglect the role of the body, since doing so implies an anthropology that incarnates the soul
within the body as though the two are different natures. 285 This is spiritualism, which neglects
the contribution that natural, bodily inclinations, ordered by nature, have for morality. 286
The Church distinguishes between two goods of marriage: the unitive and procreative. 287
The unitive significance includes the fidelity to total self-giving manifest in conjugal love. 288 The
procreative significance, which invariably connects with the unitive significance, manifest in the
conjugal act, reflects one’s openness to fecundity. 289 As such, the object of marital act includes
both significances. Rhonheimer identifies it as the loving bodily union of husband and wife,
which necessarily includes its procreative character.290 The inseparable connection between the
unitive and procreative significance of the marital act, which Paul VI highlights in Humanae
Vitae constitutes the Inseparability Principle. 291
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Paul VI holds that each and every conjugal embrace must remain open to both
significances. 292 Rhonheimer distinguishes between function and meaning insisting that although
one may not be functionally able to reproduce because of sterility or periodic incontinence, one
ought nonetheless be open in meaning or, better said, in will to fruitfulness. 293 In Man and
Woman He Created Them, John Paul II argues that the body speaks a language in truth that is
reread each time a couple engages in the conjugal act. 294 The truth spoken by the body in the
conjugal act refers to its innermost structure, which includes the inseparable connection between
the unitive and procreative meanings. 295 Rhonheimer insists that referral to the inseparability
principle is not sufficient to explain why each and every marital embrace must remain open to
procreation, because it does not include the object of contraception. 296 To explain, Rhonheimer
has recourse to the virtue of chastity, which the Moral Object of contraception contradicts. 297
b. Responsible Parenthood and Chastity
Reason makes the inclination toward bodily union in the marital act human. 298 Insofar as
it constitutes an act touched by reason, it is a truly personal act. Reason is the measure and rule
of the natural inclination to husband and wife joining in the marital embrace, which makes the
act both human and personal. 299 Rhonheimer identifies the ordering of reason with responsible
parenthood, which he relates to both the virtue of justice and chastity. 300 In particular, he focuses
on the role that chastity, as an ordering virtue of sexual inclinations, plays for responsible
parenthood.301 Following Paul VI in Humanae Vitae,302 Rhonheimer argues that responsible
parenthood necessitates periodic continence, which provides married couples means of growth in
chastity, that is, the integration of sexual drives to the order of personal love. 303 Contraception
not only denies the procreative significance of the marital act, thereby denying its unitive
significance, because of the Inseparability Principle, but it also robs the couple of a means to
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growth in chastity, since it enables them to engage in the marital act without regard for the
procreative consequences. 304 Without the rational ordering that responsible parenthood places on
sexual drives, the marital act loses its connection to what makes it an authentically human act of
love oriented to one’s spouse. 305 Consequently, contraception disrupts both the procreative and
unitive significance of the marital act. This also accords with John Paul II’s interpretation. 306
Rhonheimer’s articulation of contraception eschews physicalism and spiritualism
defining it as a vice that counters chastity. He shows that the natural, bodily inclination to sexual
union contributes to morality and that practical reason regulates sexual desire with an orientation
to responsible parenthood, that invariably relates to personal love, which a proper ordering of
desire presumes.
This section demonstrates that an accurate account of Natural Law includes an adequate
understanding of anthropology that avoids the pitfalls of physicalism and spiritualism, which
ethicists that derive Natural Law from the physical order cannot avoid. The next section analyzes
the related concept of the Moral Object of the Act.
2B. Moral Object
John Paul II, in Veritatis Splendor, rejects the teleological interpretation of action of
consequentialism and proportionalism, while reaffirming the longstanding concept of the Moral
Object attributable to Thomas Aquinas. 307 Not excluding the role that intention—as ulterior
end—and circumstances play in determining the morality of human acts, John Paul II maintains
the primary and fundamental role that the Moral Object as rationally chosen by a deliberate will
plays in determining the morality of human acts. 308 John Paul II also retains the existence of
intrinsically evil acts, a concept that teleological theorists eliminate. 309 His defense of the Moral
Object and intrinsically evil acts sparks renewed interest in Aquinas’s understanding of action. 310
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In this section, I explicate the object of the act in the context of Aquinas’s complex virtue
theory concerning action. Then, I demonstrate the erroneous understanding of the Moral Object
of the manualists and proportionalists. One implication of the Naturalistic Fallacy is that one
considers morality from the third-person perspective, rather than a first-person perspective. The
third subsection not only illustrates the deficiency of the third-person perspective, but elucidates
John Paul II’s restoration of the first-person perspective regarding the object in Veritatis
Splendor. The final subsection addresses the topic of contraception that is a sticking point for the
controversy regarding the Moral Object and intrinsically evil acts.
i. Aquinas’s Action Theory
In the following, I articulate Aquinas’s understanding of the Moral Object. First, I situate
his discussion in the context of the debate on the role of intentions in relationship to action
according to Peter Abelard and Peter Lombard. Then, I follow John Finnis’s interpretation of
Aquinas’s meticulous situating of intention within the person. 311
a. Intrinsically Evil Acts
Servais Pinckaers, in “A Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts,” articulates
Aquinas’s development of Peter Abelard and Peter Lombard’s use of intention vis-à-vis
intrinsically evil acts. 312 Although intrinsece malum does not appear in expression before the
sixteenth century, the concept of deeds being evil in themselves originates in Scripture and
Augustine explicates it in his De mendacio and Contra mendacium ad consentium.313 Against the
legalism of his day that focuses merely on the external act or the desires to commit sin, Abelard
attempts a retrieval of Augustine’s morality rooted in reason and will. 314 Abelard places the
source of evil solely in the intention of the agent; that is, his or her voluntary consent to a desire
or action.315 In other words, for Abelard, the evil of an action is neither in the desire to commit
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an evil act, nor in the performance of it, rather, it resides in the agent’s intention. Pinckaers
indicates that the main thrust of Abelard’s theory is positive, to reposition the focus of morality
on intention and consent, however, the downside is that it eliminates any consideration of
external action and desire for morality. 316 Although this does not seem to be Abelard’s intention,
his theory, in principle, excludes the possibility of intrinsically evil acts. 317
In distinction 40 of the second book of his Sentences, Peter Lombard addresses the
question of intention and its relationship to external acts. 318 First, he restates Abelard’s position
that external works are neither good nor evil except insofar as an agent intents them as such. 319
Then, Lombard presents the counter-position that some works are good or evil regardless of the
intention of the agent. 320 Lombard offers a via media following Augustine’s direction in Contra
mendacium ad consentium.321 Augustine holds that some acts are good or evil depending on their
causa or reason, for instance a couple engaging in the marital act to conceive children, or to give
food to the poor. 322 So long as one does these acts for a good reason, they are good; however,
should one do them for a bad reason, they are bad. For example, it is not good to give to the poor
in order to look good; this is vanity. 323 However, for Augustine, some acts are evil in themselves:
theft, fornication, and blasphemy; and one may never do these even for a good reason. 324 To
illustrate, Augustine forbids one to steal from the rich to feed the poor. 325
b. Intention to Action
Arguably no one reflects deeper on the inner workings of the person concerning action
than Aquinas.326 Finnis indicates that many philosophers and theologians misunderstand his
action theory, which in turn, leads to erroneous implications. 327 In Aquinas: Moral, Political and
Legal Theory (Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought), Finnis meticulously follows
Aquinas’s articulation of his action theory from the internal perspective, which comes from
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questions 11-20 of the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologica.328 Understanding Aquinas’s
action theory is essential to understanding the Moral Object.
Just like the Church Fathers, Aquinas reorients ethics from a legalistic reduction of
external acts to its original purpose: virtue and beatitude. 329 Moreover, like Abelard and
Lombard, intention has a central role. Intentions concern the movement of the will to ends. 330 To
be sure, many ends may motivate or move people to act, but Aquinas denies any infinite
regresses, 331 insisting instead that the ultimate end for humanity is beatitude or contemplation of
the Divine Essence. 332 Regarding ends, Aquinas distinguishes between the order of intention and
the order of execution. 333 What is first in the order of intention is last in the order of execution. 334
Thus, some end inclines the will to execute action. The end begins by motivating to action and
concludes in execution. To illustrate, the experience of hunger and the past experience of
satisfaction by eating, may motivate one to eat this cantaloupe here and now. On the order of
intention, the satiation by eating constitutes an end. On the order of execution, the satiation of
one’s hunger by eating a cantaloupe constitutes the end, and the final achievement—fruitio.335
Aquinas’s action theory concerns all the intervening steps beginning with an end on the order of
intention and concluding with an action on the order of execution.
According to Finnis, for Aquinas, intention (intentio) and choice (electio) are the central
acts of the will. 336 Properly speaking, choice concerns means for accomplishing ends, while
intention concerns ends. 337 For example, if one intends to stay warm during the winter, one must
heat the house and different means exist by which one may choose to achieve the end of heating
one’s house: burning wood, electricity, or gas. The ability to conceive of means to achieve one’s
end is practical understanding (intellectus practicus).338 The ability to relate various benefits to
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each other and make a judgment about the value of one over another is practical reason (ratio
practica).339 Therefore, practical decision-making involves the will and intellect.
Rhonheimer understands Aquinas to assert that the intellect, which ordinarily acts
theoretically, perceiving and judging the world according to the speculative order of knowing,
acts in extension (extensio) during practical reasoning. 340 One way of distinguishing theoretical
from practical is by the type of syllogism or mode of reasoning that one uses. Theoretical
syllogisms only lead to theoretical conclusions that do not entail action. 341 For instance, one may
conclude that since one cat has four legs, all cats have four legs. Practical syllogisms, on the
other hand, consist of practical premises that give rise to conclusions of action. 342 For
Rhonheimer, the practical syllogism is thinking that involves doing. 343 For example, staying
warm constitutes a necessity for life; therefore, one must choose some means for achieving the
end of heating one’s house during the winter.
Finnis identifies choice as the central event for action, but several internal processes
involving both the intellect and the will lead up to and follow choice. 344 Although each of these
functions may belong to a particular faculty of the soul—intellect or will—ultimately, it is the
person who acts. 345 Thinking about the interesting proposals that the intellect offers is
deliberation.346 Sometimes this involves taking counsel (consilium) with oneself or others. 347
After deliberating and taking counsel, one may determine that one option stands out as
better than the rest. 348 In this case, one reaches a consensus and although assent belongs properly
to the intellect, Finnis says that one assents to the only eligible action. 349 Put another way, since
one does not prefer one truly eligible option to another, one simply assents rather than
chooses.350 Aquinas also calls the assent of the will a sentence (sententia) or judgment
(iudicium).351 If, however, one concludes the process of thinking with several viable options,
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then one must make a final judgment (iudicum electionis) that does properly constitute a
choice.352
One commits to a final judgment as an action by the will choosing it. 353 But choice is not
enough for action; one must actually command (imperium) the act, using (usus) one’s bodily
powers to physically actualize it. 354 Finally, in the intellect one knows that the act is complete
(cogitio finis in actu) and through the will one experiences satisfaction in it (fruitio).355
c. External Act: Materia Circa Quam and Proximate End
For Aquinas, actions receive their species from ends. 356 Joseph Pilsner holds that Aquinas
uses the relationship between form and matter in a substantial being to illustrate the analogous
relationship that ends have for action. 357 This is particularly true because human actions cannot
exist without an end. 358 Therefore, just as form gives shape to substantial beings, so ends give
form to action. 359 Pilsner following Aquinas holds that acts of the will, itself a type of motion,
like all motions, are specified by their end. 360 Distinct from natural motions, so-called active
principles do not determine the species of human acts. 361 This is because humans are free, that is,
not limited by instinct. 362 To illustrate, eyes can only see color by means of light; they cannot
hear or taste or feel, as such. Therefore, the active principle of seeing limits the function of eyes.
In contrast to humans, active principles limit animals to particular physical behaviors in response
to stimuli; however, because humans have a will and an intellect, they have a freedom regarding
decisions and actions that do not characterize other animals.
Pilsner identifies three distinct meanings for object in Aquinas. First, object consists of
that to which an action relates. 363 This is what Rhonheimer calls the res aliena.364 Ralph
McInerny offers a more sophisticated definition: “that which the agent sets out to do, to effect,”
that is, the act itself. 365 According to Pilsner and Rhonheimer, this limited understanding of
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object does not constitute the meaning of the Moral Object for Aquinas. 366 Second, object means
a certain formal aspect that specifies a related action, habit or power. 367 This notion of object has
reference to qualities and the senses, which Aquinas discusses in his Commentary on Aristotle’s
De Anima.368 Just as formal aspects of being correspond to the different senses, so formal aspects
of the good rationally composed by the intellect attract human agents through the will. 369
Therefore, in this sense, the ratio constitutes the formal aspect of the object of human action.
Finally, but most importantly, the object constitutes the proximate end of action, as opposed to
the remote end. 370 Working together, one may say that the remote end orders the specific act.
For example, one may steal—an evil proximate end—for the purpose of giving money to the
poor—a good remote end. 371 However, for the act to be good, both the proximate end and the
remote end must be good. 372 Both ends relate to intention, but the proximate end constitutes the
Moral Object, since it specifies the act, while the remote end acts as a circumstance of the act. 373
In article 18 of the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas addresses the
sources of good or evil in action. 374 He maintains that the goodness of an act depends on three
distinct sources: Moral Object, end, and circumstance. 375 To demonstrate how the Moral Object
and the end affect the will, Aquinas uses the dichotomous terms of matter and form—analogous
to the hylomorphic sense376— in relationship to external and internal acts, and materia ex qua
and materia circa quam.377 The Moral Object determines the species of an act just as form
determines the species of natural things. 378 The end configures the Moral Object, impacting the
species as well. 379 However, John Abraham Makdisi indicates that the end does not replace the
Moral Object.380 The Moral Object is not the matter ‘of which’ (a thing is made) (materia ex
qua), but the matter ‘about which’ (something is done) (materia circa quam) giving act its
species like a form. 381 In human acts, the intellect predicates good and evil Moral Objects in
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reference to reason. 382 Good Moral Objects conform to practical reason because they have
suitable matter (materia debita) and evil Moral Objects do not conform to reason since they have
unsuitable matter (materia indebita).383
Aquinas insists that one consider the species of an act formally with regard to the end—
the object of the internal act—and materially with regard to the object of the external act—that
which is brought to bear.384 Regarding how ends impact species of acts, Aquinas makes an
important distinction between external (exterior) and internal (interior) acts of the will, each
having their own proper object: that which is brought to bear and the end, respectively. 385 For
Sousa-Lara, internal acts pertain to intention and ends, while external acts concern the
choice/command and the Moral Object. 386 This accords with Makdisi who indicates that the
interior act is the very act of willing, while the exterior act is a voluntary act that the will
commands.387 The end is formal because the agent chooses the Moral Object to attain it.
To illustrate, Aquinas says that he who steals that he may commit adultery is more an
adulterer than a thief. 388 The object of the interior act of the will, also the remote end, is adultery,
which causes the agent to choose the Moral Object of theft. The end formally configures the
species of the act of theft, which constitutes his means for achieving the end of adultery.
The Moral Object may be indifferent, but the end must be morally good. 389 Driving a car
is indifferent, but doing it to rob a bank is evil, while doing it to go to church is good. In action,
there is always an end (finis operantis) with a rational good (ratio boni) that the will intends,
otherwise nothing attracts the will to move. 390 Therefore, it is possible to consider the morality of
the object of the internal act of the will, that is, the object of intention (end), separately from the
object of the external act of the will, which is the object of the choice (Moral Object). 391
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Concerning the description of the order of practical reason from the subsection above,
intention is formal to choice, just as choice is formal to command. 392 In his On Evil, Aquinas
asserts that exterior acts are part of the moral genus only insofar as they are voluntary, that is,
proceeding from the will. 393 By separating content of the exterior act from its voluntariness, one
is left with the so-called materia ex qua of the human act. 394 The will commands the materia ex
qua of the external act through the other faculties, constituting merely the act’s material
dimension.395 The choice is formal to the will’s command of the materia ex qua of the exterior
act.396 Moreover, insofar as the exterior act—materia ex qua—is devoid of voluntariness, it
receives its moral character solely from the choice. 397
In addition to speaking about the interior and exterior acts, one may speak of their
respective objects as well. The will intends the object of the internal act of the will—the end,
while it chooses the object of the external act of the will, and as the previous paragraph
demonstrates, the former configures the latter like form to matter. 398 Sousa-Lara understands
Aquinas to equate the object of the external act with the materia circa quam, the Moral Object,
and the proximate end. 399 Aquinas identifies the object of the internal act with the remote end. 400
Rhonheimer notes the confusion that identifying the object of the external act with the Moral
Object presents. 401 He indicates that the object of the external act “is the external act as a good
understood and ordered by reason.” 402 More precisely, the object of the exterior act is the matter
and circumstances understood and ordered by reason, which present it to the will as good. 403
Therefore, Rhonheimer, following Aquinas, asserts that the Moral Object is the exterior act. 404
Rhonheimer is not considering the external act as prescinded from its voluntariness, that is,
materia ex qua, but configured by reason materia circa quam.405 On the order of intention, the
external act is the Moral Object insofar as the intellect forms it and presents it as a proposal for
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action to the will. 406 Moreover, the Moral Object has the character of an end insofar as intention
focuses on it. 407 Thus it is also the proximate end. Since the interior act of the will is the very act
of willing,408 it is possible for Rhonheimer to call the Moral Object the object of the interior act
of the will.409 The intelligible proposal to take what does not belong to oneself—to steal—
constitutes the means by which the adulterer accomplishes his end. In its voluntariness, that is,
insofar as the will intends it as a choice, it constitutes an end, specifically a proximate end,
chosen as configured by and for an ulterior end—adultery.410 On the order of execution, the will
forms the goodness of the external act, which possesses a moral quality to the extent that one
wills it.411
Sousa-Lara notes that while Rhonheimer insists on introducing a new term to explain the
intelligible content of the external act—what he calls basic intentional content—the necessity for
this disappears if one understands the external act as both the object of choice (Moral Object)
and that which one commands. 412 On the order of intention, reason configures the external act
and presents it to the will as a proposal, in which case it is materia circa quam, and the Moral
Object. On the order of execution, the will chooses and commands the external act. On the
order of intention, the moral goodness of the act comes from reason, whereas on the order of
execution, it comes from the will. 413 As the will chooses and commands the external act, in the
interior act of the will, the will intends the ends. 414
Having analyzed the concept of the Moral Object in the context of Aquinas’s action
theory, the following subsection highlight the importance of maintaining the unique origin of the
Moral Object in the moral order.
ii. Naturalistic Fallacy

78

a. Genus Moris Versus Genus Naturae
Finnis notes that Aquinas presents in his prologue to his commentary on Aristotle’s
Politics four distinct orders that correspond to four distinct sciences. 415 First, there is the natural
order that corresponds to the natural sciences, math and metaphysics. 416 Second, the order of the
mind pertains to the science of logic. 417 Third, the order of deliberating, choosing and acting
pertains to the science of moral philosophy. 418 Finally, a multitude of practical arts corresponds
to an order that humans impose on external matter. 419 The latter two categories constitute two
distinct parts of the practical philosophy. 420 Many interpreters of Aquinas mistakenly believe that
moral laws derive from laws of nature. 421
In point of fact, however, Finnis insists that misappropriating human actions as any of the
other three categories leads to its misunderstanding. 422 Rhonheimer holds that the fundamental
error of consequentialism is that it reduces morality to poiesis, technical decision making. 423 In
consequentialism, rather than answering what the right choices one should be doing, one uses
reason to bring about through action as a cause the best possible consequences. Finnis says that
this amounts to reducing a question of doing to one of making. 424 In this sense, the concern of the
consequentialist is bringing about states of affairs through action. 425 Consequentialism derails
moral decision making from its primary focus of freely choosing good act. 426 Instead, human
action focuses on how to create the best outcome by action. 427 The right action for choice is
relative. There is little concern about the goodness of the will regarding choices.
Finnis acknowledges that one may approach ethics from a speculative or theoretical
perspective; that is, one may analyze how one comes to know practical truths, discuss and relate
these to other truths, but ethics is primarily about practical truth. 428 Ethics is practical not merely
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because it is the study of human praxis, but because it concerns one’s acting on real and true
goods.429 The Naturalistic Fallacy holds that the practicality of ethics derives from the physical;
contending that the genus moris derives from the genus naturae.430 Rhonheimer calls this error
physicalism or naturalism. 431 It presumes that Natural Law and laws of nature are the same. 432 It
constitutes the primary error of manualists and the teleological theorists who oppose them. 433 For
Rhonheimer, they mistakenly believe that one discovers moral truths; when reason constitutes
them as acts of practical understanding. 434
b. Manualism and Proportionalism
In The Sources of Christian Ethics, Servais Pinckaers describes the characteristics of
manualism.435 The modern period of moral theology begins with the nominalism of Ockham,
which focuses morality on obligation and the ideal law. 436 A chasm develops between theology
and pastoral concerns, which necessitates the development of manuals to guide parochial priests
in confession.437 This corresponds with the counter-reformation and the formation of seminaries
as institutions for preparing priests to minister in an increasingly pluralistic world. 438 Under the
influence of the Jesuits, the focus of moral theology becomes increasing pragmatic. They
eliminate speculative content, such as the final end of man and grace altogether, emphasizing the
commandments, sacraments, canonical censures and penalties, and states of life. 439 The manuals
use cases that illustrate concretely how to apply the commandments and moral obligations. The
entire attention of morality theology focuses on individual cases of conscience. 440
The manuals generally have four different categories: human or free action, law,
conscience and sin. 441 Freedom is freedom of indifference with voluntaristic overtones that
contrast with the limits of the law. 442 In this sense, law does not incorporate one’s natural
inclinations or direct one toward beatitude; rather, it simply constitutes an externally imposed
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mandate.443 The law becomes an external imposition that obliges, but as G. E. M. Anscombe
indicates in Intention, ought is a late addition to the practical syllogism. 444 Casuistically, the
conscience represents the person’s use of freedom of indifference to conform external acts to
externally imposed laws. 445 One sins when one fails to use one’s freedom to adequately apply
laws in concrete action. 446
Just as Abelard and Lombard respond to contemporary legalism, proportionalists such as
Peter Knauer, 447 Josef Fuchs, 448 Louis Janssens, 449 Bruno Schuller, 450 and Richard McCormick 451
respond to the legalism of the manualist tradition. However, as Rhonheimer indicates, their
rejection of manual legalism, rooted in physicalism, amounts to letting the Naturalistic Fallacy in
through the back door. 452 To illustrate, one need look no further than the first article that
introduces the term proportionalism, that is, Peter Knauer’s “The Hermeneutic Function of the
Principle of Double Effect,” where he says that moral evil consists in nothing more than causing
physical evil.453 Using the Principle of Double Effect, Knauer argues that so long as a
commensurate reason exists one may do any action. 454 So long as the ends justify the means, one
may commit any finis operis, which he identifies as the Moral Object. 455 In fact, if the ends are
satisfactory, then the commensurate reason changes the finis operis from a direct causing of evil
to an indirect causing of evil. 456 This is exactly what Richard McCormick means by the
expanded notion of the object. 457
Louis Janssens, in “Ontic Evil and Moral Evil,” reduces moral evil to intending ontic
evils, that is, physical evil. 458 He reduces the means (Moral Object) to the material component of
the act.459 In Thomistic terms, he reduces the Moral Object to the external act prescinded from its
voluntariness, that is, materia ex qua.460 Consequently, Janssens falls victim to the same flaw
that Rhonheimer accuses Josef Fuch of: reducing acts to pure events or behavior. 461 According to
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Rhonheimer, proportionalists reduce acting to intending failing to realize that acts themselves
have intentional content. 462 In other words, action for proportionalists involves causing the
purely physical act or event for an end, which constitutes a state of affairs. 463 For this reason,
opponents accuse proportionalists of being consequentialists.
The main problem with the proportionalists’ approach to theology is that it evacuates
reason from the intentional content of the Moral Object. 464 Moreover, by making the genus moris
derivative of the genus naturae, it establishes a dualism. 465 Rhonheimer contends that the proper
good (bona propria) toward which the natural inclinations tend are of the genus naturae, but not
pre-moral in the sense that they are indifferent to the genus moris.466 Rather, for Rhonheimer,
natural, human inclinations are always subject to the influence of practical reason insofar as this
is a constitutive component of the human person. 467 Once again, Rhonheimer affirms that for
Aquinas, the Moral Object is not a matter out of which (materia ex qua), but a matter concerning
which (materia circa quam).468 The Moral Object is the external act formed by reason and
chosen by the will. 469
An important implication of not deriving the genus moris from the genus naturae is that
the Moral Object can only be known from the first-person perspective, which the next subsection
discusses.
iii: Moral Object and the Perspective of the Acting Person
Manualism is casuistic, using cases to teach. Unfortunately, the perspective of the acting
person, which John Paul II reaffirms as of primary importance for moral theology, is lost. 470 In
fact, one can only know the Moral Object from the first-person perspective. 471 This subsection
addresses the deficiency of the third-person perspective of morality of the manualists and
teleological theorists. First, following Finnis and Rhonheimer, I show how the naturalistic fallacy
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reduces action and choice to events, devoid of intentional content. Second, I articulate Finnis’s
demonstration of the irrationality of a proportionalist utilizing the Socratic Principle. Finally, I
summarize John Paul II’s personalistic perspective to morality, which avoids the relativistic
pitfalls of proportionalism.
a. Avoiding Eventism
As morality during the manualist era focuses more on obligation, so theologians
increasingly define the object of the act in terms of the genus naturae. As the above
demonstrates, this corresponds to a dualism that renders action indifferent to natural inclination.
At the same time, as Rhonheimer points out, it makes objects of the genus moris derivative of the
genus naturae, which constitutes the Naturalistic Fallacy. 472 Ultimately, this culminates in the
proportionalists equating the object with causing evil in the world, without commensurate
reason.473 Consequently, human acts are nothing more than events that give rise to states of
affairs.474 Finnis indicates that the proportionalists attempt to guide choice by assessing states of
affairs from a so-called objective standpoint; as such, they are guilty of eventism. 475 Ultimately,
this renders choice insignificant, since it can only be known from the first-person perspective. 476
In fact, a consequence of an eventistic perspective for morality is that it reduces the
Moral Object to intention. 477 According to an eventistic approach all acts in themselves lack
moral content. The only thing that morally specifies them is their reason for acting, that is, the
end or intention. 478 Rhonheimer explains that the act of killing another person, according to an
eventistic perspective, lacks moral content, except for the intention or end that one has in view of
killing the person. 479 Thus, if the commensurate reason suffices, one may kill another person.
For Rhonheimer, what is missing in this assessment is the intentional content that exists
in doing an act, prior to any consideration of the end, that is, why or for what purpose one is
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doing this act.480 The intelligible content of ‘the what one is doing’ constitutes the Moral Object.
This explains what one is choosing in doing a particular act. For example, in the act of killing
another person, one is setting oneself against the other’s life—a fundamental good of that
person.481 The act of killing another is, therefore, not inherently morally neutral as an earthquake,
but intentionally and morally charged, even before one considers the ulterior end of action. 482
Moreover, one can only know the Moral Object from the perspective of the acting person. Only
the acting person knows if she intends to kill the other person or is practicing self-defense.
Similarly, the outside observer cannot tell if a man and a woman copulating are committing
adultery or engaging in the marital act.
b. The Socratic Principle
Finnis and Rhonheimer reject the third-person perspective of morality because it does not
pass the test of the Socratic Principle. 483 The Socratic Principle, which hold that it is better to
suffer wrong than to do it originates with Democritus. 484 The Pauline Principle, ‘evil may not be
done for the sake of good,’ is a corollary. 485 Kant’s categorical imperative that ends do not justify
the means also derives from this. 486 The author of the Gospel of John also raises this question by
placing it into the mouth of Caiaphas: “Is it not better that one innocent person be put to death
than that the whole people perish?” 487 For both John and Paul, the answer is clearly no. 488 For
Rhonheimer and Finnis, proportionalists clearly teach that one may indeed do evil that good may
result, so long as the ends justify the means. 489
For Finnis the biggest difference between a proportionalists and a non-proportionalist is
that the right choice resides in the outcome of action. 490 Finnis illustrates the irrationality of
proportionalism by demonstrating a contradiction that all eventistic ethics are subject to. Finnis
offers two apparently similar propositions:
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(1) It is true that every person x that x should act on the principle that ‘I ought not to do V.’
(2) It is true of every person x that x not doing V is a proportionately better state of affairs
than x doing V. 491
Finnis reformulates (1) to include the Socratic Principle: “(1a) It is true of every person x that x
should act on the principle that ‘I ought to suffer wrong rather than do wrong.” 492 Consequently,
“(2a) It is true of every person x that x suffering wrong is a proportionately better state of affairs
than x doing wrong.” 493 However, Finnis demonstrates that (2a) contains a contradiction insofar
as it implies that “(2b) It is true of any person x, y, z that x suffering wrong from y is a better state
of affairs than x doing wrong to z.”494 In addition, one can derive: “(2c) a suffering wrong from b
is a better state of affairs than a doing wrong to b” and “(2d) b suffering wrong from a is a better
state of affairs than b doing wrong to a.”495 These radical contradictions are possible in an
eventistic ethic because the acting subject disappears. 496
Rhonheimer explains that the implication of the Socratic Principle is that one cannot
simply compare two separate individuals to determine which action is correct. 497 Sometimes the
right action is to abstain from acting. To illustrate, Rhonheimer uses the extreme example of the
French Nazi collaborator Paul Touvier who claims that he killed seven innocent people to rescue
93 innocent people. 498 According to Rhonheimer and Finnis, nothing—no matter how good the
ends—justifies one willing the death of innocent people. Another example includes the scenario
of an assailant coercing a hostage to kill another hostage, lest the attacker kill all the hostages. In
an eventistic ethic one simply weighs the consequences, without any consideration of the
morality of choosing the death of an innocent person. For a non-proportionalist, it is better to
suffer the evil of another person’s decision, than to commit evil so as to prevent it. Of course,
this example has the mistaken logic that one person’s decision to abstain from an evil act causes
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an even greater evil state of affairs. In fact, the assailant freely chooses to murder the innocent
hostages. The hostage does not commit a greater evil, by failing to commit an evil that
purportedly rescues others from death. After all, there is nothing that prevents the assailant from
violating his word and killing the other hostages anyway.
c. Personalism in Veritatis Splendor
In Veritatis Splendor, John Paul II affirms the traditional personalistic perspective of
morality that characterizes authentic Thomistic moral theology. 499 This is not to say that he
embraces a relativistic approach to morality, which he clearly rejects. 500 Nor does it mean
denying its objective and universal application. 501 It is, however, to say that the Natural Law,
which governs morality, is not extrinsic to the human person, but constitutive of it. 502 In other
words, God does not arbitrarily dictate commands that have nothing to do with the human
condition. Rather, the Natural Law, reflective of the eternal and divine law, abides in the human
person through creation. 503 It is precisely its connection to the eternal and divine that renders it
universal.504
In action, the Natural Law manifests itself as practical reason, which guides, but does not
determine the truly autonomous person in moral decision making. 505 John Paul II avoids the
trappings of reducing moral decision making to biological processes; rather, he insists that
humans are truly free, though not in an absolute sense that treats human nature as raw datum. 506
Thus, he avoids the trappings of dualism that reduces the human person to either the bodily or
spiritual component. 507 Rather, the human person constitutes a unity of both body and soul,
reducible to neither. 508 By rooting morality in the human person, John Paul II, not only avoids
conflicts between nature and freedom, which a dualistic understanding of human nature lends
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itself to, he also further establishes its universal and immutable character. 509 This is what
provides the foundation for moral norms that transcend culture or time. 510
For John Paul II, the voice of reason speaks within the depth of one’s heart on practical
matters through one’s conscience. 511 While norms both negative and positive may be universal
and immutable, the human person must still apply these in concrete actions.512 In this regard, the
personal perspective for morality is invaluable and primary, not because one decides what is
good to do in an absolute sense, but because one appropriates the truth in action by means of
one’s conscience. 513 Therefore, the conscience stands as a witness to the law and constitutes a
dialogue between the person and God. 514
In opposition to proportionalists and teleological theorists, in general, John Paul II both
rejects the fundamental option and reaffirms the existence of intrinsically evil acts, which
meeting the appropriate criteria constitute mortal sin. 515 John Paul II concurs that one may
fundamentally orient one’s life toward God, but this does not mean that one’s concrete actions do
not matter, nor that they have little to no impact on one’s commitment to God. 516 It is precisely
through one’s acts that one reveals one’s commitment. 517 Separating concrete acts from one’s
fundamental orientation represents a dualism rooted in human nature. 518 Therefore, following the
longstanding teaching of the Church, John Paul II reaffirms that mortal sin is possible, when
one’s act constitutes grave matter; one has full knowledge, and gives deliberate consent of the
will.519 Indeed, for John Paul II, an appropriate teleology regarding morality understands the
human person as attaining one’s ultimate end through concrete acts. 520
Ultimately, John Paul II takes issue with teleological theorists—consequentialists and
proportionalists—for their rejection of the traditional understanding of the Moral Object. 521 The
next subsection illustrates how proportionalists conceive of the Moral Object as intention. 522 As
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Rhonheimer illustrates in the above subsection, proportionalists evacuate the Moral Object of its
own intentional content.523 They make the Moral Object equivalent to intention—hence the
identification as teleologists—while Thomists, such as Finnis, Rhonheimer, and John Paul II
defend a notion of the Moral Object as having an intentional content of its own. 524 John Paul II
retains the traditional distinction regarding the three sources of morality—Moral Object,
intention, and circumstances—of which Moral Object is primary. 525
John Paul II defines the Moral Object as that which the will deliberately and rationally
chooses.526 The human person, through a deliberate act of the will, chooses a rationally
configured type of behavior. 527 The person constitutes the active agent; as such, one can only
know the Moral Object from the perspective of the acting human person. 528 The intellect
rationally configures it, which the will deliberately intends, bestowing moral content upon the
so-called behavior. 529 Insofar as certain types of rationally configured behavior conform or fail to
conform to the suppositum of human nature, that is, truly lead to one’s ultimate end—good or
evil—intrinsically evil acts do exist. 530 As such, each particular human act—freely and
deliberately chosen—not only builds character—either contributing to growth in virtue or vice—
but also draws the acting human person closer to one’s ultimate end. Moreover, the primacy of
the Moral Object means that no intention or circumstance can change the Moral Object, making
an intrinsically evil act good. 531
In reaffirming the primacy of the Moral Object, John Paul II also demonstrates the
importance of returning to the perspective of the acting human person when evaluating action. At
the same time, he rejects any tendency to relativize morality, by rooting the Natural Law in the
divine law, which God bestows on humanity in creation. Moreover, he understands the human
person as a composite that avoids the dualistic trappings of teleological theories. Above all, he
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re-establishes the primary role of the Moral Object for morality. Insofar as this constitutes a
rationally configured type of behavior, which the will deliberately chooses, it manifests itself in
particular acts that have teleological import regarding an one’s ultimate end.
Having demonstrated the importance of the first-person perspective for Moral Object, the
next subsection identifies the Moral Object of contraception.
iv. Object of Contraception
The meaning of the Moral Object centers on the debate as to whether or not contraception
is an intrinsically evil act. John Paul II reorients the understanding and significance of the Moral
Object as the deliberate act of the will in Veritatis Splendor.532 Before this encyclical,
theologians arrive at differing conclusions based on their divergent understandings of the Moral
Object. The following subsection considers the perspectives of the manualists, proportionalists
and virtue ethicists, especially Rhonheimer concerning the topic of contraception.
a. Manualism
John T. Noonan Jr. in Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic
Theologians and Canonists traces the historical approach of theologians throughout the centuries
of the Church regarding their treatment of the pastoral issue of contraception. 533 As Pinckaers
indicates, the manuals are tools for pastoral formation of priests in seminary. 534 Consequently,
the focus is physical and external. Regarding the variety of manual authors, Noonan follows the
perspective of four: John Gury’s Compendium of Moral Theology,535 Thomas Gousset’s
Justification de la theologie morale de St. Alphonse de Liguori,536 John Baptist Bouvier’s
Dissertation on the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue and Supplement to the Treatise on
Marriage,537 and Francis P. Kenrick’s Theologia moralis.538
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Noonan indicates that manual authors eliminate recourse to Augustine in favor of the
more tolerant Liguori to extinguish the Jansenist influence. 539 They equate contraception with
Onanism or coitus interruptus, that is, the act of withdrawing the penis and ejaculating
extravaginally. 540 Rome’s approach to contraception in the nineteenth century is surprisingly
tolerant, encouraging priests “not to destroy the good faith without any fruit for souls,” that is,
not to mention the issue if it is not brought up, but to speak the truth if nonetheless pressed. 541
Equating contraception with Onanism makes it odious and ugly, and a quick, yet superficial
rejection.542 Of the four manuals that Noonan analyzes, only Bouvier’s has an argument against
contraception that does not merely constitute a rejection of Onanism. 543 Although he argues that
contraception violates the primary end of marriage, procreation, he nonetheless contends that the
punishment is due to its equivalence with Onanism. 544
As the birth control movement spreads in the Western world during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century, the need for a more sophisticated, if not nuanced approach to the
onslaught becomes apparent. Short and sweet arguments with recourse to Old Testament
retributive justice—divine or not—no longer suffice. For this reason, Pope Pius XI writes Casti
Cannubii, an encyclical that addresses the nature of marriage and modern threats to it. 545 Pius XI
after articulating the three ends of marriage according to Augustine, condemns the practice of
frustrating the marital act to avoid having children, but nonetheless intending to gratify desires
without the so-called consequent burden of having children. 546 He unequivocally condemns as
unnatural, intrinsically vicious, and gravely evil any contraceptive act, which is disruptive of the
primary end of the marital act of begetting children. 547 He admits of no exception to this rule, the
violation of which constitutes an intrinsically evil act. 548
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b. Proportionalism
Proportionalists offer a nuanced approach to contraception, one that allows for exceptions
to the exceptionless. Knauer’s argument, which has recourse to the Principle of Double Effect,
rejects too narrow an understanding of Pius XI’s pronouncement in Casti Cannubii, which he
perceives as ambiguous. 549 It is ambiguous for Knauer because it does not specify whether one’s
intention to physically interfere with the fertility of the procreative act is psychological or
moral.550 He indicates that the purely physical evil of losing procreative power does not
constitute a moral evil, without further content, in particular, intention in the moral sense. 551
Recall that Knauer’s definition of moral evil constitutes the causing of a physical evil
without a commensurate reason. 552 He insists that without intentional content in the moral sense,
the act of preventing pregnancy does not yet constitute the Moral Object; therefore, it is
impossible to make a moral assessment of it. 553 It must have a commensurate reason. 554 Insofar
as one can use periodic continence for an evil end of preventing children, Knauer sees no
difference between using periodic continence or contraception either for good or immoral
reasons.555 For Knauer, if periodic continence is not realistic for preventing pregnancy, where a
couple ought not to get pregnant, for a commensurate reason, such as, a lack of resources for
fulfilling the responsibilities of parenthood in education and rearing, then a couple may use
contraception.556 Moreover, if utilizing contraception, instead of periodic continence, improves
the love between the couple, then they ought to use it. 557
c. Rhonheimer
In 1968, Paul VI publishes Humanae Vitae, reaffirming the Church’s condemnation of
contraception.558 Paul VI bases his rejection of contraception on the Inseparability Principle,
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which constitutes the notion that the procreative and unitive dimension of the marital act are
inseparable.559 One cannot have one without the other; if one denies or violates the procreative
dimension of the marital act, then one also denies or violates the unitive dimension. 560 Insofar as
contraception interrupts the procreative significance of the marital act, it also interrupts the
unitive significance. 561 Moreover, Paul VI rejects any argument that attempts to justify the use of
contraception based on either its means or end, reaffirming the truth of the Socratic Principle: “it
is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it.” 562
Rhonheimer argues that the Moral Object of the contraceptive act violates chastity,
rooted in the Inseparability Principle.563 He bases his argument in anthropology, that is, human
nature.564 Human acts are always of a human person, which constitutes both a body and spirit. 565
Rhonheimer rejects any dualistic anthropology that separates acts of the body from the soul. 566
Dualists usually equate the soul with the person and relegate the body to mechanistic
determinism.567 For Rhonheimer, freedom is a constitutive part of the human act of love, which
the marital act speaks as the language of the body. 568
Rhonheimer defends Paul VI’s teaching on the Inseparability Principle, making an
important distinction between meaning and function. 569 To say that every instance of the marital
act must have the procreative and unitive meaning, or the procreative to have the unitive and visa
versa, is not to say that each and every act must be functionally procreative, that is giving rise to
conception. 570 For this reason, a couple practicing periodic continence respects and maintains the
openness to the procreative meaning, even if they know or expect the act not to functionally lead
to conception. The same may be said of a couple that is unable to conceive because of age or
sterility. Rhonheimer accuses Noonan of misunderstanding this conceptual distinction, which
leads Noonan to make room for exceptions. 571
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For Rhonheimer, the Moral Object concerns choices pertaining to action, which the will
deliberately chooses. 572 In particular, the Moral Object constitutes what one does in an
intentional sense. 573 For this reason, Rhonheimer, following Aquinas, understands the Moral
Object to be formae a ratione conceptae—a form of a rational concept, that is, a proposal that
the intellect forms according to reason and presents to the will as a choice. 574 Therefore, for
Rhonheimer the description with intentional content, that is, the Moral Object of the marital act
is: for a married couple to give themselves with their whole spiritual, affective, emotional, and
sexual being to loving union, which physically manifests itself in copulation.575 Intentionally,
this includes openness to the meaning, not necessarily, function of procreation. 576 Moreover,
conceptually, the ends of marriage are unique to the Moral Object of the conjugal act. However,
in the object of the marital act, the aspect of loving union is the fundamental aspect, which
implies the procreative meaning, not in a secondary way, but as inseparably connected. 577
For Rhonheimer, recourse to the Inseparability Principle does not suffice to answer why
one may not utilize contraception in a particular instance, if as the proportionalists say one is
fundamentally open to life. 578 To explain why each and every instantiation of the marital act
must be open to the procreative meaning, Rhonheimer correlates responsible parenthood to
chastity, that is, the virtuous integration of sexual drives into the dominion of reason and will. 579
This is not a matter of repelling or suppressing sensual appetites, rather it means impressing or
modifying them with the seal of reason. 580 For Rhonheimer, responsible parents practicing
periodic continence to avoid conception do not just commit an act of omission by avoiding
sexual intercourse during fertile times, but commit a deliberate human act; and therefore, bodily
and sexual act of loving union that is open to procreation. 581 Though their act of refrain does not
entail sexual intercourse, it nonetheless is sexual and a personal expression of mutual love.
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In contrast to periodic continence, contraception enables a couple to avoid pregnancy
without modifying sexual behavior. 582 More precisely, contraception constitutes choosing an act
that impedes the possible procreative consequences of the sexual act. 583 For Rhonheimer,
contraceptive acts are immoral not merely because they physically impede the possibility of
procreation, but because they render “needless a specific sexual behavior informed by
procreative responsibility.” 584 Moreover, it constitutes a choice against chastity, insofar as they
are no longer procreative and need to be under the domain of reason and the will. 585 Therefore,
the Moral Object of contraception constitutes a vice against the virtue of chastity. 586
Having demonstrated the impact that a personalistic conception of both the Natural Law
and the Moral Object have for the Catholic Church’s official teaching against contraception, the
following chapter connects this chapter’s insights on the Moral Object to the Principle of Double
Effect.
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CHAPTER THREE – PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT
In light of the preceding chapter’s insights on the Natural Law and the Moral Object, this
chapter analyzes the Principle of Double Effect. The first section traces the Double-Effect
Reasoning from Thomas Aquinas to Peter Knauer. The second section contrasts a teleological
construct of Double Effect with non-consequentialist versions.
3A. Double Effect from Aquinas to Knauer
i. Aquinas and Double Effect Reasoning
Aquinas uses Double-Effect Reasoning in two places in the Summa Theologica.1 First, he
explains killing in self-defense.2 Second, he shows how one may unintentionally scandalize
others by alluring dress or spiritual acts. 3 In the following, I elucidate several criteria that derive
from Aquinas’s Double-Effect Reasoning.
In the first objection to article seven, Aquinas quotes Augustine’s objection to killing
another, even in self-defense, except for a soldier or official exercising public office. 4 The
objector implies that one may only kill if one exercises public authority. The following objection
and the response both qualify the meaning of Augustine’s statement. Moreover, the proper
meaning of intention gives further weight to Aquinas’s explanation.
Intention has several means for Aquinas. Understanding his parsing of the terms in the
explanation of human action clarifies his use of it in the context of Double-Effect Reasoning. In
the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae, he distinguishes between intending a remote end
(finis operantis) versus choosing a proximate end (finis proximus or finis operis).5 The proximate
end is the Moral Object, while the remote end is the reason one does an act.
In agreement with Augustine, Aquinas objects to civilians intending to kill a person either
as a means or an end. One may not intend to kill another even in self-defense. This is because he

113

objects to doing evil for a good result. This constitutes at least two criteria in the Principle of
Double Effect. One, the Moral Object of the act must be morally good or neutral. Two, one must
not intend any evil effects.
Aquinas uses praeter intentionem to explain the unintended consequences of an act. 6
Returning to his answer on killing in self-defense, he says that an act may have more than one
effect not all of which one intends.7 Moreover, actions get their species from intention, not from
what is beside (praeter intentionem) intention, which is accidental. 8 Praeter intentionem is a
multivalent concept that has several meanings in Aquinas’s corpus. Duarte Sousa-Lara elucidates
three ways Aquinas uses praeter intentionem, which I explicate in the following. 9
First, regarding moral actions and intention, he insists that the agent never intends evil
per se, but praeter intentionem or per accidens. Whenever one commits sin, one chooses a good
with a privation. The will intends the good per se, but the privation accompanies the good,
praeter intentionem. Aquinas uses the example of one eating unto death as an analogy for one
who sins intending a good with an associated evil. Just as the diner chooses, and therefore,
intends the good pleasure associated with eating, not the premature death due to poor health, so
he chooses and intends some good in the sin, not the evil. 10 The premature death and damage due
to sin are praeter intentionem. It is only in this sense that one chooses to sin.
Second, praeter intentionem refers to an unforeseen effect or a causally chance
occurrence. Intelligible agents choose what they apprehend. If one errs in apprehension, then one
errs in choosing and intending. For example, if one chooses to drink fruit punch, but instead
drinks poison, the evil of consuming poison is not chosen per se, since it is outside of both one’s
apprehension and intention. The consumption of poison is praeter intentionem. Nonetheless, the
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evil consequences of consuming poison ensue. The agent did not foresee this. Here, praeter
intentionem refers to an accidental event in that it is both unforeseen and occurs by chance.
Third, praeter intentionem, refers to the foreseeable, yet unintended effects of actions.
This concerns Double-Effect Reasoning. More specifically, it concerns intention’s moral
specification of the act. An act receives its species precisely from what the agent intends, not
from its effects.11 As it pertains to Double-Effect Reasoning and self-defense, one may intend to
preserve one’s life; however, one’s action may kill the assailant. Insofar as one does not intend
the latter, it is beside (praeter intentionem) the Moral Object.
In addition to the negative effect being praeter intentionem, Aquinas also insists that the
act of self-defense must be proportionate to the attack. 12 By proportionate, Aquinas does not
mean that the ends must justify the means. He is not saying, weighing all possible outcomes, if
the remote end is good enough, one may have a proximate end that is immoral. For instance, in a
hypothetical scenario where a captor threatens to kill five hostages, if one does not kill one
person in exchange for the five, one may not licitly acquiesce. No matter how many people may
be saved—five or a hundred—or how menacing the foe one may not justifiably commit an
intrinsically disordered act. No positive outcome can ever justify one intending an intrinsically
evil act. For Aquinas, proportionality does not mean a change in intention or the Moral Object.
Indirectly, however, the amount of force one uses in self-defense reflects intention, and
therefore, the Moral Object. In this regard, proportionality is a litmus test for Aquinas. For him,
if one uses more force than necessary, this indicates that one’s intention is not one of selfdefense, but murder. The proportionality criterion necessitates that the defender not use more
force than necessary to resist the assailant’s attack. If an assailant attacks with a pillow, it is not
proportionate to resist with a gun.

115

Aquinas, following Jerome’s interpretation of Matthew 15:12, asserts that one commits
scandal when one’s actions or words cause another’s spiritual downfall. 13 He distinguishes
between active and passive scandal. 14 Active scandal occurs in the one who commits a sin that
leads another into sin. Passive scandal occurs in the one led into sin. Ordinarily, active scandal
leads to passive scandal, but one may resist the temptation to scandal, thereby not sinning. In
such a case, active scandal exists without passive scandal. It is also possible to have passive
scandal without active scandal, such as when one’s good deeds are the occasion for another’s
sin.15 For instance, one moved to envy by another’s charity, is an occasion of passive scandal
without active scandal.
Aquinas divides active scandal into two types: direct and accidental. 16 Direct active
scandal occurs when one intentionally leads another into sin by one’s sinful actions. Accidental
active scandal occurs when one’s sinful actions unintentionally leads another into sin. In this
accidental case, the scandal is beside the sinful act. In the following article, Aquinas further
clarifies that one may commit active scandal by “doing something that has the appearance of
evil.” 17
Aquinas uses Double-Effect Reasoning again in his discussion about women wearing
adorning dress. He acknowledges that women’s dress lead some men to lust; however, he allows
women to adorn themselves if they intend to please their husbands. 18 He says “those women who
have no husband nor wish to have one, or who are in a state of life inconsistent with marriage,”
sin if they intend to insight lust in another by their dress. 19 Intention is central.
Having elucidated Aquinas’s version of Double-Effect Reasoning, the following
subsection traces its development in his successors.
ii. Antoninus to Gury
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Double-Effect Reasoning evolves through the centuries in articulation and prominence.
Ironically, as it becomes more prominent, it also diverges more from the principles that
undergird it. As the role of the Moral Object diminishes, a causal system replaces it. The focus
shifts from choosing proximate ends to causing effects. This subsection follows the
chronological development of these trends in the following: Antoninus, Cajetan, Vitoria, Suarez,
John of Saint Thomas, and Domingo of Saint Teresa.
According to T. A. Cavanaugh, Antoninus is the first to advance Aquinas’s use of Double
Effect.20 In his Summa theologica moralis, Antoninus returns to scandal and alluring dress. 21
Antoninus makes explicit Aquinas’s implicit use of Double Effect to justify women wearing
alluring dress to please their husbands, but unintentionally scandalizing others. 22 For Cavanaugh,
Antoninus does with Aquinas’s discussion of revealing dress, what Aquinas does with
Augustine’s killing by self-defense.23 Just as Aquinas permits killing by self-defense under the
umbrella of Double Effect, so Antoninus permits alluring dress, even if it scandalizes another, so
long as she only intends to please her husband or to follow the custom of her status or country. 24
Scandal and alluring dress is a hallmark example for discussions on Double-Effect Reasoning.
Another Dominican, Tommaso de Vio Gaetani (Cajetan) writes a comprehensive and
influential commentary on Aquinas’s Summa Theologica in the sixteenth century. 25 Joseph T.
Mangan, in “An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect,” says that for the first 200
years after Aquinas, no significant development occurs for Double-Effect Reasoning until
Cajetan’s commentary on the Summa Theologica.26 Cajetan interprets Aquinas’s Double-Effect
Reasoning in line with contemporary formulations of the Principle of Double Effect. 27 Mangan
interprets Cajetan’s understanding of both the means (finis proximus) and the remote end (finis
operantis) to simultaneously fall under one intention.28 But he distinguishes the end from the
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necessary effects of the end. While the end falls under the intention, its effects do not. For killing
in self-defense, the death of the assailant proceeds from the defensive act necessarily as an effect
but does not fall under intention either as a means or an end. 29
Cajetan maintains the distinction in Aquinas between one who intends to kill to save
one’s life and one who intends self-defense but kills. An important development, however, is the
awareness of the necessary, causal relationship between the act of self-defense and the death of
the assailant. In I-II, q. 20, a. 5, Aquinas argues that foreseen consequences do increase the
goodness or badness of an act. 30 Thus one might conclude that it is only when consequences are
not foreseen that one may refer to them as praeter intentionem.31 Cajetan contests this view in
his commentary. 32 He has no qualms about knowing or foreseeing the death of the attacker in
self-defense. This does not change the scope of intention over the Moral Object. For Cajetan,
even though one may know that the act of self-defense is fatal, one may still not intend to kill,
either as a means or an end.
Next, Cajetan broadens the application of Double Effect to include not only self-defense,
but also defense of temporal possessions and spiritual welfare. 33 Just as one has a right to selfdefense, so one has a right to defend necessities of life, if no other means exist. Again, the act is
one of defense, with the effect of the death of a thief. Moreover, if one can defend physical life
and property (to the death), then it is all the more important to defend one’s spiritual vitality
(even to death), especially in light of eternal implications.
Cajetan also argues that a judge—personally knowing a man to be innocent—ought to
condemn him to death, if the public evidence convicts him. 34Aquinas argues that a judge, acting
as a public person may only use the knowledge available to her as a public person. 35 She does
not intend to kill, but acting in the confines of the office, she sentences him to death.
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Cajetan’s monumental commentary on Aquinas’s Summa Theologica transfers the
hermeneutic of theology from commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences to Aquinas’s Summa
Theologica.36 The Dominican, Francisco de Vitoria, follows Cajetan’s lead as department chair
of theology at the University of Salamanca. With regard to foreknowledge of the death of an
assailant, Vitoria applies a distinction between choosing and intending to Double Effect, which
Aquinas and Cajetan avoid. Mangan emphasizes the importance of a correct understanding of
intention for a proper interpretation of Aquinas’s Double Effect. 37 He argues that his Jesuit
counterpart, Vincente M. Alonso, limits the scope of intention solely to the reach of the remote
end, whereas Aquinas utilizes a broader sense for intention that includes the proximate end as
well.38 John Finnis, in Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, highlights the difference
between the narrow and broad sense of intention. 39 Generally speaking, the object of choice
corresponds to the means, while the object of intention corresponds to the remote end, but for II II, q. 64, a. 7, Aquinas uses the broader sense of intention. 40 In the footnote, Finnis points the
reader to Aquinas’s De Malo to illustrate this broader sense of intention, which Aquinas applies
to Double-Effect Reasoning. 41 In De Malo, Aquinas offers a hypothetical scenario of one
choosing to steal from the rich to give to the poor.42 He argues that while the person may intend
good, he wills evil. Thus, he concludes, “if we should understand the will by intention, so that we
call the whole, both the end intended and the deed willed, the intention, the intention also will be
evil.” 43 For this reason, Aquinas specifically denies one the possibility of intending to kill
another, even for the purpose of self-defense.
Since Vitoria maintains the distinction between choice and intention, he argues that one
may will to kill an attacker in self-defense, but one may not intend to kill him as an end for one’s
action.44 Analogously Vitoria uses the example of a sick man amputating his arm to save his life.
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The man intends to save his life choosing to amputate his arm as a means to good health.45 The
analogy, however, does not hold, because amputating one’s arm is a neutral act. Choosing to kill
another, either as a means or an end is not neutral, but intrinsically immoral. Aquinas’s broader
sense of intention that includes both the means and the end precludes Vitoria’s move to justify
the means by the ends. What exempts the death of an assailant from moral guilt is that it is
beyond the scope of the intention and will altogether, which is precisely what praeter
intentionem means.
Twenty years after Vitoria’s death in 1546, Francisco Suarez begins studies in theology at
the University of Salamanca. Whereas Vitoria neglects the morality of the proximate end for
sake of the ultimate end, permitting one to choose to kill an assailant, Suarez eliminates
discussion of the proximate end altogether. In addition, he introduces vocabulary that opens the
door further to causal morality. Sousa-Lara translates Suarez’s words. 46 Suarez concedes that if
one kills another unintentionally, then one is not guilty of per se direct, voluntary homicide,
which means the act is not voluntary in the absolute sense. 47 However, as to the cause-effect
relationship, that is, insofar as it is known that one’s action causes the death of another, Suarez
asserts that it is indirectly voluntary, which remains true even if the effect follows per se from
the cause.48 Where the death is accidental, in that it is not foreseen, he argues that it is not
voluntary.
Suarez’s use of ‘indirect voluntary’ is not consistent with Aquinas, who uses indirect
voluntary to describe willing by omission. 49 For instance, if one willfully chooses not to save a
person’s life when it is within one’s power to do so, then one kills by omission. The inactive
willing is what Aquinas means by indirect voluntary, but this is not what Suarez means. In fact,
Suarez and other commentators develop Aquinas’s notion of indirect willing to include positive
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acts as well as acts of omission. Afterwards, they apply indirect willing to cases of Double
Effect, with the implication that indirect willing is synonymous with praeter intentionem.
In Aquinas, indirect voluntary connotes culpability, since it is by means of the will
choosing not to act that one commits a sin. However, Suarez and others remove culpability, but
maintain an extrinsic connection to the will. What he says regarding the unintended killing of
another in self-defense illustrates this point: “It is confirmed, on the other hand, that it is
voluntary only in its cause, it is only indirectly voluntary, even if the effect follows necessarily
(per se) from that cause.” 50 For Aquinas, however, so long as the will connects with the act,
culpability abides. Praeter intentionem means that the will in no way intends or chooses the evil
effect; thus removing moral culpability.
In addition to substituting indirect voluntary for praeter intentionem and maintaining a
connection of the will to the effect, Suarez also eliminates discussion of the proximate end.
Without any consideration for the proximate end, the first-person perspective of choice that
constitutes an action as voluntary, is lost. The movement of the will as intention and choice give
an external act its moral character. The movement of the will is by definition an internal act,
which can only be known from within the person. By eliminating consideration of the proximate
end, Suarez pushes morality outside the soul into the natural sphere. Consequently, acts are
merely causes chosen for their effects.
According to Aquinas, one may consider one act in two ways: the natural order and the
moral order. Insofar as an act causes an effect that has a corresponding order or disorder in the
natural order it is good or evil on that level. However, for an act to be evil on the moral level, one
must will it as such. 51 Recall the above example of unknowingly, and unwillingly consuming
poison. An evil on the natural order occurs, but since one does not will it, it is not a moral evil.
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Recall from the previous chapter that Aquinas considers two movements of the will:
intending and choosing. By intending, the will has as its object an end. Intention guides
choosing. By choosing, the will selects a particular Moral Object, and then commands a specific
external act. Rationally ordered to its end, the will commands external acts by means of the
choice. The object of the choice is the proximate end that intention and the remote end formally
configure, as form to matter in such a way that the will commits one act through intention and
choice.
By way of example, if one kills an assailant, as an outside observer, one does not
necessarily know the agent’s intention. The external act of self-defense in its purely natural
sense—materia ex qua—may look no different than one choosing to kill the assailant. Only the
perspective of the acting person reveals the will. By means of self-revelation, various scenarios
may arise. One, it may become apparent that the agent fully intends to kill the assailant,
regardless of self-defense. Two, the agent may intend to kill the agent, as a means to selfdefense, something which Vitoria and many other commentators have no problem with, but that
Aquinas detests as immoral. Three, the agent may intend to protect one’s self using proportionate
means, that one may or may not foresee leading to the death of the assailant. The first example
differs from the latter two in that the proximate end is murder, not self-defense. Without an
appreciation for the proximate end, the difference between scenarios two and three obfuscates.
Only the first-person perspective reveals the proximate end.
J. Ghoos, in “L’Act a Double Effet Ètude de Théologie Positive,” insists that John of
Saint Thomas (John Poinsot) is the first to put the full version of Double Effect into written form
in his treatise on the fundamentals of moral theology, published posthumously in 1645.52
Cavanaugh speculates that Suarez had little influence on Poinsot. 53 Poinsot restricts morality to
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the realm of freedom, both of which he limits to the internal act of intention that he defines as an
act of the will. 54 Unlike Aquinas, however, he argues that external acts have no intrinsic
freedom, since the will does not govern them. 55 As such, external acts are also devoid of intrinsic
moral quality, but only have it by analogy, in virtue of intention. 56 With so much focus on
intention, which includes the ultimate end, morality becomes more about causing acts for their
effects. Ghoos illustrates this inclination by explicating the inchoate criteria of Double Effect in
Poinsot’s writing. First, one must not intend the harmful consequences. 57 Two, the bad effect
cannot be the proper effect of the intentional object. 58 Three, the good effect must offset the
negative.59 As with Suarez, Poinsot has no account for the distinction between the proximate and
remote end. Acts are about causing effects. Like his predecessors, he applies Double Effect to
new and old examples: a butcher selling meat to a Jew who uses it for idolatrous worship; a
priest who distributes communion to one having made a sacrilegious confession; and killing in
self-defense.60
Mangan, argues that Domingo de Saint Teresa writes the most important articulation of
the Principle of Double Effect in his Treatise on Sin in the 1647 Carmelite publication of Cursus
Theologicus.61 The Salmanticenses use four criteria of Double Effect to justify situations of illicit
sensual pleasure. 62 Domingo maintains the causal language dividing the principles between
causes per se and causes per accidens. The first assertion prohibits causes per se that have only
unlawful effects or bring about good effects only as a consequence of the unlawful effect. 63 The
second assertion permits causes per se that have an evil effect, if and only if, the good effect is
either simultaneous to or precedes the evil effect. 64 Third, there must be a proportionately good
reason for performing the act that cannot otherwise be avoided and one must not be able to
prevent the evil effect. 65 Finally, they advise one to weigh the act in relationship to the virtues
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that it opposes. 66 Not all virtues oblige in the same way. If act conforms to a virtue higher than
the evil effect it opposes, one may commit it.
Aquinas’s successors broaden the application of Double Effect; eliminate the distinction
between the proximate and remote end; and externalize moral deliberation. The following
subsection examines a manualist’s construct of the Principle of Double Effect.
iii. Jean Pierre Gury
Mangan argues that Jean Pierre Gury is the first to articulate the Principle of Double
Effect as a theory applicable to the rest of moral theology in his Compendium theologiae
moralis.67 Christopher Kaczor, in “Double Effect Reasoning from Jean Pierre to Peter Knauer,”
indicates that many consider Gury to be the leading casuist of the 19 th century.68 Because of his
important role in Catholic moral theology, and his development of the Principle of Double
Effect, this subsection explicates his version. In particular, it highlights the implications of
Gury’s cause-effect morality in contrasts to Aquinas’s intention-focused morality. Gury
publishes the first of 17 editions in his lifetime of the Compendium in 1850.69 I use the 17th
edition since it presumably represents his most mature formulation. 70
In the first tractatus, De Actibus Humanis, Gury discusses human acts and willing. Here,
he explicates the Principle of Double Effect in number nine of chapter 2. 71 First, recalling
Aquinas’s Summa II-II, q. 64, a. 7, he argues that it is morally permissible for there to be a
situation where two effects follow immediately from a good or indifferent cause, one good and
the other truly bad, if there is a grave reason, and the end of the agent is honorable. 72 Unlike
Aquinas, but very much like his causal predecessors, Gury identifies human acts as posited or
actualized causes. 73 This concise statement says a lot in just a few words. First, if one concedes
that positing causes is at least analogous to intending ends, then like Aquinas, Gury argues that
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some causes are good or indifferent in themselves—and conversely, some are intrinsically evil—
independent of the end of the agent. Given the complexity of the world, he, like Aquinas
recognizes that multiple effects may proceed from any given cause (or act), some good and some
bad. Third, not all of these are intended equally. Indeed, for Aquinas, some may not be intended
at all. Fourth, the immediate following of the effects indicates that the good and bad effects are
causally independent. In other words, the bad effect does not cause the good effect. Fifth, he
holds that a grave reason must proportionately justify positing the cause in light of the evil effect.
Put another way, the good effect needs to outweigh the bad effect. Finally, he insists that the
agent must not intend the bad, but the good effect.
Similar to an argument reductio ad absurdum, Gury logically reasons that the above
statement must be true, otherwise one would be sinning by: one, intending the bad effect; two, by
positing the cause itself; or three, by foreseeing the evil effect. 74 Regardless of how good the end
is for which one acts, the act would be unlawful simply because of the evil effect. Two,
regardless of the intrinsic moral quality of the act, the evil effect means that one sins simply by
positing it. Three, if one foresees that an evil effect will occur, then the act is definitely sinful.
All of these absurd conclusions are true if the criteria of the Principle of Double Effect are not
true. Therefore, in order to avoid this absurd reduction to sin, they must be true.
Notice that the above conditions essentially reduce morality to a form of
consequentialism. Cconsequentialist ethical theories run aground of rendering all of the above
conditions true. If one only considers consequences, then only effects matter. Such ethical
theories externalize acts rooting moral quality in consequences. If an action leads to a negative
consequence, then it is sinful and ought not to be done. This is truer if one foresees evil effect.
The only thing that saves a consequentialist theory from absurdity is the criteria of
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proportionality that capriciously weighs effects against effects. This is the basis of Gury’s fourth
criterion.
Gury explains why each of the absurd conclusions is false in the first of two etenim. One,
since the end is good, it is not on account of it that the act is unlawful. 75 Two, since the cause is
good or indifferent, positing it does not render the act unlawful. 76 Gury relies on more than
effects to justify his ethical theory. Three, foreseeing the evil effect does not render it immoral,
because it is at least offset by the good. 77 Mangan, following the fifth German edition translates
this as “not on account of the foreseeing of the evil effect, because in the hypothesis the evil
effect is not intended but merely permitted.” 78 Apparently, later editors alter this third criterion
according to a distinction between permitting evil versus intending evil. Permitting still has a
connotation of willing. Aquinas’s praeter intentionem is completely separate from the will,
thereby exonerating the agent of any culpability. Fourth, where the bad does not overpower the
good, one has a right to obtain a good end from the honorable cause. 79 In summary, he insists
that all four of the above conditions of Double Effect must hold: 1) the end of the agent must be
honorable; 2) the cause of the effects must be good or at least indifferent; 3) the evil effect must
not be the means to the good effect; and 4) there must be a proportionately serious reason for
positing the cause that does not contradict an obligation of virtue such as justice or charity. 80
Finally, in the second entenim, Gury explains each of the four conditions in greater detail.
First, the end of the agent must be good; one must not intend the bad effect, otherwise one sins. 81
As with Vitoria and Suarez, the broader sense of intention, that includes the proximate end, is
lost. The proximate end is entirely assumed into the remote end.
Second, Gury insists that the cause must be good or at least indifferent, that is as an act it
must not oppose any law. 82 Obviously, if the cause is evil in itself, the action is imputable to the
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agent as a fault. 83 Again, the concept of the will choosing a Moral Object (proximate end) is lost.
Gury replaces this with the positing of external causes. The causes externally imposed laws.
There is no sense that the will chooses rationally ordered object of the moral order; rather, one
posits a cause in natural order. While intrinsically evil acts may exist, they exist externally to the
soul. Understood as causes, acts follow laws on the natural order discoverable through trial and
error. Constituting moral theology externally, he lays the foundation for teleological ethical
theories.
Third, the bad effect must not be the means to the good effect, since this is causing an
evil effect for the sake of a good effect. 84 For Gury, actions involve causing effects. Sometimes
effects cause other effects. As such, one must not cause an evil effect for the good effect that
results. Gury’s causal expression fails to encapsulate Aquinas’s prohibition of choosing evil
means for a good end. This is because, for Aquinas, the Moral Object is not merely an external
effect, but an object of the moral order that the will deliberately chooses.
Fourth, Gury argues that the positive effects must proportionately outweigh the negative
to justify actuating the cause. 85 Kaczor astutely notes that for Aquinas the law of proportion
regarding Double Effect weighs the act in relationship to the end, while Gury weighs effects to
effects.86 Recall that for killing in self-defense, the question is about the means chosen to repel
an attacker. If the attacker is using deadly force, then one may justifiably choose deadly means
for self-defense; not, however, to justify choosing the evil of murdering an assailant. According
to Gury, the implication is that so long as the good effect (staying alive) outweighs the negative
effect (death of the assailant), one may justifiably kill the attacker.
Gury’s formulation of the Principle of Double Effect is the culmination of his
predecessors’ casuistic and causal morality. Like Suarez, he abandons the distinction between the
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proximate ends and ultimate end. His construct maintains the cause-effect terminology of
Domingo de St. Teresa. Since willing is about positing causes, he inadvertently equals laws of
morality with laws of nature and shifts the focus of moral decision making to the perspective of
the outside observer. Finally, his understanding of proportionality, which constitutes the
weighing of effects paves the way for Peter Knauer’s proportionalism, which the following
subsection discusses.
iv. Peter Knauer
Peter Knauer, in “The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect,” says that
the Principle of Double Effect is not only an important principle for morality, but also the most
fundamental of all the principles of moral theology. 87 His paper is groundbreaking because it
represents the inauguration of proportionalism, an important movement in moral theology that
peaks in the late twentieth century under the advocacy of the American theologian Richard
McCormick, before Pope John Paul II condemns it in Veritatis Splendor.88 This subsection
elucidates Knauer’s articulation of Double Effect and its subsequent role in proportionalism.
Knauer argues that the ‘simply good’ or a physical goodness desirable in itself is
precisely what is morally good too. 89 He holds that the will intends the ‘simply good,’ distinct
from any evil.90 Obviously, evil constitutes part of reality, but one does not will evil directly, but
only in association with some good. 91 Like his predecessors, he explains human action in terms
of cause and effect. Similar to Gury, he also uses the concept of permitting evil effects. Since
actions cause good or evil, Double Effect aids one in justifying the causing of evil effects.
Knauer, attempting to avoid modernist tendencies of relativism that subjective arbitration
risks, attributes an objective morality to Aquinas. He sees a direct correlation between what one
intends and the external world in which acts produce effects. For this reason, he argues that the
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Moral Object (proximate end) is ‘the end of the work’ (finis operis), also the effect of the act in
the world.92 Knauer equates the effect with the Moral Object. 93
Knauer realizes that for an action to be moral there must be some connection between it
and the will or intention, otherwise one simply identifies the effect with the external, physical
act.94 Intention morally qualifies act. But it must be objectively grounded; so, he roots the good
(or evil) of an intention in the physical, external world. He says, “all physical evils which are not
justified, and which arise in pursuit of a value, are in the moral sense eo ipso morally intended
and belong to the finis operis itself.” In other words, the will intends physical evil in the world.
Knauer maintains this position, not only to objectively ground morality, but also because
he believes that a consistent reading of Aquinas demands it. He refers the reader to I-II, q. 1, a. 3
and to I-II, q. 18. 95 In I-II, q. 1, a. 3, Aquinas says that acts receive their species from their end.96
He further indicates that only acts proceeding from a deliberate will are human. 97 In addition, the
object of the will is the good and the end, but the end is the principle of human acts. 98
In the answer, Aquinas does not explicitly specify the nature of the end. Since the
discussion of passions and heat immediately precedes his discussion of human acts, it is
understandable how one could interpret ends physically. But Aquinas, referring the reader to the
first article, clearly distinguishes purely physical, involuntary acts from distinctly human acts
that proceed from the deliberate will. 99 If this is not enough, he eliminates further confusion in
his response to the second objection, when he says, “the end, insofar as it pre-exists in the
intention, pertains to the will.” 100 That is, the ends of human acts originate in the will. Therefore,
the disorder of an intrinsically evil act corresponds more to a privation in the deliberate act of the
will, than any evil effect in the world. Basing morality in the subject person does not detract
from the objectivity of Aquinas’s ethical theory, since he roots it both in Natural Law and the
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human person. It does, however, mean that the moral order is not the same as, nor derivative of
the natural order.
Regarding the role of the remote end (finis operantis), Knauer insists that it too must not
merely be in the will, but must correspond to the external end. 101 What has been said above in
this subsection regarding ends of the will and the broad sense of intention in response to Vitoria
in the second subsection, suffices to clarify that moral ends are not derivative of the natural
order, but the moral order. Moreover, moral ends do not depend so much on their external effects
as the orientation of the will.
Because of the strong correlation between the effects of an act and the intention of the
will, Knauer equates the proportion of the intention of the act to the end in Aquinas to the
contemporary formulation of commensurate reason. 102 Since Knauer equates the object of
intention with effects, he like Gury considers the criterion of proportion to be about the weighing
of effects, not the proportioning of intention to a remote end, as a good rationally ordered by the
intellect and intended by the will. Knauer asserts “that an evil effect is not ‘directly intended’
only if there is a ‘commensurate reason’ for the act.” 103 Put another way, one may cause an evil
effect if there is a commensurate reason. 104
Knauer links his distinction between direct and indirect to three other aspects of
traditional moral theology: 1) formal and material cooperation in evil; 2) intrinsic and extrinsic
acts; and 3) negative and affirmative laws. He argues that once one applies the Principle of
Double Effect to the formal and material cooperation in evil the distinction between the two
becomes the same as direct and indirect, respectively. 105 While formal cooperation in evil always
constitutes a direct willing of evil, where commensurate reason abides material cooperation in
evil constitutes indirect willing of evil. 106
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Knauer makes a distinction between intrinsically evil acts and extrinsically evil acts. He
claims that intrinsically evil acts are always forbidden, while he permits extrinsically evil acts
where there is commensurate reason. 107 By intrinsically evil acts, Knauer does not mean the
same thing as Aquinas. For Aquinas, intrinsically evil reflects a disorder in the will’s intending
of a proximate end that can never be rationally ordered to the good. For Knauer, the only
difference between the two is that an intrinsically evil act constitutes an extrinsically evil act
without a commensurate reason. 108 With the application of Double Effect or commensurate
reason, the distinction between the two reduces to the difference between direct and indirect
causing of effects.
Finally, Knauer argues that the difference between a negative law and an affirmative law
consists in its obligation to the agent. He insists that negative laws are always obligatory, no
matter what, whereas, affirmative laws are obligatory, unless one has a commensurate reason not
to obey them.109 Relating these to causality, he asserts whenever one violates a negative law, one
directly causes evil, which is always prohibited. 110 However, one may licitly violate the
affirmative law causing evil indirectly, if one has a commensurate reason. 111 Regarding natural
law, he argues that the only unchanging norm is the obligation “to seek the best possible
solutions in their total existential entirety.” 112 This clearly links Natural Law and morality to the
natural order through effects.
Ultimately, for Knauer, the Principle of Double Effect “means that to cause or permit an
evil without commensurate reason is a morally bad act.” 113 Without a commensurate reason, the
evil is no longer accidental to the intention of the person, but becomes the Moral Object. 114
Whenever a commensurate reason exists, it occupies the place of the Moral Object and alone
determines the moral quality of the act.115 To illustrate he argues that when killing in self-
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defense, the commensurate reason constitutes self-defense. Knauer insists that a commensurate
reason is not just any reason whatsoever, but must outweigh the evil in exchange for the good in
such a way that it is not contrary to nature. 116 Whenever one wills evil directly, that is without a
commensurate reason, one intents something in such a way that it cannot be achieved according
to nature. This is precisely what constitutes sin as being contrary to nature. In other words, one
permits or causes a physical evil, without a commensurate reason.
Several things are apparent from the above discussion regarding Double Effect and
commensurate reason. According to Knauer, moral quality derives from the natural order as an
effect, which constitutes the Moral Object. Furthermore, whenever a commensurate reason
exists, evil is accidental or caused indirectly, which is what he means by praeter intentionem.
This is contrary to Aquinas’s understanding of praeter intentionem that means outside the will
altogether. For Aquinas, one does not will the evil at all, either directly or indirectly.
By rooting moral quality exclusively in the end, either as effect or commensurate reason, he
affirms that ends do justify means. This is the hallmark of proportionalism. So long as one has a
sufficient reason, one may use any means to achieve one’s end. Indeed, he rejects ethical theories
that render an act evil merely because of means. 117 If the means are not good enough, it is simply
because one does not have a commensurate reason. 118 With sufficient commensurate reason, one
can justify the causing of virtually any evil. For this reason, proportionalists, like Knauer deny
Aquinas’s version of intrinsically evil acts.
In summary, like his predecessors, Knauer maintains the external orientation of the action
with a focus on direct and indirect causing/permitting of effects. Moreover, to maintain
objectivity, he grounds morality in the natural order. He dissolves the distinction between the
proximate and the remote end with his proportionality criterion that justifies the any means for a
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good end. The following section contrasts the proportionalist’s version of the Principle of Double
Effect with that of non-consequentialists.
3B. Contemporary Formulations of the Principle of Double Effect
In Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II rejects components of teleological ethical
theories including proportionalism. 119 This section explores contemporary formulations and
applications of Double Effect by several authors. First, it explicates John Finnis, Germain Grisez
and Joseph Boyle’s use of Double Effect in defense of craniotomy in “‘Direct’ and ‘Indirect’: A
Reply to Critics of our Action Theory.” 120 Second, it highlights the distinction between intending
and foreseeing, which T. A. Cavanaugh, following G. E. M. Anscombe argues is a difference
between practical and speculative knowledge, respectively. 121 Third, it explores several practical
applications including: euthanasia/terminal sedation, terror bombing/tactical bombing, and
craniotomy/hysterectomy.
i. Finnis, Grisez and Boyle: Defending Craniotomy
Finnis et al., in “‘Direct’ and ‘indirect’: a Reply to Critics of Our Action Theory,” offer
eight cases that illustrate the intuitive veracity of their action theory, which incorporates the
perspective of the acting person, in common language. 122 Next, they offer a proper account for
the role of intention with regard to the perspective of the acting person. 123 Finally, they
demonstrate how this perspective may justify a physician performing a craniotomy. 124
a. Eight Cases that Illustrate Intention
Finnis et al. use eight cases to show that intention, and therefore, the perspective of the
acting human person is important for moral determination. 125 The first case consists of a boy who
decides to forgo his lunch, choosing instead, to buy a toy airplane with his lunch money. 126 This
first case demonstrates that action consists of a choice for a particular proposal among several
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options.127 Here, the boy, both intends to carry out the chosen proposal, and to attain the purpose
of the act.128 By choosing to the buy the airplane instead of lunch, he experiences hunger. 129 But
he does not intend the hunger; rather, he tolerates it as an unintended side effect. 130 This shows
that actions often have unintended consequences. 131
In the second case, a patient succumbs to a rare, but fatal side effect of his blood pressure
medication.132 This illustrates that one does not necessarily intend bad side effects, even when
one foresees and causes them through one’s actions. 133 In the third case, a man chooses to drive
home drunk, rather than to take a cab or stay at his friend’s house; consequently, he hits and kills
a bystander. 134 This demonstrates that even though one may not intend negative side effects, one
can still be morally responsible for them. 135 The fourth case, a stuttering witness testifying on
behalf of a defendant, demonstrates that one’s behavior in acting may constitute a side effect
preceding both one’s intended action and purpose. 136
The fifth example, a farmer castrating bulls to fatten them up, shows that observable
context is not enough to determine what a person is actually intending to do. 137 As an outside
observer, one may conclude that the farmer is sterilizing the bulls for the purpose of making
them infertile. Only the perspective of the acting person determines whether a consequence
constitutes a side effect or the purpose for one’s action.138 The sixth case, upsetting the minority
by commending an unpopular outgoing president, shows that even when one’s behavior
constitutes the choosing, doing and purpose of an act, there may be side effects distinct from
it.139
The seventh example consists of a company director choosing when to halt production to
retool, based on both a slight financial gain and the ability to undermine unionization. 140 This
shows that foreseen effects may not be the reason one chooses, even when doing so looks no
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different from the outside. 141 Finally, the eighth case is a spy who kills his beloved guest for the
purpose of silencing her. 142 Although the spy kills the guest for the purpose of silencing her, this
ulterior motive does not detract from the fact that he intends and chooses to kill her. This
highlights the important perspective of the acting person, which indicates what the person
intends by an action. 143
Finnis et al. conclude that the above examples demonstrate the important role of intention
from the first-person perspective. Moreover, although the emphasis in ethics and law denigrates
its significances as of late, it remains, as it has throughout history, an important component for
moral decision-making.144 Unfortunately, Bentham’s utilitarianism conflates what one foresees
with what one intends. 145 Finnis et al. refer the reader to contemporary jurisprudence that
maintains a distinction between intended and unintended actions. 146 That is not the same as
saying that there are no consequences for one’s actions, if the consequences are not intended.
The third case of the drunk driver killing a pedestrian proves this. 147
b. Perspective of the Acting Person
Finnis et al. demonstrate the importance of the perspective of the acting human person for
an adequate account of Aquinas’s action theory that also conforms to John Paul II’s critique of
proportionalism and defense of the Moral Object in Veritatis Splendor.148 Following the
perspective of the manualists and Enlightenment philosophers, proportionalists continue to focus
on the third-person perspective regarding morality. 149 As the above cases demonstrate, the
observer’s perspective does not adequately account for intention, especially regarding the Moral
Object. In the previous section, I highlight a distinction between the broad and narrow sense for
intention that Finnis elucidates in his reading of Aquinas’s De Malo.150 The broad sense of
intention includes both the proximate end and the ultimate end; however, more narrowly
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understood, it constitutes only the ultimate end. 151 Much confusion arises from the failure to
distinguish between the broad and narrow understanding of intention. Finnis et al. indicate that in
Veritatis Splendor, John Paul II uses the term intention in the narrow sense. 152
In the broad sense of the interpretation, intention is important insofar as the Moral Object
constitutes the willing or intending of a means for an end. The Moral Object that one wills is
what the person chooses through a deliberate will. 153 Only the perspective of the acting person
enables one to identify the Moral Object, which is the primary determinant of an acts morality. 154
Actions that have a Moral Object contrary to the good constitute intrinsically evil acts or
exceptionless, non-tautological negative norms. 155
Finnis, in Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth explains Aquinas’s defense of
exceptionless moral norms. 156 Augustine, in Contra mendacium argues that there are at least two
exceptionless moral norms: lying about the faith—even to catch heretics—and adultery. 157 In
response to this, Peter Abelard argues that the moral quality of an act depends entirely on
intention.158 Perhaps inadvertently, readers accuse him of denying the existence of intrinsically
evil acts.159 For instance, Peter Lombard, in his Sentences argues that certain acts are wrong in
themselves (mala in se) precisely because they do not depend on the purpose, will, intention or
motivation of the acting person. 160 In his commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas argues that
intrinsically evil acts are wrong precisely because of the acting person’s will, intention and
purpose.161 Even if the intentions and circumstances are good, the object can be wrong insofar as
the will’s choosing of it is wrong. 162 For instance, lying to catch a thief is wrong because one
cannot deliberately will or choose to lie in a good way.
Intention, understood in the broad sense, includes both, the choosing of a Moral Object
(proximate end), and the intending of an end (remote end); the difference being one of proximity
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to the acting agent. 163 Insofar as one chooses a particular action for a given end, the former
constitutes the proximate end, while the latter is the ulterior (or remote) end. 164 Although there
may be no chronological distinction between an agent’s choosing a proximate end and intending
an ulterior end, the former has greater proximity to the agent, insofar as the will deliberately
chooses that action. 165 In this sense, the proximate end acts as a means to the ulterior end. 166 If
the proximate end violates an exceptionless moral norm, then it’s object is immoral and ought
not to be done. Moreover, the quality of the ulterior end or circumstances cannot change this.
c. Debunking Unsound Arguments against Craniotomies
Having established the use of intention according to their action theory, Finnis et al.
utilize it to debunk so-called unsound arguments against craniotomies. 167 In particular, they
reject the cause-effect approach to morality that presumes a third-person perspective. 168 To this
end, they reject seven traditional arguments against craniotomies. 169 First, they rebuff the
argument that a craniotomy just is killing a baby, precisely because this presumes an outsider’s
perspective, constitutive of the cause-effect approach to morality. 170 Such an argument presumes
that the species of the act consists of the natural order; however, Aquinas specifically places the
character of the moral act in the moral order. 171 Second, they reject any claim that “since the
procedure alone does not help the mother, it may not be done,” since such an assertion, once
again, restricts morality to the physical domain. 172 Third, the physical dissimilarity to removing a
gravid uterus is not enough to constitute an ethical difference. 173 Alternatively, the physical
similarity to partial-birth abortion, does not render the proposal the same.174 The permissibility of
an alternate procedure that squeezes the skull without crushing it, points to the fact that the
physical act alone does not characterize the object. 175 While alternatives, allowing the mother
and child both to die and the death of the child through craniotomy are repugnant; Finnis et al.
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argue that the exceptionless moral norm prohibiting the killing of the innocent does not exclude
craniotomies.176
Finally, Finnis et al. assert that just because a procedure cannot be safely taught or done
does not mean that it is immoral. 177 For clarity, however, they accept the Church’s teaching
against the direct killing of the unborn. 178 They argue, however, that a craniotomy does not
constitute direct killing. 179 Moreover, one may assert that craniotomies are immoral, but they
insist, not because it constitutes direct killing. 180
d. Defending Craniotomies
Next, Finnis et al. rebut an argument which Kevin F. Flannery makes asserting two
physical differences between a hysterectomy of a pregnant woman with uterine cancer versus a
craniotomy.181 First, the physician performs the hysterectomy on the woman, and the craniotomy
on the child. 182 Second, descriptively, the hysterectomy does not necessitate the death of the
child according to its definition, while the craniotomy does. To the first objection, Finnis et al.
argue that direct physical action does not entail direct killing of the innocent, as countless
examples indicate. 183 For instance, in self-defense, the defendant may kill the assailant using
direct physical means, but this does not equate to direct killing of the innocent as the adopted
moral proposal. Regarding the second, they insist that what counts for moral analysis is content
of the proposal the agent actually adopts, not what an outside observer may ascribe to it. 184
Accordingly, they assert that their description of a craniotomy does not include killing a baby. 185
In “Natural Law mens rea versus the Benthamite Tradition,” Flannery says that
performing a hysterectomy on a pregnant woman’s cancerous womb needlessly early changes
the act to direct killing. 186 Finnis et al., however, insist that although failing to wait a few weeks
to save the baby constitutes an injustice to the baby and homicide, it does not then become direct
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killing.187 Similarly, a bomber proposing to explode an aircraft in flight to collect insurance on
the aircraft kills the passengers only indirectly. 188 They contend that asserting that neither case
constitutes direct killing does not detract from the grave moral wrongness of the acts. 189
Finnis et al. refute the allegation that their moral theory depends on the criterion of the
indivisibility of performance, which Jean Porter concludes is of central importance for them in
“‘Direct’ and ‘Indirect’ in Grisez’s Moral Theory.” 190 Recalling the rebuttal to the second
illusory argument in section III—crushing the skull alone does not suffice, but that removal of
the body must follow—they reiterate the insignificance of the inseparability of the primitive or
physical act. 191 Again, what matters for the moral determination of the act is what one actually
proposes as a means to one’s end, not what one could propose. 192 Porter argues that the weakness
of their action theory is the inability to actually know what the agent is, in fact, choosing. 193
Indeed, such a weakness, she argues, enables one to substitute motives after the fact. 194 For
Finnis et al., the apparent lack of objective from the third-person perspective, does not equate to
an actual lack of objectivity. 195 Regardless of what may be ascribed by one’s self or an outside
observer after the fact, the means chosen at the time of deliberation objectively are what they are;
and the conscience of the agent testifies to this. 196 Moreover, in contrast to what Porter infers on
Grisez, namely that the intention be understood psychologically and logically, they assert that
both are irrelevant since the object chosen constitutes a proposition rationally configured to some
intended good end. 197 While emotions motivate, they do not constitute what one actually does,
which is a product of practical reason. 198
Using the example of killing in self-defense and euthanasia, Porter reveals her inability to
distinguish between the intended end and the accepted side effects. 199 Indeed, the statement
regarding self-defense, “attempt to kill again,” and the example of a physician’s botched attempt
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to euthanize a patient, indicate that the respective agents actually chose an immoral means from
the beginning, namely to kill. 200 What makes killing in self-defense permissible is precisely the
agent’s intent not to kill, but defend one’s self, even if one foresees the death of the agent.
Likewise, intention distinguishes euthanasia from sedation to relieve pain that expedites the
dying process. In both cases, death constitutes an unintended side effect, not the end for one’s
action.
Finnis et al., utilizing an action theory based on perspective of the acting person, defend
their view that the object of the act in performing a craniotomy does not constitute direct killing,
but the reducing the dimensions of the cranium, of the child, which indirectly or unintentionally
leads to the death of the child. They contend that their opponents’ failure to grasp the soundness
of their argument constitutes an inability to understand the complexity of their theory. Two
errors stand out, one, they reduce the means to the external, physical act alone, or two, they fail
to differentiate the object from the unintended side effects. The following explores the intended
versus the foreseen in greater deal from the perspective of T. A. Cavanaugh.
ii. A Thomistic Response to Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle
T. A. Cavanaugh in, Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil, addresses
Finnis et al.’s perspective on craniotomies. 201 Essentially, Cavanaugh argues that their inability
to arrive at the conclusion that craniotomies constitute direct killing amounts to relegating the
moral realm to the conceptual realm to such a degree that not only is each person’s moral
deliberation incommunicable, but a disconnect exists between the mind and the external
world.202 Cavanaugh asserts that they fall victim to H. L. A. Hart’s critique of rendering what
constitutes a contingent connection merely conceptual. 203 In his discussion regarding selfdefense, Aquinas says, “An act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the
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end.” 204 By implication, if the means chosen is not proportionate to the end, one may correctly
conclude that the Moral Object is immoral. For instance, if one intentionally uses more force
than necessary to repulse an assailant’s attack, this may indicate a Moral Object of murder, not
self-defense. Moreover, it is not necessary to conclude this merely from the first-person
perspective. In other words, a third-person perspective on action does say something about an
agent’s intention.
Finnis et al., utilizing the writings of John Paul II, argue against using the third-person
perspective to determine another’s intention: “the truth about what is intended and being done is
available, primarily if not exclusively to the acting person in that acting.” 205 Ostensibly this is
because it caves to the teleological tendencies that John Paul II condemns. 206 Such a subjectively
grounded method risks relativism. While it may be true that what one actually deliberates,
chooses and carries out in choice is known primarily, if not exclusively by the acting person, if
one cannot communicate this in words or behavior, then nothing prevents one from covering
one’s actions with lies. Cavanaugh indicates that language constitutes one means of
communicating intention, but the body, in its behavior does so too. 207 For instance, regarding
adultery, John Paul II in Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body says, “The
body tells the truth through faithfulness and conjugal love, and, when it commits ‘adultery’ it
tells a lie, it commits falsehood.”208 Not with standing differences, confusion and ambiguity in
language and behavior, an objective truth, whether of the moral order or the natural order is
certainly communicable.
The dilemma seems to abide between the role of the Moral Object and its relation the
exterior act. Duarte Sousa-Lara discusses the relationship between the interior (internal) act and
the exterior (external) act in relationship to the proximate end in “Aquinas on Interior and

141

Exterior Acts: Clarifying a Key Aspect of His Action Theory.” 209 Following Aquinas’s
articulation of exterior acts in De Malo, Sousa-Lara indicates, “exterior acts belong to the genus
moris [Moral order] only insofar as they are voluntary.” 210 Conceptually, one may abstract the
voluntariness from the exterior act, which constitutes the materia ex qua, also called the material
element of the human act or the primitive act. 211 Alternatively, the materia circa quam is the
proximate end (Moral Object) and the object of choice. 212 Sousa-Lara, following Martin
Rhonheimer and Finnis et al., argues that the materia circa quam, links the soul of the act
(proximate end) to the body of the act (materia ex qua).213 Moreover, in this regard, the materia
circa quam already has a formal element, a rational good able to move the will. 214
Manualists, proportionalists and many Thomists interpret exterior acts merely as the
physical acts commanded by the will.215 Such an interpretation renders the exterior act devoid of
rational configuration to the good, in which case the connection between the physical act in
natural order and the moral act in the moral order is tenuous at best. The third-person
perspective, being speculative in nature, only reveals the natural order. For this reason, many
Thomists insist that one needs more than a third-person perspective to determine intention.
Sousa-Lara takes Aquinas to relate the interior act with intention and the remote end.216 In
addition, the exterior act refers to the choice, the proximate end, and the commanded act. 217
Thus, a connection occurs between the natural and moral order in the exterior act.
For intrinsically evil acts, Aquinas insists that an inappropriate or unsuitable matter
abides, which the will chooses. 218 This matter is the Moral Object, suitable or unsuitable in
relationship to reason219 and the human person. 220 Insofar as the will deliberately chooses the
inappropriate matter, a disorder abides within the will itself. 221 The will externalizes the
disordered choice by commanding the act. Again, insofar as the external act is voluntary, it
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retains its connection to the moral order. 222 As a commanded act, the exterior act manifests in the
natural order. Thus, a connection abides between the practical and ontological. In “‘Materia ex
qua’ and ‘Materia circa quam’ in Aquinas,” Sousa-Lara indicates that the physical act limits the
range of possible Moral Objects. 223 For example, there are only three possible Moral objects for
coitus: marital love, fornication, or adultery. While an outsider’s perspective can limit the
options, only the first-person perspective indicates which Moral Object one chooses.
Practical reason does not formulate the Moral Object in a conceptual vacuum. John
Abraham Makdisi in his dissertation, “The Object of the Moral Act: Understanding St. Thomas
Aquinas Through the Work of Steven Long and Martin Rhonheimer,” following Aquinas shows
how circumstances on the natural order can impact the moral order. 224 As the third criteria for
determining the morality of an act, 225 circumstances are of the natural order that add to or detract
from the morality of an act only accidentally, but do not change the Moral Object. 226 However, if
one chooses that which is a circumstance in another act as the reason for acting, then it
determines the Moral Object. 227 For example, if one chooses lethal means to rebuff a non-lethal
attack, then the Moral Object is not self-defense, but murder. In addition, if a couple engaging in
the sexual act are not married in natural order, then the act cannot be one of marital love. So long
as both freely choose it, the Moral Object must be either fornication or adultery.
That the natural order limits the range of possible Moral Objects does not detract from
the primacy of the first-person perspective in morality. 228 Indeed, the above demonstrates the
unique importance this plays for Thomistic action theory. It does; however, mean that since some
external behaviors correspond with certain intentions, one may attain a closer awareness, even if
not perfect, about what the acting agent intends. Though he does not word it in such terms,
Cavanaugh rightly demonstrates that the conceptual disconnect between the practical choice and
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the contingent physical behavior of crushing a child’s skull in a craniotomy clearly and
unambiguously manifests a direct intent to kill. 229 As a subsection demonstrates below, while
one may make a conceptual distinction between crushing the skull of a child and killing it, the
effect so intimately connects with the act it is a constitutive part of the intent, not a foreseen
effect.230 The following subsection differentiates terminology for the Principle of Double Effect.
iii. Intended and Foreseen in T. A. Cavanaugh
This subsection elucidates Cavanaugh’s distinction between intending and foreseeing.
a. Double-Effect Terminology
In Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil, Cavanaugh argues for the
distinction between intended and foreseen, as opposed to alternative formulations: intended/side
effect, direct/indirect, or intended/unintended. 231 Cavanaugh dislikes the use of side effect
because it implies that it has no ethical significance. 232 Moreover, he asserts that proponents
often insinuate that bad side effects are less bad, and therefore, permissible to allow. 233 This is
precisely what foreseen avoids. 234
In addition, the direct/indirect distinction is ambiguous and leads to confusion. 235 The
confusion arises because one may use direct or indirect in reference to intention or cause, which
mean very different things. 236 For instance, in self-defense, one may use force, that directly
causes harm to one’s assailant, but one does not intend it directly, but indirectly. In contrast, one
may directly intend to harm another through an action that only does so causally indirectly.
Cavanaugh insists that permitting, allowing and accepting do not suffice to describe the
foreseen, yet unintended. 237 Once again, it fails to capture the distinction between intending and
causing. For instance, in passive euthanasia, one intentionally omits action, causally permitting,
allowing, and accepting the patient to succumb to the dying process to relieve suffering. 238
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Causally, the agent does nothing, allowing, permitting, accepting, the process of dying to
proceed unhindered. However, intentionally, the agent intends for the patient to die.
Cavanaugh dislikes the intended/unintended distinction as well, because as Finnis
indicates unintentional implies accidental or lack of foresight. 239 Logically, unintended is not
necessarily the contrary of intended insofar as it may mean both intending-not-to-x and notintending-to-x.240 Only the latter is the contrary to intending. 241 Ultimately, Cavanaugh
concludes that an important distinction for Double Effect is intended/foreseen, where the latter is
not intended.
b. Intention/Foreseen Distinction
Cavanaugh argues that certain actions inexorably have a malevolent intention attached to
them: euthanasia, terror bombing, and craniotomy. 242 One cannot commit these actions without
intending harm. At the same time, this does not mean that agents cannot intend harm by actions
that do not necessarily have evil intentions linked to them, such as, terminal sedation, tactical
bombing and hysterectomies. 243 Put another way, one cannot choose euthanasia, terror bombing
or a craniotomy as a means to an end without intending harm. Though malicious intent is not
inexorably linked to terminal sedation, tactical bombing and hysterectomies, one may
nonetheless intend harm choosing them as a means to an end—good or bad.
Cavanaugh asserts, with G. E. M. Anscombe that changing the direction of intention does
not thereby render one’s act devoid of intention.244 In other words, one cannot simply redirect
one’s intention in such a way that one’s act is not intentional. Moreover, one cannot add
secondary intentions to cover for primary intentions. 245 According to Cavanaugh, such an
approach to foreseen effects is a non-starter.246
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Cavanaugh demonstrates the deficiency of the counter-factual test that Charles Fried
offers.247 Fried asserts that one may determine whether one intends the bad effect, by answering
the question: would one commence without the foreseen negative effect? 248 According to Fried, a
negative response indicates that the agent intends the evil, while a positive answer indicates one
does not intend the malevolent effect. 249 Following James Sterba, such a test does not suffice to
conclude that the agent does not maliciously intend the foreseen means. 250 To establish intent,
Sterba recommends asking if the foreseen bad effects help to explain why one chose a particular
action.251 If the answer is yes, then one may tie it to intention. 252
Next, Cavanaugh addresses closeness and conceptual necessity to determine if an effect
constitutes intention or foreseen effect. 253 According to Cavanaugh, certain actions have a
conceptual necessity attached to them. 254 For example, it is impossible to conceive of
assassinating someone without killing. 255 Intending to assassinate conceptually necessitates
intending to kill. 256 Likewise, for Cavanaugh, intending to perform a craniotomy inexorably
entails killing a child, even if one can conceptually distinguish the act of crushing the skull and
the child dying. 257 Accordingly, Cavanaugh asserts, “if one’s intent conceptually includes the
effect, then one intends that effect.” 258
Next, Cavanaugh defines the nature of intention and distinguishes it from foreseen
effects.259 To begin with, he observes that intentions concern that which is desirable. 260
Unfortunately, desirable has several references, including reason and feelings. 261 Regarding
intention, desirable concerns that which one determines to be rationally good to effect,
something that may be affectively undesirable. 262 As such, it is clear that intention is different
from emotional feelings.
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For Cavanaugh, intention also has a volitional content oriented to achieving a particular
good in action. 263 More than simply wanting or desiring a good, one wills to act according to
plan by intending. 264 In fact, what distinguishes wanting from intending is the plan for action. 265
To achieve one’s goal, one both intends the end in sight and the means to achieving the end. 266 In
contrast, foresight lacks the volitional content of intention; rather, it consists of an awareness of
causal relations.267 Knowing causal relations does not amount to having a plan of action and
acting accordingly. When one acts with foresight, however, it does reveal one’s intention. 268
Deliberation is the process whereby one formulates an intentional plan of action. 269 To
intend is for an agent to tend toward some end, the intervening space of which constitutes the
means.270 It is precisely through deliberation that reason discovers means to achieving ends. 271 In
deliberation, the end answers the question why and the means answer the question how. 272
Committing one’s plan to action, Cavanaugh logically induces that one may say “end x by means
y.”273 An important distinction between intention and foresight is that the former causes
deliberation, while latter does not. 274
It is important for Cavanaugh to avoid any consequentialist tendency, which reduces
means to causes and ends to effects. The difference between means/ends and causes/effects is
that means relate to ends as through an agent’s deliberation. 275 An agent deliberates over possible
causes to achieve specific effects and insofar as the agent intends causes for effects they are
means for ends. 276 As an example, a cue ball may hit an eight ball into a corner pocket, such that
an observer says that the cue ball causes the eight ball to going into the pocket. But a qualitative
difference occurs when an agent intentionally hits the cue ball so that this constitutes a means to
attaining the end of putting the eight ball in the corner pocket. 277

147

Recall that for Aquinas there are four irreducible orders—order of nature, logical order,
moral order, and practical arts—that correspond to four irreducible sciences—natural sciences
(math and metaphysics), logic, morality, and technical sciences. 278 Following Anscombe’s lead,
Cavanaugh highlights the epistemic difference between intention and foreseen effects that
corresponds to the difference in orders. 279 Intention corresponds to practical knowledge;
therefore, it consists of knowing by doing without observation; while foreseeing effects
corresponds to speculative knowledge—knowing by observing. 280 As such, both have different
directions of fit. 281 Foreseen effects, insofar as they constitute speculative knowledge are true
insofar as what one knows corresponds to the truth that is. 282 Intentions, on the other hand, are
true when one’s execution of action achieves its end. 283 Therefore, intentions give rise to actions,
while foreseen effects correspond to events or happenings. 284 Moreover, since foresight
constitutes a different order from intention, it does not define one’s act or inform one’s behavior,
as the latter does. 285
While intent may at times be difficult to observe, different intentions give rise to different
behaviors that although subtle and sometimes ambiguous, are nonetheless often discernible. 286
Cavanaugh illustrates by showing how different intentions inform the same behavior, with
differences, as for example, blinking to send a message looks quite different from blinking to
remove an irritant from one’s eye. 287
To eliminate confusion and correct error, Cavanaugh advocates for the adoption the
intention/foreseen distinction in Double Effect. The above demonstrates that this lexicon offers
several advantages for highlighting important distinctions between what one intends and the
foreseen effects. The next subsections apply this distinction to three contrasting topics:
euthanasia/terminal sedation; craniotomy/hysterectomy; and terror/tactical bombing. 288
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iv. Euthanasia Versus Terminal Sedation
This subsection discusses the distinction between euthanasia and terminal sedation.
a. The Catholic Church: Euthanasia and Terminal Sedation
In the Declaration on Euthanasia, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith defines
euthanasia as “an action or omission which of itself or by intention causes death, in order that all
suffering may in this way be eliminated.” 289 Intention plays a vital role in determining whether
an act constitutes euthanasia. In Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life, William May
highlight a distinction between active and passive euthanasia that relates to intention. 290 Active
euthanasia constitutes an act of commission whereas passive euthanasia is an act of omission,
both for the end of eliminating suffering by killing. 291 He further delineates, taking into account
the will of the patient: voluntary—the patient agrees, non-voluntary—the patient is unaware and
involuntary—the patient refuses. 292 Few question the immorality of nonvoluntary or involuntary
euthanasia, since it violates the patient’s autonomy; however, voluntary active or passive are
finding increasing acceptance among ethicists. 293
Pope John Paul II, in Evangelium Vitae, contends that insofar as euthanasia entails the
intentionally terminating human life, it violates the exceptionless moral norm to respect the
inviolable dignity of the human person. 294 At the same time, this does not mean that physicians
may not use treatments at their disposal to relieve pain and as an unintended, yet foreseen effect
expedites the dying process by depressing respiratory function. 295 Moreover, while one is obliged
to accept proportionate or ordinary treatment, one may refuse disproportionate or extraordinary
treatment.296 Since the treatments and methods chosen to euthanize—actively or passively—or to
relieve pain are often identical, the first-person perspective is crucial for determining intent.
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Many physicians contend that continuous, deep sedation, when done properly, does not
shorten a patient’s life. 297 If true, this renders obsolete recourse to the Principle of Double Effect
to justify the unintended, but foreseen expedited death of the patient. However, insofar as the
Church encourages patients to maintain consciousness to prepare themselves for death as they
near the end of life, the Principle of Double Effect justifies sedation for patients experiencing
intense pain or anxiety. 298 Thus, even if painkillers do not hasten death, ethicists rely on Double
Effect to vindicate rendering a patient unconscious at the end of life. 299
b. Joseph Boyle: Euthanasia and Terminal Sedation
In “On Killing and Letting Die,” Joseph M. Boyle, Jr. formulates an argument defending
the moral distinction between killing and letting die. 300 First, he indicates that it is possible to
wrongly let someone die. 301 He holds that such an act of omission is just as morally
reprehensible as killing a person by commission. 302 He acknowledges that not all cases of letting
die are morally wrong. 303 However, he insists that “most cases of killing—and all case of directly
killing the innocent—are morally wrong.” 304 If the abovementioned premises are true, then two
converse conclusions are true: 1) not all cases of deciding to let someone die simply constitutes
the application of the judgment that it is wrong to kill; 2) the moral decision to kill someone is
not merely the application of the decision that it would be wrong to let this person die. 305 Boyle
highlights that for traditional ethics the proscription for killing the innocent includes killing via
euthanasia, because the patient is innocent in the relevant sense, that is, innocent as noncombatants in war. 306 Moreover, killing in euthanasia constitutes direct killing, rather than
indirect killing—a foreseen, yet unintended effect of an action—since one intends the death of
the patient, usually as a means to bring about an end to suffering. 307 In active euthanasia, the
patient’s death constitutes the means for ending pain. 308
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Boyle raises an objection that opponents such as James Rachels often level against the
moral significance thesis, namely, that it is sometimes worse to let someone die, than to relieve
their suffering quickly by killing them. 309 To illustrate, Rachels argues that parents who let their
Down syndrome child die by starvation, neglecting to repair an intestinal blockage, should have
simply acknowledged their intention—not to raise a child with Down syndrome—and killed the
child via active euthanasia to forgo the painful death of starvation. 310 Boyle indicates that
Rachels’ inference does not justify his wholesale rejection of the thesis, but merely shows that
one can abuse it. 311 Indeed, as Boyle illustrates there are many cases where one determines that
treatment is futile or burdensome, and therefore, one ceases treatment, allowing the patient to
die, but this does not necessarily mean that one intends the death of the patient, as one clearly
does in active and passive euthanasia. 312
The moral significance of the distinction between passive euthanasia and allowing one to
die, without necessarily intending death, depends on two assumptions: 1) that there is a
difference between what one intends and what one foresees, but does not intend as a side effect;
and 2) that this distinction has moral significance. 313 Boyle demonstrates that Rachels’s rejection
of a distinction between euthanasia and letting die, presumes falsely that all decisions for the
latter entails a decision to end the patient’s suffering by death, which is patently not true. 314
Others such as Michael Tooley 315 contest the moral significance thesis with the so-called moral
symmetry principle, which asserts that there is no moral difference between killing and letting
die, but is only supportable by example. 316
Michael Tooley offers two examples in which one intends the death of the other, but the
physical difference consists in Jones letting Smith die by a bomb (by not warning him), as
opposed to Jones killing Smith by shooting him. 317 Daniel Dinello counters using an example of
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two patients desperately in need of the other’s organ to survive: Jones needs a heart tra nsplant or
will die in two hours and Smith needs a kidney transplant or will die in four hours—each are the
only possible donor candidate for the other. 318 Boyle indicates that this counterexample does not
suffice to disprove the symmetry principle, because there may indeed be a difference of
intention.319 Clearly it is wrong to kill Smith, but this does not entail the decision to will Jones’s
death.320 As such, the symmetry principle still remains valid for some cases, but this does not
invalidate Boyle’s thesis.321 In turn, Boyle concludes that while there are certainly cases where
one may intend another’s death by letting her die, this does not constitute a logical necessity,
since it is possible to allow her to die without intending her death.
In the abovementioned paper, Boyle demonstrates that a physician’s intention may not
always include the death of the patient, but when it comes to terminal sedation, intent—an
important factor for resolving legal disputes—is precisely what one must prove. In “Medical
Ethics and Double Effect: The Case of Terminal Sedation,” Joseph Boyle argues that the
Principle of Double Effect is transferable to medical ethics. 322 In particular, by analyzing
documentation and dosage, Boyle argues one can determine the physician’s intention.323
Following Aquinas and Gury, Boyle articulates the four criteria of Double Effect. 324 First, the act
in question must be good or indifferent, which he indicates prescribing and administering
analgesics to be. 325 Second, the bad effect must not be the cause of the good. 326 Again, in this
case, the bad effect—the death of the patient—is not necessarily the cause of relieving the
patient’s pain. Third, the bad effect must not be intended. 327 Fourth, Boyle highlights the
condition of proportionality, which necessitates a grave enough reason to justify the accepted,
yet unintended effects. 328
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c. Intention/Foreseen Distinction: Euthanasia and Terminal Sedation
Using the intention/foreseen distinction, Cavanaugh explains the difference between
voluntary active euthanasia and terminal sedation. 329 In the case of euthanasia, the physician
deliberates over how to achieve the intended end of ceasing the patient’s pain and concludes that
killing the patient is a good solution.330 Consequently, the physician deliberates further about
how to terminate the patient’s life. 331 Arriving at a practical action, the physician administers a
lethal dose of a drug. 332 Since the physician intends to end the patient’s pain by means of death,
pain relief alone does not qualify as success; the patient must die. 333 In the case of terminal
sedation, having the goal of ending the patient’s pain, the physician deliberates that a barbiturate
drip is the best solution, even though he foresees this causing a premature death. 334 Unlike in the
case of euthanasia, the foresight that the barbiturate-drip causes death, does not invoke further
deliberation in the physician about utilizing it for that purpose. 335 Put more simply, the foresight
does not provoke further deliberation, whereas the intent to kill does; which stands out as a
defining difference between foresight and intent. 336 Moreover, regarding terminal sedation,
although the physician expects the patient to die using the barbiturate-drip, if death does not
ensue, he does not fail in achieving his goal. 337 Failure occurs if the barbiturate-drip does not
relieve the patient’s pain. 338 Thus, Cavanaugh concludes that the distinction between euthanasia
and terminal sedation contrasts as “necessarily-intended-death versus foreseen-not-necessarilyintended-death.” 339
v. Hysterectomy Versus Craniotomy
This subsection explicates the distinction between a hysterectomy and a craniotomy.
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a. Direct Killing in Abortion
In Evangelium Vitae, Pope John Paul II points to the Didache as testimony for the
Church’s unbroken teaching against direct abortion: “you shall not put a child to death by
abortion nor kill it once it is born.” 340 Direct abortion occurs whenever one wills the death of the
unborn child either as a means or an end to one’s action. 341 He recapitulates what the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith articulates as the Magisterial Teaching of the Church
that this prohibition against killing begins at the moment of conception, which corresponds to the
inviolable dignity of the human person. 342 The Church does not prohibit indirect abortion for
proportionate reasons. 343 Indirect abortion means that one does not will the death of the child. 344
The classic scenario is a woman with a gravid (pregnant), cancerous uterus who undergoes a
hysterectomy to save the mother’s life. 345 The foreseen, yet unintended effect is the death of the
child.
b. Defending Craniotomies
As the above demonstrates, Finnis et al. argue that the same line of reasoning justifies
craniotomies, since for them it is nothing more than cutting the cranium. 346 Germain Grisez
defends craniotomies in Living a Christian Life.347 First, he insists that four criteria must exist: 1)
some pathology threatens both mother and child; 2) it is not safe to wait; 3) there is no way to
save the child; 4) the procedure that saves the mother’s life results in the child’s death. 348 In
“Double Effect and a Certain Type of Embryotomy,” Joseph M. Boyle argues in favor of
craniotomy, under the circumstances given by Grisez, rejecting the traditional belief that it
constitutes direct killing. 349 Boyle understands direct killing “as that killing in which the
resulting death either is intended or is immediate or is the effect of a cause which may not
morally be posited.” 350 Boyle defends H. L. A. Hart’s assertion that the craniotomy is not direct
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killing, holding that it is no different than the indirect killing that occurs when removing a
gravid, cancerous uterus via hysterectomy. 351 Hart insists that in both cases the fetus’s body must
be removed from the woman’s body. 352 In fact, however, for the hysterectomy the body of the
fetus does not pose the threat, so properly speaking, this is not what the surgeon removes; rather,
she removes the uterus that carries the child. Even if the woman were not pregnant, the physician
must remove the cancerous uterus. In the case necessitating a craniotomy, however, the condition
of the child being stuck constitutes the pathology.
Following Hart, Boyle insists that if there is no conceptual connection between a side
effect and what one intends in action then the side effect is outside of one’s intention—praeter
intentionem.353 Boyle argues that since the craniotomy has no conceptual connection to the death
of the child, 354 it does not constitute direct killing. 355 Rather, he argues that the conceptual
content of a craniotomy is merely the altering of the dimensions of the fetus’s skull. 356 Boyle
continues the argument asserting that the fetus’s death is neither the means nor the end of saving
the mother’s life, for which the physician performs a craniotomy. 357
Cavanaugh indicates that common language points to an awareness of a correspondence
between the conceptual and causal. 358 For Cavanaugh, Finnis et al. so narrowly define
craniotomy that it conceptually excludes the death of the child. 359 As such, their conceptual
definition excludes what is causally necessary to craniotomy, the death of the child. 360 In fact, the
causal necessity is so strong; it is virtually impossible to conceive of even the possibility of a
craniotomy that does not also entail the death of the child. 361 Moreover, R. A. Duff argues that
this connection is so strong that it is even logically impossible to define craniotomy without
including the death of the child. 362 Duff offers two examples which he proposes are analogous to
saying that a craniotomy does not logically entail the death of the fetus: 1) a man decapitating his
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wife to see her surprise in the morning; and 2) a man intentionally colliding his car with a police
officer’s, but only intending to knock him off, but not cause injury. 363 Boyle rejects the first,
insisting that the stated claim cannot possibly be the intention of one’s act. 364 The second he
rejects because he argues that a stunt man may indeed intend such a consequence without
injury.365 Just because Duff’s two examples do not hold up to Boyle’s criticism does not suffice
to negate his argument altogether. 366 The fact that one cannot conceive of a child surviving a
craniotomy suffices to prove Duff’s point.
c. Craniotomies and Hysterectomies
As Cavanaugh indicates, the procedure of crushing the skull, by its definition entails the
death of the child, and therefore, one cannot practically distinguish killing the child from a
craniotomy.367 He utilizes the intention/foreseen distinction to shed further light on this
situation.368 In both cases, the physician desires to save the mother’s life, which leads to further
deliberation about means. 369 In the case of the gravid, cancerous uterus, he concludes that its
removal is the only viable solution. 370 The death of the child is foreseen as causally necessary,
but the success of the procedure does not depend on this. 371 Moreover, the definition of the
procedure does not depend on the death of the child; it is possible to perform a hysterectomy on a
woman who is not pregnant. 372
In the case of the craniotomy, however, the physician after deliberation concludes that
intentionally crushing the baby’s skull and extracting its body from the birth canal is the means
to saving the mother’s life. 373 In a craniotomy, she is not using forceps to maneuver the child’s
head and body through the cervix, in which case one may argue that the intention is to remove
the child’s head and body from the cervix without necessarily killing the child. 374 Rather, she is
cutting the skull, and removing the brains, essentially beheading the child, which by definition
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not only causes the death of the child, but also intends it. 375 Therefore, Finnis et al.’s objection to
the fifth argument against craniotomies, namely that it is never done to help the child, does not
hold.376 Most importantly, however, Cavanaugh argues that the craniotomy is direct killing, since
the intentional content necessitates the removal of the contents of the child’s head, which
inexorably links to the child’s death. 377 While she succeeds in saving the mother’s life, should
the child somehow survive the procedure, she has not succeeded in doing a craniotomy. 378 The
next subsection considers the difference between terror bombing and tactical bombing.
vi. Terror Bombing Versus Tactical Bombing
This subsection highlights the distinction between terror bombing and tactical bombing.
a. Traditional Just War Theory
The American Civil War constitutes the most devastating war on United States’ soil and
the tactic of “Total War” not only represents a fundamental change in approach, but also shapes
the nature of war for the twentieth century and beyond. William Tecumseh Sherman’s
unforgettable words, “war is cruelty” and his further argument that the “crueler it is, the sooner it
will be over” seems to resonate with many theorists. 379 As oxymoronic as it may seem,
philosophical tradition does advocate for rules of war and just war theory. While Augustine first
gives voice to just war, it is Aquinas that articulates its conditions. 380 Today, just war theorists
often distinguish between jus ad bellum and jus in bello; that is, just reasons to go to war and just
action in war, respectively. 381 In general, the latter qualifies questions pertaining to bombing.
James F. Childress, in “Just-War Theories: The Bases, Interrelations, Priorities, and
Functions of Their Criteria,” says that the primary goal of war is not to kill or injure, but to
incapacitate the enemy’s ability to wage war, which informs the rules in war. 382 This constitutes
an exceptionless moral norm of war that for Childress provides a foundation for the criteria of
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justice in war: 1) enemies that surrender deserve protection and medical care; 2) one ought not to
target non-combatants; 3) one should use proportionate force; and 4) avoiding weapons or
practices that inflict unnecessary suffering. 383 Childress further indicates that should one foresee
that an attack poses a risk to civilians, due proportion ought to inform one’s decision making. 384
These criteria alone should discourage any legitimate military authority from utilizing terror
bombing.
b. Just War, Terrorism, and Nuclear Deterrence
In 1987, Finnis et al., in Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism, reject the use of
nuclear weapons as a deterrent, calling for an immediate abandonment of this policy by Western
governments, in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union would likely not reciprocate. 385 They base
this decision on the threat that it poses to the human lives of the Soviet Union. 386 Their line of
reasoning stands on appreciation for the basic human goods, of which human life—not only the
condition for realizing other human goods—is itself. 387 Finnis et al. formulate the first principle
of morality in terms that integrate both human goods and the first principle of natural law: one
ought to choose and will acts in favor of human good and avoid those that are not. 388 This gives
rise to the universal Golden Rule: treat others, as one would like to be treated. 389 The
Democritean Principle is another intermediate principle: “do not do evil that good may come.” 390
After affirming that human life is not only the means to enjoy other basic human goods,
but a basic human good itself, Finnis et al. use the three abovementioned principles to defend
their thesis that “it is always wrong to choose to kill a human being.” 391 Although their theory
restricts violence greatly, they do not advocate pacifism. 392 They permit the killing of the noninnocent in just wars, but only as a means to defend or halt serious attacks that cannot be
otherwise stopped. 393 One’s use of force in war is justified, if and only if, one chooses it to
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defend or stop the unjust enemy’s aggression, but not if one intends to kill the enemy. 394
Consequently, they reject wars of aggression for any reason altogether. 395
Finnis et al. argue that killing an offender out of retribution or retaliation consists of
choosing a bad means for a good end. 396 Although one may accidentally kill innocent people in
combat, it is never morally permissible to kill the innocent intentionally. 397 Therefore, since the
use of nuclear weapons in the context of deterrence entails retaliatory action and the intentional
murder of innocent non-combatants, it constitutes an intrinsically evil act. 398 Moreover, since
keeping nuclear weapons, as a deterrent is only effective if one is actually willing to use them,
this act also constitutes an intrinsically evil act. 399 Furthermore, recalling the Socratic Principle,
that “it is better to suffer wrong than to do it,” 400 Finnis et al. advise all Western nations to
immediately disarm their nuclear weapons, for the welfare of the citizens of the Soviet Union. 401
In “Catholic Teaching on War and Peace: Its Application to American Foreign Policy
after 9/11,” Joseph Boyle revisits the topic of nuclear deterrence, arguing that it constitutes a
form of terrorism. 402 In an earlier paper, “Just War Doctrine and Military Response to
Terrorism,” however, Boyle maintains a distinct difference between terrorism and deterrence. 403
Terrorism consists in the use of violent actions for the purpose of influencing decision-making in
its survivors.404 By definition, deterrence entails the threat of either just or unjust response to
criminal acts, and therefore, does not necessarily exclude the threat of using terrorism. 405 For
instance, Boyle argues that nuclear deterrence during the Cold War constitutes the threat of
terrorism.406 In the later paper, however, Boyle conflates the two acts, deterrence and terrorism,
insisting that nuclear deterrence constitutes a form of terrorism, not merely an act of terrorism. 407
Boyle’s conflation of the two distinct acts is another instance of failing to see how the
physical act itself influences and contributes to the definition of the act. It is one thing for one to
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threaten terrorism in an act of deterrence, but quite another for one to actually commit a violent
act of terrorism. 408 Boyle is correct in asserting that nuclear deterrence constitutes the threat of
terrorism, but not in saying that the act of deterrence itself is terrorism. 409 Certainly an analogy
exists insofar as the threat of terrorism attempts to persuade, but a true difference abides between
a threat and a violent act, which terrorism by definition entails.
c. Terror Bombing and Tactical Bombing
Cavanaugh uses the intention/foreseen distinction to further highlight the immorality of
terror bombing in contrast to discriminate tactical bombing. 410 In both cases, the agent desires
victory, but uses different means to achieve this end. 411 The terror bomber, by definition intends
harm to non-combatants, maiming, or killing in an attempt to demoralize the enemy. 412 While the
ultimate end is victory, the terror bomber seeks to achieve this end by means of killing or
maiming non-combatants. 413 Such behavior necessarily coincides with the terror bomber’s
intention. If one achieves victory without killing or maiming non-combatants, one has attained
one’s ultimate goal, but failed to achieve one’s proximate means. 414 Not only does terror
bombing violate the exceptionless norm to not intentionally kill, but it violates at least three of
the abovementioned criteria, possibly excepting only the norm to do no harm to surrendering
combatants.
In contrast to terror bombing, tactical bombing entails the intent of destroying an enemy’s
ability to wage war by attacking installations of war. 415 The tactical bomber foresees that
bombing a combatants’ installation causally necessitates the death of enemy combatants and
even non-combatants.416 While the tactical bomber is aware of this, it does not determine the
outcome of deliberation. 417 Moreover, since the death of the non-combatants does not constitute
the intention of one’s action, it also does not define success. 418 In other words, if no non-

160

combatants die in the bombing of military installations, the tactical bomber may still claim
success, so long as it damages the installations. 419 So long as the tactical bomber uses due
proportion in determining which targets to hit in relationship to potential harm to noncombatants, he or she does not violate any of the abovementioned criteria.
The three contrasting cases above distinguish between intrinsically evil acts and those
that have causally foreseen effects, but do not violate exceptionless moral norms. 420 In each case,
Cavanaugh demonstrates that where one violates an exceptionless moral norm the harm not only
constitutes a causally necessary effect, but the agent also intends it as a means to one’s end. As a
volitional act, one must do more than answer “would one pursue the action were the evil not
brought about?”; but “is one successful in accomplishing the intended act without the harm being
done?”421 In each of the cases that violate an exceptionless moral norm the answer is negative,
while in the permissible cases, the answer is positive. In other words, doing the harm in the
permissible cases does not define the act, whereas in the impermissible cases it does.
The first subsection of this section presents Finnis et al.’s argument in favor of
craniotomies arguing that from the perspective of the acting person they do not constitute
intentional killing. 422 Next, based on the work of Sousa-Lara’s understanding of the external act
constituting the choice and the commanded physical act, I argue that a certain degree of
predictability regarding primitive physical acts enables one to observe and determine moral
intention with a limited degree of potential. 423 Cavanaugh’s distinction between intended means
and foreseen effects not only provides an adequate terminology, but also enables one to
sufficiently distinguish acts that violate exceptionless moral norms from those that Double-Effect
Reasoning justifies. 424 The three subsequent subsections present the Church’s traditional
teaching regarding three different ethical dilemmas including: euthanasia/terminal sedation,
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craniotomies/hysterectomies, and terror bombing/tactical bombing. In addition, these respective
subsections account for Finnis et al.’s perspective on the aforementioned topics. Finally, the
three contrasting examples illustrate the veracity of Cavanaugh’s theory. 425
The following chapter applies the theory of this and the preceding chapter first to health
care ethics consultations, and then, to the Principle of Cooperation.
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CHAPTER FOUR – HEALTH CARE ETHICS CONSULTATIONS AND COOPERATION
Having explained the function of the Principle of Double Effect for Catholic health care
ethics, this chapter assesses the role of two separate, but related tools, health care ethics
consultations and the Principle of Cooperation.
4A. Health Care Ethics Consultations
This section highlights several features for health care ethics consultations. Using the
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services,1 it offers a unique approach
that incorporates aspects of the Core Competencies of the American Society for Bioethics and
Humanities, 2 the Veterans Health Administration, 3 and other literature.
i. Health Care Ethics Consultation
The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities indicates that health care ethics
consultations respond to ethical dilemmas in the clinical setting. 4 In particular, they facilitate the
resolution of conflicts between values that inhibit decision-making regarding clinical action. 5
Ultimately, they should improve the quality of health care by helping participants to resolve
ethical dilemmas. 6 This is also how health care ethics consultations differ from other consultation
services. Both the Veterans Health Administration and the American Society for Bioethics and
Humanities distinguish between case consultations and non-case consultations. 7 Case
consultations pertain to a particular clinical case, whereas, non-case consultations refer to other
types of consultation, such as, answering general ethical questions, policy review, organizational,
and professional questions. 8 The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities focuses its
competencies on case consultations, though the scope of application is not necessarily limited to
such.9
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While there are several approaches to health care ethics consultations, including:
authoritarian, pure consensus, and facilitation, the American Society for Bioethics and
Humanities argues that the facilitation approach works best. 10 In the authoritarian approach, the
ethicist usurps the decision-making authority of the patient or surrogate and makes decisions for
them.11 This is problematic because the ethicist fails to respect the autonomy of the patient and
care team. The consensus approach is faulty because it does not necessarily incorporate values
and norms, but rather bases decision-making entirely on an agreed upon consensus. 12 The
American Society for Bioethics and Humanities offers a twofold explanation in favor of the
facilitation approach. One, ethicists help identify values; and two, they assist in formulating an
ethical resolution. 13
In principle, because of its integration of relevant sources, the facilitation approach
avoids sliding into moral relativism. 14 For Catholic hospitals, this includes the use of the Ethical
and Religious Directives. As a facilitator, ethicists utilize a broad spectrum of skills that surpass
the role of philosopher or theologian. They develop strong interpersonal skills, such as listening,
coordinating meetings so that all voices are heard, helping people articulate their values, and
helping to resolve conflicts. 15 At the same time, consultants need to avoid manipulating patients
or clinicians into adopting their personal preferences. 16 This does not mean refraining from
educating or pointing out unethical practices. 17 Ultimately, the facilitation approach is desirable
because it empowers patients, surrogates, and clinicians to act on well-articulated values.
One size does not necessarily fit all, when it comes to how many individuals to include in
an ethics consult. The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the Veterans Health
Administration differentiate three sizes: 1) individual, 2) consultation team, and 3) Ethics
committee.18 Necessity determines the size of the consultation. The American Society for
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Bioethics and Humanities recommends individual consultation when the need for information is
urgent.19 In addition to time constraints, all parties may not feel comfortable communicating in
large groups.20 Ethicists should meet with patients and clinicians before the formal meeting to
make sure all the relevant information is shared. 21 Even where time is not necessarily a
constraint, the efficient use of personnel may preclude a formal meeting of the entire ethics
board.22 The disadvantage of an individual consultant is that one must have all the relevant
competencies and there is no way to guard against biases. 23
The advantage of a larger group of consultants is the multidisciplinary perspective and
the representation of more competencies and experience. 24 A team consult is smaller than a
whole committee. Members should be chosen for complementary competencies. 25 Although they
are not as efficient as an individual consults they are quicker than committees. According to the
Veterans Health Administration, the team consultation is the most commonly used model for
health care ethics consultations. 26 The full ethics board meeting presumably engages the widest
variety of expertise and competencies ensuring collective proficiency. 27 Although it utilizes the
greatest personnel hours, it helps for evaluating quality of a consult and policy-making, not to
mention the avoidance of legal repercussions. 28 For this reason, the American Society for
Bioethics and Humanities recommends using it for potentially high profile clinical cases. 29
a. Proficiencies
Before discussing the mechanisms for health care ethics consultations, I discuss
proficiencies for handling them. 30 The Veterans Health Administration and the American Society
for Bioethics and Humanities divide proficiencies into three classes: 1) knowledge; 2) skills; and
3) attributes, attitudes, and behaviors. 31 Knowledge consists of the information that ethicists
ought to master for consultations. Skills consist of practical techniques important for running
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them. The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities divides these skills into three
categories: 1) ethical assessment and analysis skills; 2) process skills; and 3) interpersonal
skills.32 The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the Veterans Health
Administration list attributes, attitudes, and behaviors that an ethicist ought to have and
develop.33 While it may not be necessary to have advanced proficiency in all these areas, it is
important to have at least some basic proficiency in each. In the following, I discuss each
proficiency in greater detail.
First, I discuss knowledge that ethicists and board members ought to attain. The fewer the
number of members participating in a consultation, the greater amount of knowledge that single
individuals must have. To begin with, it is important for consultants to be familiar with the field
of ethics. This includes knowing various ethical theories and how to apply them. The American
Society for Bioethics and Humanities encourages proficiency in consequentialism, deontology,
virtue-based ethics, natural law, communitarian, and feminist theories. 34 As an applied science, it
is important to be familiar with casuistic approaches as well. 35 An ethicist for a Catholic hospital
should be familiar with the Catholic theological tradition and the Ethical and Religious
Directives.
In addition to familiarity with the philosophical and theological theories, it is important to
be familiar with the common issues and scenarios that arise necessitating its application. This
includes, but is not limited to: confidentiality, patient rights, end-of-life decision-making,
beginning-of-life decision-making, surrogate decision-making, competency, conflict of interest,
competency of minors, and organ donation. 36 It is important to know institutional policies, along
with federal and local laws pertaining to healthcare. 37 Even though an ethicist may not be a
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practicing clinician, it is nonetheless important to be familiar with the clinical literature, practice,
and terminology. 38
As an applied field, health care ethicists need to develop certain practical skills. First,
ethicists must be able to assess and analyze information ethically. 39 To begin with, one must
determine what the uncertainty or conflict of values consists of. 40 In order to achieve this goal,
one must gather all relevant information from the patient, surrogate, family, clinicians, attorneys,
and administrators. 41 At the same time, one must be mindful of power relations, ethnic, cultural,
and religious influences. 42 It is important to maintain the scope of the consultation to ethics. 43
Moreover, one must identify, articulate, and clarify the ethical concerns, values, and beliefs held
by all including oneself. 44
In terms of analysis, the ethicist has to access relevant information to clarify the relevant
ethical concepts to facilitate ethical decision-making.45 Sometimes this means clarifying whom
the appropriate decision-maker is.46 Success in analyzing involves being able to integrate all
relevant information from many different sources including practical and theoretical. One must
also be able to identify personal biases and limitations so that one can seek assistance. 47
Next, both the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the Veterans Health
Administration consider processing skills. 48 To begin with, the ethicist needs to determine if a
request actually constitutes an ethical dilemma or another type of problem that needs to be
referred elsewhere. 49 Next, the ethicist needs to decide which type of consultation model to
utilize: individual, team, or committee, and who needs to be involved: patient, surrogate, family,
and clinicians.50 Before having a formal meeting, the ethicist should speak to the patient, and
other parties to collect information and get an idea of what the situation entails. 51 This process

179

also entails documentation in the patient’s health records. 52 The ethicist must also be able to run
an effective ethics consultation, which necessitates the development of good interpersonal skills.
Perhaps the most important interpersonal skill that an ethicist must have is listening. 53
While listening may seem like a passive activity, it involves lots of work, if it is done well.
Listening begins with respecting each person and being able to empathize with his or her
perspective.54 Effective health care depends on hierarchical structures, but these can lead to
moral distress for subordinate clinicians, especially when they identify inappropriate behavior or
practice in their superiors. An ethicist must be attentive to the power dynamics at work and
attend to concomitant moral distress of subordinates and helping superiors to hear their concerns
without feeling overthrown or betrayed.55 The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities
calls this leveling the playing field. 56
Good listening includes active listening. This means helping others articulate their views
without adding to or taking away from the content of their message. Ethicists have an important
role to educate others on ethics and to help others express their views in ethical terms. Being able
to recapitulate another’s view in such a way that others can understand it better, sometimes
including the one espousing it, is an important tool of communication for ethicists, especially
since ethics is not the expertise of everyone. 57 By using this skill with each respective party, an
ethicist ensures that all are heard helping to bring about effective resolutions amenable to all.58
Finally, the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the Veterans Health
Administration discuss attributes, attitudes and behaviors that they believe are requisite for an
ethics consultant. 59 First, the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities says that ethicists
should be tolerant, patient, and compassionate. 60 The healthcare world is high-stress and when
ethical dilemmas arise, tensions and emotions are high. An ethicist brings a sense of calm and
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understanding, working constructively even in situations of duress. 61 Next on the list are honesty,
forthrightness, and self-knowledge. 62 These virtues help one address uncomfortable issues that
most prefer to avoid. Ethical dilemmas are often messy; people are vulnerable. These virtues
help the ethicist to avoid tendencies toward quick resolution through manipulation. 63
Courage is another important virtue that helps one raise the red flag and address unethical
behavior, especially when doing so is not popular. 64 Humility and prudence are two virtues that
aid one in choosing the right battles and not over-stepping one’s bounds. 65 Ethicists need to be
good leaders, acting decisively, but also having restraint at times. 66 Above all, they need to be
people of integrity, which means that their words match their behavior and beliefs. 67
b. Veterans Health Administration
Both the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the Veterans Health
Administration offer a method for running consultations. However, before discussing this, I
mention two topics related to the above proficiencies that ethicists need when leading health care
ethics consultations, that is, skills for facilitating consultations, and evaluative, quality
improvement skills. 68 To facilitate an effective meeting, one first introduces the participants,
their roles and expectations. 69 It is always a good idea to begin a meeting by emphasizing the
importance of confidentiality. 70 Next, one lays the ground rules and clearly defines the goal and
timeframe for meeting it.71 The ethicist should run the meeting so that each party has an
opportunity to speak, but making sure that the team stays focused. 72 To facilitate this, it may be
helpful to have an agenda drafted before the meeting. Finally, the ethicist needs to determine
what type of follow up is necessary, including whether to have another formal meeting. 73
It is important for ethicists to also do prep work before the meeting, including picking
appropriate members that complement and represent different competencies. 74 Furthermore, one
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must mentor and offer further training to members. In addition, one must maintain a good
rapport with the leadership of the institution and be familiar with procedures and policies. 75
Finally, ethicists should inform staff and patients about access to health care ethics consultations.
No service is complete without some means of evaluation and quality assurance. This
involves evaluation of the access, process, and implications to the organization and policies of a
health care ethics consultations. 76 The ethicist needs to provide means for collecting and
analyzing relevant data to determine not only the effectiveness of the consultation in terms of
outcome, but also in how it is accessed and run. 77 Being self-reflective and not afraid to critique
one’s approach is key to success in this arena. Looking for patterns in the content of consultation
may lead one to discern the need for change in practice or policies within the organization. 78
Having positive relationships with the administration can make this more effective.
For the procedure of running health care ethics consultations, the Veterans Health
Administration recommends the five step approach: clarify, assemble, synthesize, explain, and
support.79 They intends the step-by-step procedure to be analogous to a clinician’s physical
exam or history of a patient. 80 In this sense, the ethicist should follow it precisely when
performing an ethics consult for an active patient case. 81 This also provides an outline for
documenting in the patient’s records. 82 In the following, I discuss each of these steps in detail.
According to the Veterans Health Administration’s approach, one must first clarify the
consultation request. 83 They indicate that ethical problems concern values and/or conflict of
values.84 The ethicist helps the requester articulate the issue or concern at hand.85 Often, ethical
concerns accompany dilemmas that require expertise in other fields, such as, legal, medical,
psychological, spiritual, or administrative, in which case referral is necessary, in addition to
addressing the ethical concern. 86 Having determined that the case involves an ethical concern,
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one determines if it is an active patient case; if it is, then one follows the procedure in the
Veterans Health Administration and records it in the patient’s records. 87 Next, one obtains
preliminary information, such as, contact info, date, time, urgency, requester’s role, brief
description, assistance desired, and care setting. 88 Then the ethicist should share realistic
expectations for about the process with the requester. 89
Finally, regarding clarifying the request, the Veterans Health Administration asks the
ethicist to formulate the ethics question, for which they offer a five-step process.90 First, the
requester describes the situation ethically as she understands it. 91 Second, the ethicist identifies
value labels for strongly held beliefs, ideals, principles, or standards, such as honesty, equality,
rights, justice, etc. 92 Third, having identified values, the ethicist then describes them from the
perspective of respective parties. 93 Next, of all the values mentioned, the ethicist identifies the
“central value perspective,” that is what constitutes the value or values in conflict. 94 Fifth, the
ethicist formulates the main ethical concern. 95 Finally, the Veterans Health Administration
recommends formulating this concern according to the format of one of three questions:
1. Given that [1st central value], but [2 nd central value], what decisions or actions are
ethically justified?
2. Given that [1st central value], but [2 nd central value], is it ethically justifiable to
[decision or action]?
3. What ethical concerns are raised by name of document, and what should be done to
resolve them? 96
Second, the ethicist must assemble all the relevant information. 97 The Veterans Health
Administration reformulates Jonsen, Siegler, and Winslade’s four topics—medical indications,
patient preferences, quality of life, and contextual features 98—into three categories: 1) medical
facts, 2) patient preferences and interests, and 3) other parties’ preferences and interests. 99 In
addition, they insist that ethicists gather relevant ethical information for the case. 100 Although it
is not the ethicist’s job to make recommendations regarding medical decisions, the medical facts
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are important, and where the ethicist lacks clinical knowledge, he ought to ask more questions. 101
Sources for information include: patient, health records, staff, family members, and friend. 102
Third, the ethicist needs to synthesize the information such that it addresses the ethical
concerns. 103 Because many may feel reluctant to share in a formal meeting, it is important to
gather information prior to determining whether to convene a formal meeting. 104 Before a formal
meeting, the ethicist should formulate the problem in words, meet with all parties, and bring
relevant literature. 105 During the meeting, the ethicist should work to level the playing field and
engage the group in creative problem solving. 106
One of the most important roles of an ethicist is ethical analysis, which involves
formulating and weighing arguments and counterarguments based on ethical principles and
theoretical perspectives. 107 The Veterans Health Administration recommends that ethicists use
more than one ethical perspective, such as, casuistry, consequentialism, utilitarianism,
principlism, deontology, and virtue ethics, to name a few. 108 Performing quality ethical analysis
involves not only formulating arguments and counterarguments, but also weighing them to
determine a conclusive response to the dilemma. 109 In addition, it is important to determine who
the appropriate decision maker is. 110 This is not always easy. Often it is the patient, but if the
patient is incapacitated or a minor, then a surrogate decision maker takes over. I discuss this
topic in greater detail below. Finally, when there are multiple competing ethically sound options,
the ethicist facilitates deliberation avoiding manipulation by imposing personal preferences. 111
The decision having been made by the appropriate decision maker, the ethicist now has
the responsibility of explaining this to the other participants. 112 This involves contacting the
requester, clinicians, family members, and other relevant participants personally to share the
outcome of the consultation, giving them an idea for the plan going forward. 113 Sometimes, this
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involves educating participants about ethics, policy, law, or medical practices. 114 It also involves
documenting both in the patient’s health records and the consultation records, for which the
Veterans Health Administration offers a procedure. 115
The final step is supporting the consultation process. 116 The consultant should follow up
with participants to determine the effectiveness of the consult, resolve further issues, offer an
empathetic ear, and educate further, if necessary. 117 This provide an opportunity to evaluate the
effectiveness of the service, and if necessary, to make adjustments to the process. 118 This is also
how one may identify underlying systems issues. 119
The Veterans Health Administration’s approach to health care ethics consultations is a
tried and true process that enables ethicists to provide effective services to patients, surrogates,
and clinicians. So long as an ethicist incorporates the Ethical and Religious Directives into this
approach, especially regarding ethical analysis, there is no reason Catholic Health care systems
should not embrace and follow them.
ii. Principles and Topics for Health Care Ethics Consultations
Today, much of biomedical ethics depends on principlism, an ethical theory originating
in Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress’s book Principles of Biomedical Ethics.120 The
authors establish a foundation for biomedical ethics based on a common morality, which consists
of four foundational principles: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. 121 In the
following, I discuss these four principles, relating them to health care ethics consultations. I also
integrate recommendations from Jonsen et al.’s text, Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach to
Ethical Decisions in Clinical Medicine.122
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a. Autonomy
The first principle is autonomy, which Beauchamp et al. discuss in the fourth chapter of
their text.123 Contrary to common misconceptions, Beauchamp et al. do not believe that respect
for autonomy trumps all other ethical principles, nor is it excessively individualistic, excessively
rational, or overly legalistic. 124 While there are many definitions for autonomy, it at least means
that one has the capacity for self-rule that is free from interference and limitations or inadequate
understanding. 125 More explicitly, autonomy consists of two conditions: liberty (freedom from
compelling influences) and agency (ability to intend action). 126 Beauchamp et al. argue for a
three-condition theory within reach of competent agents: 1) intentionality, 2) understanding, and
3) non-control.127 For an act to be intentional, the agent must conceptualize and plan for it, but
consequences do not necessarily have to go according to plan. 128 An agent only needs a
“substantial degree of understanding and freedom from constraint” for one to be autonomous. 129
To be non-controlling, it must be free from forces internally or externally coercive or
manipulative.130 While acts are either intentional or non-intentional, they may be more or less
autonomous according to degrees of understanding and control, the threshold of which
determines whether an action is substantially autonomous. 131
There are a number of important concepts that depend on autonomy, including:
determination of competence, informed consent, and confidentiality. Jonsen et al. also base
patient preferences on autonomy. In addition, autonomy plays an important role for quality of
life determination from the patient’s perspective. 132 I begin by discussing informed consent.
Regarding patient preferences, Jonsen et al. ask six questions, the first of which pertains
to informed consent. 133 To the patient, the physician describes the diagnosis, the recommended
course of treatment, and its reasons, along with alternative treatments, explaining benefits, and
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risks to each, to which the patient either accepts or declines the recommendation. 134 Although
legal standards regarding quality of disclosure once depended on the perspective of the
physician, today they are patient-centered.135 The minimum legal standard is “the reasonable or
prudent patient standard,” while Jonsen et al. encourage movement toward a “subjective
standard,” disclosure uniquely conformed to the individual patient. 136
Jonsen et al. offer four criteria that constitute appropriate disclosure: 1) medical status; 2)
potentially helpful interventions, including risks and benefits; 3) professional opinion regarding
alternatives; and 4) a recommendation based on the physician’s best clinical judgment. 137 In
conveying this information, physicians ought to communicate it in such a way that it avoids
technical terminology, and presents statistics in common, easy to understand examples. 138 Jonsen
et al. assert that physicians ought to disclose professional experience regarding outcomes of
procedures, especially when the risks are high or the treatment is elective. 139 It is one thing to
provide patients with information, but quite another to ensure understanding. Jonsen et al. say,
“Physicians have an ethical obligation to make reasonable efforts to ensure comprehension.” 140
Clinicians may facilitate comprehension by not only allowing patients to ask questions, but by
asking questions of the patient to test understanding.141 Since nothing in healthcare should
happen without documentation, the clinician ought to document the conversation regarding
informed consent, including the patient’s concerns and demonstrated comprehension, which
constitutes more than a mere signature.142 Although it is true that physicians are often pressed for
time, and bad news may be difficult to explain, initially misunderstood, or induce anxiety in the
patient, taking the time to inform consent not only promotes patient shared decision-making, but
strengthens the physician-patient relationship, and engenders a better therapeutic outcome.
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Unfortunately, not all patients are mentally capable or legally competent to receive and
process information to make a reasonably informed decision concerning care. As such, clinicians
need to establish the capacity of a patient for decision-making. Legally, only a judge can make a
determination that one is incompetent to make personal decisions regarding finances and
healthcare; however, clinically, sickness, anxiety, or drugs may compromise one’s decisional
capacity.143 Clinically, mental capacity to give consent entails the ability to receive and process
information, understanding the consequences of decisions, being able to communicate and think
rationally about one’s values and goals in relationship to the physician’s recommendation. 144
Obvious situations where this capacity is lacking include: comatose, unconscious, or severely
demented, in which case a surrogate acts as the decision-maker.145 However, ethical dilemmas
arise when mental capacity to give consent is questionable, for instance, under the influence of
drugs, fear, trauma, or severe illness. 146 In life-threatening situations, where mental capacity is
doubtful, a physician has the right to intervene; otherwise, it is necessary to determine decisional
capacity.147
If a physician determines that a patient does not have decision making capacity, then the
following must be done: 1) determine if the patient has any written advance directives; and 2)
determine if and whom the surrogate decision-maker is.148 Jonsen et al. list several methods of
advance planning including, but not limited to: 1) a durable power of attorney for healthcare, 2)
directive to physicians, and 3) living will. 149 Today healthcare institutions are required to ask for
advance directives and to offer assistance in completing them, if lacking upon admission. 150 The
simplest advance planning is to appoint a durable power of attorney for healthcare, which makes
decisions regarding one’s healthcare in the event that one becomes incapacitated. 151 The patient
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ought to know the surrogate and she ought to know the patient’s values and desires regarding
healthcare decisions. 152
It may also be helpful to have an advance directive or directive to physicians.153 This
constitutes a legal document expressing to the physician one’s wishes if one is incapacitated. 154
Often this contains a provision appointing a designated decision maker. 155 A living will
expresses one’s wishes in a less formal way, but may provide more guidance regarding quality of
care or specific conditions. 156
If healthcare decision-making falls to a surrogate, because of the patient’s incapacity, and
one is not designated, legislative statutes dictate an order of priority based on relation: 1) spouse,
2) parents, 3) children, 4) siblings, etc. 157 Conflicts may arise because of surrogate incapacity or
financial interests. Jonsen et al. identify two standards that guide surrogate decision-making: 1)
substituted judgment and 2) the best interest standard. 158 Substituted judgment occurs when the
patient either expresses preferences explicitly or the surrogate may reasonably infer from the
patient’s past statements or known values. 159 Whenever the patient’s preferences are not known,
the surrogate ought to makes decisions in the best interest of the patient. 160 Needless to say, this
is not always easy, but ought to be according to known beliefs and values of the patient. 161
Jonsen et al. identify incapacitated patients without a surrogate or next of kin as an
“unbefriended or unrepresented patient.” 162 Without representation, these patients are highly
vulnerable. Under such circumstances, the physician team often makes decisions for the
patient.163 To reduce conflict, Jonsen et al. recommend that hospitals institute policies that allow
for outside consultation. 164
Regarding minors, Jonsen et al. indicate that in general, physicians need the consent of a
parent or guardian to offer treatment; however, there are some exceptions. 165 In emergencies,
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minors, those below the age of 18, may be treated without permission according to presumed
consent.166 In addition, certain procedures or drugs may be administered without parental
consent, including treatment for sexually transmitted infections, contraception, drug addiction,
and abortion (though the latter is sometimes explicitly excluded by law in certain states). 167
Moreover, emancipated minors may be treated without parental consent; and under specific
conditions, mature minors (15 years or older) may be treated. 168 Regarding the mentally ill, only
a psychiatrist may hold a patient against his will for the sole purpose of treating the mental
illness, however, not other comorbidities, without consent.169
Conscientious objection concerns the autonomy of the clinician, sometimes limiting that
of the patient. 170 Ideally, healthcare decision-making takes place within the physician-patient
relationship as a shared enterprise. If conflicts arise, however, physicians are not always obliged
to simply do whatever patients want. Physicians should not perform procedures or prescribe
medicine that is contrary to the goals of medicine. 171 In addition, a clinician may object to
participating in a treatment or procedure that she believes to be immoral. 172 For instance, a nurse
may refuse to assist in an abortion or a pharmacist may refuse to fill a prescription for the
RU486.173 While existing laws support conscientious objection, there are limits to its ethical
practice.174 For instance, it is unethical to refuse to treat a patient out of prejudice or for immoral
notoriety.175 Conscientious objection is a serious moral decision that a clinician must give great
consideration to, which includes the legal ramifications and potential harm to patients. 176
b. Non-Maleficence and Beneficence
Non-maleficence consists of the principle to do no harm. 177 Beauchamp et al. present
non-maleficence in conjunction with beneficence, according to four distinct non-hierarchical
norms: “1) one ought not to inflict evil or harm; 2) One ought to prevent evil and harm; 3) one
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ought to remove evil or harm; and 4) One ought to do or promote good.” 178 The first requires one
to intentionally avoid actions, which cause harm, while the latter three, associated with
beneficence, require one to act helpfully. 179 They contrast harm from wronging another. 180
Specifically, harming for them means thwarting, defeating, or setting back a party’s interest. 181
One who is harmed is not necessarily wronged. 182 A surgeon may amputate a diseased limb that
harms a patient, but does not wrong the patient. 183 Nor is one necessarily harmed when
wronged.184 For example, when an insurance company unjustly refuses to pay a patient’s hospital
bill.185
Questions concerning non-maleficence inexorably link to questions on quality of life.
William May asserts that allowing quality of life and autonomy to either determine or trump the
dignity of the human person underlies arguments condoning intrinsically evil acts such as active
voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. 186 Under the guise of mercy and respect for
autonomy proponents defend patients’ and physicians’ rights to such acts. 187 Following the
Catholic tradition, based in Natural Law, May defends the dignity of every human person,
inexorably part of human nature, and therefore, constituting the basis for the principle of
autonomy.188 For May, autonomy exists for the purpose of achieving the flourishing of the
human person as a human person—body and soul. 189 According to May, lines of reasoning
defending euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, presume a dualism that differentiates the
human person from the human body. 190 Moreover, quality of life constitutes the litmus test for
the dignity or worth of a person’s life, since below an arbitrary threshold life may be justifiably
terminated.191 This threshold is arbitrary because it depends on the subjective judgment of the
individual making the determination. May argues that insofar as autonomy and respect for it
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issues from the dignity of the human person, using it to violate the dignity of the human person,
under the guise of respect for it, is inconsistent. 192
Some argue that the slippery slope trajectory of quality of life arguments render it
untenable for any ethical consideration whatsoever. 193 However, May, following the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s reasoning in its Declaration on Euthanasia, insists
that quality of life does have an important role to play for utilizing treatments. 194 One may
classify treatments, including procedures, medicines, or interventions, as proportionate
(ordinary) or disproportionate (extraordinary). 195 Proportionate treatment consists of any
treatment that has a reasonable hope of benefit with an acceptable amount of burdensomeness. 196
Disproportionate treatment consists of treatment that the patient or proxy determines to be
excessively burdensome or futile. 197 According to May, respect for the dignity of the human
person obliges one to accept proportionate treatment, whereas, it permits one to reject
disproportionate treatment, even when doing so hastens death.198 Quality of life is an important
factor for determining both the burdensomeness and usefulness of a treatment; as such, it
maintains an important role for biomedical ethics in the Catholic tradition. 199 According to the
Catholic tradition, one does not use quality of life to make a judgment about the value of one’s
life in the absolute sense as to whether one should live or die; rather, one makes a judgment
about treatment. 200
Beauchamp et al. indicate that patients and families often experience significantly more
moral distress at the thought of discontinuing treatment, once commenced, than simply foregoing
it from the beginning. 201 This is particularly controversial when it comes to life sustaining
devices such as cardiovascular implantable electronic devices. 202 It is quite distressing because
deactivation of such devices sometimes leads to immediate death. 203 Despite controversy and
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frequent concomitant moral distress, the difference between foregoing treatment and
withdrawing does not limit one’s right to reject disproportionate treatment. 204
The principle of non-maleficence obliges clinicians to do no harm. 205 Insofar as it is a
negative norm, obliging one to refrain from action, non-maleficence accordingly obliges no one
to do any positive act, which active euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide constitutes. 206
Therefore, alone it cannot justify such acts. Even with other principles, however, insofar as nonmaleficence is a more stringent obligation, it ought to overrule any further consideration of such
acts.207 Regardless, most medical interventions have some concomitant harm. In all cases,
however, non-maleficence, in addition to respect for autonomy, limited by respect for the dignity
of the human person from which autonomy proceeds, demands that one demure from requests to
kill patients or aiding them in any suicidal act. This exceptionless moral norm, however, does not
mean that one may not utilize quality of life, along with other factors to determine whether a
treatment is proportionate, even when one knows that its cessation accelerates death. 208
c. Justice
Unlike non-maleficence, the principle of beneficence places a positive obligation, rather
than, a negative obligation on the clinician to care for a patient. 209 Beauchamp et al. list five
prima facie rules which beneficence obliges: “1) protect and defend the rights of others; 2)
prevent harm from occurring to others; 3) remove conditions that will cause harm to others; 4)
help persons with disabilities; and 5) Rescue persons in danger.” 210 In particular, however, the
contractual relationship between physician and patient carries specific obligations on the part of
the physician, which demand a high degree of professionalism. 211
According to Jonsen et al., beneficence demands that clinicians always keep the
wellbeing of the patient above any personal goals. 212 Moreover, integral to professionalism is
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honesty with the patient, collaboration with other caregivers, and respectability. 213 Above all,
physicians ought to avoid exploiting patients for personal gain—financial or otherwise. 214 This
important obligation to avoid exploitation, relates not only to beneficence, but justice and
fairness as well. 215 In particular, it relates to the avoidance of conflicting interests. 216
Jonsen et al. consider conflicts of interest in detail in the chapter pertaining to contextual
features.217 Factors such as profession, family, religion, financial, legal, and institution, influence
the physician-patient relationship, and therefore, require ethical consideration regarding their
importance in clinical cases. 218 Justice, the virtue that pertains to the social distribution of
benefits and burdens in a fair and equitable manner, is the primary ethical principle for this
topic.219 Jonsen et al. narrow the focus to fairness, which delineates to participants that which
each deserves and can reasonably expect in a relationship or transaction. 220 In particular, Jonsen
et al. apply fairness to conflicts of interest; situations where one’s professional role makes it
possible to take advantage of another. 221 Jonsen et al. consider ten questions pertaining to
contextual features. 222
First, Jonsen et al. address conflicts of interest in relation to professionalism and
professional relationships to which he connects to three principles: primacy of patient welfare,
patient autonomy, and social justice. 223 Today physicians have multiple loyalties or allegiances,
but the principle of primacy of the patient, based on altruism, that is, doing what’s best for
another, means that whenever conflicts arise, the patient’s priorities take precedence. 224 In
addition to loyalty to patients, physicians have relationships with other medical staff, which may
give rise to moral distress, when subordinates observe unethical practices of superiors. 225 This is
precisely an issue that Jonsen et al. say ethics consultations ideally resolve. 226 To avoid unethical
practices in physicians’ relationships with business, Jonsen et al. recommend transparency and
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compliance with the law and recommendations of the American Medical Association Council on
Ethics and Legal Affairs. 227 Finally, Jonsen et al. acknowledge the importance of taking time for
family, which improves physicians’ health and performance. 228
Next, Jonsen et al. address the interests of third parties for patient care including: family,
government, hospital, insurance company, lawyers, employers, etc. 229 Family members may be a
source of aide for the patient or tension and conflict. Whenever family members act as obstacles
to care, Jonsen et al. recommend attempting to determine the source of conflict and realigning
cooperation in treatment. 230 Often confidentiality, rooted in respect for autonomy of the patient,
limits the amount of information that physicians can share with family members. However, when
personal information impacts a third party, confidentiality may be breached. 231
In 1996, congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, which
regulates confidentiality in healthcare legally on the federal level. 232 According to the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, physicians may share medical information when it
helps the patient or prevents harm to a third party. 233 For instance, if a patient has a sexually
transmitted infection, the physician may inform known sexual partners, if the patient refuses. 234
Furthermore, clinicians have a duty to report suspected cases of physical or sexual abuse and
when patients intend to harm themselves or others. 235
Genetic conditions introduce a whole new consideration for confidentiality and its impact
on third parties, such as, spouses and family planning, and children. Not only do genetic tests
vary in accuracy, but genetic conditions vary in impact and levels of predisposition. 236 In other
words, testing positive for a particular genetic mutation does not always result in developing the
pathological condition. In some cases, however, such as Huntington’s disease, genetic testing
accurately predicts future onset, but not necessarily time or degree of onset. In general, where
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there is greater accuracy and the pathology more serious, Jonsen et al. recommend that
physicians encourage patients to share information, especially, if it is likely to have an impact on
others.237 The Ethical and Religious Directives encourage families to seek genetic counseling,
and to allow it to inform designs regarding family planning, so long as one follows the Church’s
teachings regarding the transmission of life. 238
Fourth, Jonsen et al. address financial conflicts of interest. 239 Because of the increasing
costs relegated to the patient in copays and deductibles, physicians must take into account the
cost of prescriptions and procedures. 240 Moreover, physicians are obliged to inform patients of
alternative treatment options, even though it may result in a financial loss. 241 Regarding transfers
in emergency departments, Jonsen et al. say that they ought to be made based on medical
indication, rather than financial incentive. 242 Indeed, all medical recommendations should be
based clinical effectiveness, rather than cost. 243
Fifth, Jonsen et al. considers the impact of allocating scarce resources on patients.244
While physicians should not waste resources on futile treatments, they should avoid bedside
rationing, which is allowing societal efficiency to influence clinical treatment of patients. 245
Catastrophic events may necessitate triaging, the limitation of resources to rescue workers, or the
most likely to survive, before treating terminal patients. Outside of these extreme circumstances,
physicians should make decisions based on medical indication on the clinical level, rather than
consideration for the use of societal resources. 246
Sixth, Jonsen et al. address the role of religion in the clinical setting. 247 Both physicians
and patient find great meaning in religion. For patients, this is especially true when they are sick,
suffering or nearing death. Jonsen et al. encourage mutual respect regarding religious views, but
not neglect or exclusion from a discussion, especially insofar as it may impact a patient’s
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openness to and compliance with treatment. 248 For this reason, Jonsen et al. encourage physicians
to discuss religious views with patients in an understanding way and to seek accurate information
from appropriate resources such as chaplains. 249
Seventh, Jonsen et al. consider the legal issues that may affect clinical decisionmaking.250 Eighth, Jonsen et al. speak to the influence that research and education may play in
clinical decisions. 251 A physician has conflicting interests whenever he or she is both a clinician
and researcher. 252 Clinical research involves intervention or observation on patients or normal
volunteers for the purpose of gaining scientific knowledge. 253 It is essential to appropriately
inform participants and to receive consent, without coercion. 254 Institutional review boards
assure that experiments follow ethical procedures, inform participants of risks/benefits, receive
consent, compensate participants fairly, do no harm, or take advantage of vulnerable
populations.255
This section analyzes proficiencies for health care ethics consultations from the
perspective of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the Veterans Health
Administration. Then discusses the impact that principlism and the Ethical and Religious
Directive have on health care ethics consultations. The following section examines another
important principle of health care ethics from the perspective of the Ethical and Religious
Directives.
4B. Principle of Cooperation
This section explores the development of cooperation, beginning with its origin in
Thomistic action theory and Liguori’s moral theology. It also considers the development of
Cooperation in the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services of the
United States Catholic Bishops. Then, it articulates two contemporary formulations of the
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Principle of Cooperation, one that addresses the impact of proportionalism and another that
considers the mirror Principle of Appropriation.
i. Principle of Cooperation
Just as acts may have more than one effect, so one’s acts may contribute to another’s bad
act. The Principle of Double Effect accounts for the former, while the Principle of Cooperation
accounts for the latter. 256 This section compares Cooperation with Double Effect.
a. Cooperation and Double Effect:
Ethicists highlight the similarities between Double Effect and Cooperation. 257 The former
elucidates when an act with both a good and evil effect may occur, just as the latter illuminates
when and how much one’s act may licitly contribute to the evil of another. Contrary to the
Principle of Tolerance, in Double Effect and Cooperation, an agent commits an act. 258 While
Double Effect considers the morality of one’s act in relationship to two effects: one evil, the
other good, Cooperation considers the morality of two distinct acts attributable to two distinct
agents: one agent’s act contributing to another’s immoral act. Traditional formulations of Double
Effect have four or five conditions that correspond to similar conditions in Cooperation. 259 First,
regarding Double Effect, the object of the act must be good or indifferent.260 Consequently, the
first condition of Cooperation insists that the act of the cooperator must be good or indifferent. 261
Next, Double Effect insists that the agent must not intend the evil effect, but the good
effect.262 Put another way, one may only foresee the evil effect, but one must not intend it. 263 As
such, the next condition for Cooperation concerns the intent of the cooperator. The agent must
not intend the evil that the principal agent intends. 264 Formal cooperation in evil exists when the
cooperator agrees with the evil intent of the primary agent. 265 The cooperator is guilty insofar as
the will conforms to the evil intent of the principal agent. 266
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Clearly, intention—broadly speaking—plays a primary role for both principles. 267 First,
intention determines the proximate end of the act, which constitutes the Moral Object. 268 Second,
intention determines the remote end that the agent intends. 269 Therefore, the intention of the will
is the primary means for determining the sinfulness of a cooperator’s act in the aid of another’s
sin.270 The first two conditions of Cooperation rule out formal cooperation.
In Double Effect, the third condition insists that the evil effect must not be the means to
or cause of the good effect. 271 Therefore, correspondingly, the condition for Cooperation insists
that the principal agent must be the cause of the evil, not the cooperator’s act. 272 Thus, the
cooperator’s act must be sufficiently distant from that of the primary agent. Insofar as the
cooperator does not agree with the evil intent of the principal agent, it is material. 273 However,
regarding distance, one must first determine whether an act constitutes immediate or mediate
material cooperation. 274 Immediate material cooperation occurs when one cooperates in the act
itself in such a way that one’s participation is indispensable to the act’s completion. 275 For
instance, a nurse assisting a physician in a sterilization constitutes immediate material
cooperation. According to traditional formulates, immediate material cooperation is always
immoral, and therefore, forbidden, which this third condition rules out ethically. 276
On the other hand, mediate material cooperation is more distant from the principal
agent’s act. This occurs when one performs an act that paves the way for the immoral act to
occur.277 For instance, the nurse prepping the patient for sterilization or doing post-operative
care, both constitute mediate material cooperation. Therefore, the difference between immediate
and mediate cooperation concerns the level of participation, the former comprising the joining of
the principal agent in the act, while the latter is distant enough that the principal agent does not
depend so much on the cooperator’s act that without it the evil deed could not be done.278
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While formal cooperation in evil and immediate cooperation in evil are always morally
forbidden, mediate material cooperation in evil may be permissible if the appropriate criteria
exist.279 Alphonsus Liguori first articulates a rudimentary version of Cooperation in his Moral
Theology.280 He observes that servants, in particular, often find themselves in precarious
situations, whereby they contribute in some way to the sinful actions of their masters. 281 For
example, masters may expect a servant to saddle a horse in anticipation of visiting a brothel or
accompanying the master thereto. 282 Insofar as refusing to offer assistance places the servant in
jeopardy of losing his job, thus posing a grave inconvenience, Liguori argues that the servant
may comply with the expectations of the master to the extent that one’s actions remain remote to
the master’s sin. 283 Liguori offers two criteria that if met satisfy his Principle of Legitimate
Material Cooperation: 284 1) the act in question must be morally good or indifferent itself; and 2)
there must be a proportionately good reason for committing the act. 285 The first two conditions of
Cooperation address Liguori’s first criteria, as the above demonstrates. His second criterion,
however, corresponds to the fourth condition. In Double Effect, the good effect must be
proportionate to the evil effect. 286 For instance, in the removal of a cancerous, gravid uterus,
saving the mother’s life is proportionate to the evil of the child’s death. For Cooperation, the
cooperator’s decision to act must be proportionate to either the evil avoided or the good
promoted.287
Based on the condition of proportionality, Liguori indicates that the obligation of charity
does not extend to the point of gravely inconveniencing the cooperator.288 For instance, Liguori
argues that for grave reason, such as fear of losing one’s job, a servant could saddle a horse or
accompany a master to a brothel. 289 Moreover, a nurse may decide to cooperate in a mediate
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material way in the sterilization of a patient by prepping or caring for the patient postoperatively, because failing to do so means losing one’s job or harms the patient.
Therefore, according to the fourth condition of Cooperation, ethicists further differentiate
mediate material cooperation utilizing: distance and dispensability. 290 Regarding distance one
may further distinguish between proximate and remote cooperation. 291 If the cooperator’s act is
causally close to that of the primary agent’s act, then it is proximate. 292 If causally further away,
then the act is remote. 293 For instance, the nurse prepping a patient for sterilization proximately
cooperates, while the administrative assistant at the front desk remotely cooperates. 294 In both
cases of mediate material cooperation, the agent performs a good or indifferent act that the
primary agent uses as an occasion for sin. 295 However, the closer one is to the primary agent’s
act, the more serious one’s justification must be.
In addition to considering how closely one’s act relates to the primary agent’s act, one
may also consider how indispensable one’s mediate material cooperation is. 296 To be clear, one is
not answering whether one’s act inexorably connects to the principal agent’s act—the affirmative
constituting immediate material cooperation (always forbidden) and the negative making it
mediate material cooperation (sometimes permitted)—but how indispensable one’s already
constituted mediate material cooperating act is to supporting the principal agent’s act. If one’s
participation is necessary, that is, if one refuses to perform one’s job, thereby preventing the
occurrence of the immoral procedure, then one needs a more serious reason not to object; for
instance, if one is the only nurse that can prep a patient for an immoral procedure.297 On the other
hand, if one is more dispensable or free, then one needs a less serious reason to object; for
instance, if another nurse could simply step in and fill the role. 298
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At first glance, this may seem counterintuitive. One may object, for instance, insisting
that since in the second scenario other nurses could perform the objectionable task one is freer,
and therefore, more obliged to object than in the first scenario, where the nurse is seemly less
free to object without graver consequences. The rationale is that the more indispensable one is,
the greater one’s duty to object. 299 In other words, because other nurses could just as easily step
in and complete the task in the second scenario, it is more efficacious for one to object.
Orville N. Griese in Catholic Identity and Health Care: Principles and Practice
highlights a corollary condition to the proportionality condition in these principles. 300 Just as
there ought not to be any legitimate alternative to the act in question for Double Effect, 301 so one
may perform an act that cooperates with another’s evil, if and only if, a legitimate alternative
does not exist. 302 This constitutes the fifth condition in both principles. 303 For example, if a nurse
could excuse oneself from assisting in immoral procedures without fear of retribution, he ought
to do so.304
The above demonstrates a connection between these principles that ethicists traditionally
maintain. Intention plays a primary role, both in characterizing the proximate end and the remote
end in the first two conditions. In addition, sufficient separation from the principal agent’s action
also has a vital role for justifying mediate material cooperation. The following subsection
elucidates Cooperation through its application to sterilizations in Catholic health care facilities.
ii. Cooperation and Sterilization
This subsection closely scrutinizes the United States Bishops’ use of Cooperation to
mitigate relationships between Catholic hospitals and secular hospitals.
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a. Sterilization
Catholic hospitals receive pressure to perform intrinsically evil procedures such as
abortions and sterilizations in their facilities. 305 Moreover, economic advantages also coerce
Catholic institutions to form joint ventures with non-Catholic hospitals that do perform
procedures that violate exceptionless moral norms. J. F. Keenan and Thomas R. Kopfensteiner in
“The Principle of Cooperation: Theologians Explain Material and Formal Cooperation,” defend
the use of Cooperation not only by individuals, but also by institutions. 306 Gerard Magill in
“Organizational Ethics” indicates that while one applies moral responsibility to institutions, this
is only done analogously, since moral responsibility ultimately belongs to individual persons. 307
Because so much is on the line when considering such enterprises—including the closing of
facilities—bishops use Cooperation to justify joint ventures where possible. 308 The wide
availability, high public acceptability, and high utilization of contraceptive services, including
sterilization makes this a particularly precarious sticking point for Catholic hospitals considering
joint ventures.
In 1975, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith responds to a request for
clarification on the Church’s stance on sterilization in Catholic health care facilities. 309 It
categorically rejects any Catholic hospitals formally cooperating in—giving approval or consent
to—procedures that are “directed to a contraceptive end,” including sterilizations that
deliberately impede “the natural effects of sexual actions.” 310 It also affirms the traditional
doctrine regarding material cooperation “to be applied with the utmost prudence, if the case
warrants.” 311 In addition, it advises, “great care must be taken against scandal and the danger of
any misunderstanding by an appropriate explanation of what is really being done.” 312
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In 1977, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops offers commentary on the above
mentioned document. 313 After restating the three principles that the Congregation offers
verbatim, the United States Bishops present six guidelines for hospital policy. 314 First, citing the
Congregation’s document, it affirms that Catholic hospitals may not approve sterilization
procedures that are directly contraceptive, even for medical reasons, for instance, to prevent
pregnancy in women in which pregnancy foreseeably aggravates a serious condition. 315 Two, the
United States Bishops acknowledge that Catholic hospitals have both the responsibility and legal
right to choose which procedures it will or will not perform. 316 However, in the extraordinary
circumstance where hospitals are under duress or pressure, and “when it will do more harm than
good,” hospitals may materially cooperate in such procedures. 317 Three, since this may only
happen in extraordinary circumstances, the decision making must involve the bishop or his
representative, to allay scandal. 318 Fourth, they insists that after carefully weighing the evidence,
hospitals must cooperate only in a material sense, not a formal sense. 319 In other words, the
hospital must not agree to the sterilization procedure because of medical reasons, which
constitute formal cooperation, but because of pressure to cooperate that results in more harm
than good.320 Fifth, because of the extraordinary nature of such circumstances, the Bishops insist
that hospitals consider each situation on a case-by-case basis, not presuming that the same
decision applies to all cases. 321 Finally, to diminish scandal, the Bishops recommend that
hospitals explain their decision, reaffirming their disapproval for sterilization, of which material
cooperation does not constitute. 322
In 1980, the United States Bishops promulgate another document on the topic of
sterilization, focusing more specifically on tubal ligations. 323 After reaffirming the prohibition on
sterilization in the two previously mentioned documents, they further emphasize that the
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reasoning for justification must be extrinsic to the case in consideration. 324 Thus, one must avoid
formal cooperation with evil, which choosing sterilization for medical reasons constitutes. An
extrinsic example that they offer in their commentary on the Congregation’s document is the
greater evil of closing a hospital by, for instance, exhausting the financial resources of the
hospital on litigation. 325 Moreover, they recommend increased and continued collaboration
between the local ordinary, the health care facility, and the sponsoring religious community. 326
The reemphasis on the extrinsic nature of the justification for material cooperation in Catholic
health care facilities foreshadows the vacillation on presenting the Church’s teaching on material
cooperation in future editions of the Ethical and Religious Directives.
b. The United States Bishops’ and Cooperation
The third edition of the Ethical and Religious Directives contains an articulation of the
Principle of Cooperation in its appendix that diverges slightly from traditional versions, which
later gives rise to conflict with the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. 327 First, it
highlights the distinction between formal and material cooperation, emphasizing that in formal
cooperation the cooperator intends the same object as the principal agent. 328 In addition, based on
an argument that intention not only constitutes an explicit act of the will, they argue that implicit
formal cooperation occurs when the object of the cooperator’s action is indistinguishable from
that of the principal agent’s, regardless of what she says. 329 Next, they distinguish between
immediate and mediate material cooperation. 330 Immediate material cooperation, like implicit
formal cooperation has the same object as the principal agent, but acts under duress or pressure,
some of which, but not all may morally justify one’s acting. 331 Alternatively, if the cooperator’s
object remains distinct from the principal agent’s, then it constitutes mediate material
cooperation, “and can be morally licit.” 332 The United States Bishops also mention the role that
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distance and proportion play in characterizing and justifying mediate material cooperation. 333
Finally, they mention the virtue of prudence, the factor of scandal, and the prophetic role of the
Church in the world. 334
Only six years later, in the fourth edition of the Ethical and Religious Directives, the
newly formed United States Conference of Catholic Bishops eliminate the appendix on “The
Principles Governing Cooperation,” indicating in the introduction to the sixth part on “Forming
New Partnerships with Health Care Organizations and Providers,” that the brief summary did not
forestall misinterpretations and even gave rise to problems in application. 335 Kevin D. O’Rourke
et al. offer some explanation for the change in their article “A Brief History: A Summary of the
Development of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services.” 336
First, O’Rourke explains that the need for a more authoritative set of directives for Catholic
health care systems in the United States, one that overcomes so-called “geographical morality,”
first arose in the late 1960s because of the rise in proportionalism and its use to justify
intrinsically evil acts such as sterilizations in Catholic hospitals. 337 Because of the poor reception
among proportionalist ethicists, the Bishops submit the matter to the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith. 338 Which, in turn, leads to the above mentioned response on sterilization
by the Congregation to the United States Bishops. 339
O’Rourke explains that the third edition of the Ethical and Religious Directives results
from the necessity to provide a theological basis for the legalistic pronouncements of the
previous two editions, and to address new issues that arise since its first two promulgations,
including, consent in research, advance directives, and cooperation with non-Catholic
facilities.340 Contrary to what Keenan and Kopfensteiner hold, 341 O’Rourke contends that the
United States Bishops did not have approval from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
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for the appendix on Cooperation, before its vote approving the third edition, which includes the
appendix, in November of 1994.342 In the spring of 1999, the Congregation for the Doctrine of
the Faith asks Bishop Joseph A. Fiorenza, the president of the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops to revisit the sixth part of the third edition of the Ethical and Religious Directives, the
appendix on cooperation and the 1977 commentary on the Congregation’s document on
sterilization, insisting that these documents contribute to misapplication of cooperation and the
principle of partnerships. 343 The fourth edition incorporates four changes to the sixth part of the
third edition of the Ethical and Religious Directives: 1) a new directive, 70 forbids Catholic
health care institutions from engaging in immediate material cooperation in intrinsically evil acts
such as sterilization, 2) they eliminate the appendix on cooperation altogether, 3) a footnote
indicates that the directive 70 supersedes the 1977 commentary on Quaecumque Sterilizatio, and
4) they give a definition for scandal that coincides more with the Catechism’s definition. 344
c. The Object of the Cooperator
O’Rourke’s article implies that the United States Bishops took liberty in their
interpretation on Cooperation not consistent with traditional articulations and the Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith calls them to task on this. 345 I argue that this misinterpretation by the
United States Bishops centers on a misunderstanding of the Moral Object and its relationship to
Cooperation. First, the appendix says that formal cooperation exists when the cooperator intends
the same object as the principal agent. 346 Second, the appendix distinguishes between implicit
and explicit formal cooperation, suggesting that the difference consists in the spoken intention of
the agent, while, once again, the commonality is in the Moral Object. 347
By definition, however, Cooperation always has two distinct agents and two distinct
actions.348 In formal cooperation, the cooperator agrees with the intention of the principal agent,
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but his act always remains distinct, contributing nonetheless to the principal agent’s act.
Otherwise it does not constitute a case of Cooperation at all, but of two people choosing the same
object, which amounts to the same act, which amounts to two co-principal agents. As such, it is
one thing to agree with another’s Moral Object, and to aid him in completion, and quite another
to intend the same Moral Object in act. This is because, by definition, the Moral Object is the
species of the act itself. 349
Shedding more light on intention gives greater clarity. Aquinas indicates that intention is
an act of the will towards an end. 350 Broadly speaking, intending may refer to the remote end or
the proximate end (Moral Object). 351 In act, however, one always chooses a specific means to
one’s end, the means constituting a Moral Object. 352 Conceptually, one may distinguish the end
from the means, in act they constitute a single act of the will. 353 Therefore, if one intends the
same Moral Object as another, then one no longer merely cooperates, but commits the same act,
which constitutes co-principal agents, and Cooperation does not apply. 354 In Compromise and
Complicity, Chiara Lepora and Robert E. Goodin distinguish ‘complicity simpliciter’ from other
colloquial uses that involve co-prinicipalship: full joint wrongdoing, co-operation, conspiracy,
and collusion.355 In complicity simpliciter, the secondary agent contributes causally to the
principal agent’s wrongdoing, as opposed to merely doing wrong together. 356
Another important distinction is that between the physical act itself—prescinded from its
voluntariness—and the act as moral, which also clarifies that choosing the same Moral Object is
choosing the same act. Acts are moral insofar as they are voluntary, and therefore on the moral
order, not the natural order. 357 Consequently, two distinct physical acts may indeed constitute a
common Moral Object; however, insofar as they do, they also constitute the same moral act. For
instance, if one chooses to kill someone, it does not matter how one does it in the physical sense,
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that is, whether one uses a gun or a knife, the Moral Object remains the same, a choice to kill
another person. As such, insofar as two individuals have the same Moral Object, they also have
the same act, even if, in manifestation, they commit unique physical acts. Therefore, once again,
insofar as they commit the same act, Cooperation does not apply.
As such, the appendix on Cooperation in the third edition of the Ethical and Religious
Directives should maintain the distinction between agreeing with another’s action—regardless of
whether it is object or remote end—and having the same object as the principal agent. Although
Cooperation necessitates that the cooperator’s object be distinct from the principal agent’s,
formal cooperation, by definition also means that the cooperator’s act is immoral. 358 For
instance, the getaway driver in a bank robbery plays a distinctly different role in the activity, but
nonetheless, agrees with the principal agent’s object of stealing money and provides an
invaluable role as the getaway driver. An inexorable link between the two actions exists, but the
objects remain distinct. The principal agent, the bank robber steals believing that the getaway
driver will provide a necessary means of escape. Likewise, the getaway driver provides the
means of escape to the robber agreeing with the Moral Object of the principal agent’s act,
probably presuming a share in the loot.
The premise that intention consists of something more than an explicit act of the will,
which specifies the distinction between explicit and implicit formal cooperation is ambiguous, if
not misleading, and therefore, in need of greater clarification. The above demonstrates that
intention abstracted from its voluntariness consists of the physical act alone (genus naturae).359
To be sure, one may speak as though there is a difference between intending the proximate end
or remote end, but in action there is one act of the will. 360 The ethicists of the National Catholic
Bioethics Center offer a definition for explicit and implicit formal cooperation in evil that
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accounts for this difference in Moral Objects that the Cooperation necessitates. For them, explicit
formal cooperation occurs when one agrees with the evil acts of the principal agent and
intentionally chooses acts, which make it possible for the agent to do them. 361 Alternatively,
implicit formal cooperation occurs when one “intentionally contributes to the principal agent’s
act not for the sake of the evil act itself, but as a means to some other end of the cooperator.” 362
For example, a Catholic hospital may agree with a non-Catholic hospital’s intention to provide
sterilizations, making the process for obtaining these within the joint venture more attainable. On
the other hand, the Catholic hospital may actually not agree with the practice of sterilizations, but
nonetheless expedite the process for obtaining them in the non-Catholic portion of the facility,
because doing so increases the bottom line. The former constitutes explicit cooperation, because
the cooperator agrees with the principal agent, while the latter constitutes implicit cooperation,
because although they disagree with the principal agent’s intention, they nonetheless choose
means which contribute both to the attainment of the principal agent’s means and goal—
providing sterilizations—and the goal of making more money. In implicit cooperation, the act of
the principal agent becomes a means to the goal of the cooperator. Regardless, in no way does
this definition fit the United States Bishops’ definition, which maintains that the agent intends
the same Moral Object as the principal agent. 363
In addition to agreeing with the evil intention of the principal agent, formal cooperation
also has the cooperator committing an immoral act, that is, choosing a distinct, but nonetheless
immoral object. 364 On the other hand, in material cooperation, the cooperator both disagrees with
the intention of the principal agent and commits an act that is morally good or indifferent. 365
While ethicists unequivocally forbid any form of formal cooperation, if sufficient distance exists
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between the cooperator’s act and the principal agent’s act and a proportionate reason exists, then
ethicists permit, at least, mediate material cooperation. 366
In contrast, the appendix asserts that both immediate material cooperation and implicit
formal cooperation have the same object as the principal agent and that the only difference
between the former and the latter is that the cooperator experiences duress in immediate materia l
cooperation, but not in implicit formal cooperation. 367 Again, if the cooperator and the agent
have the same object, then they are co-principal agents and Cooperation does not apply. 368
Following the traditional formulation of the Principle of Cooperation, the ethicists of the
National Catholic Bioethics Center maintain that immediate material cooperation “occurs when
the cooperator assists in or contributes to the essential circumstances of the immoral act.” 369
Mediate material cooperation, on the other hand, “occurs when the cooperator assists in or
contributes to the nonessential circumstances of an immoral act.” 370 Since one assists in a
derivative sense in bringing about an intrinsically evil act in immediate material cooperation, this
constitutes an immoral act that one must always avoid. 371
Peter J. Cataldo in “Models of Health Care Collaboration” offers four characteristics for
licit collaboration between Catholic and non-Catholic health care entities. 372 First, Cataldo insists
that collaborations must avoid institutional integration of governance, management, or
finances.373 Second, certain powers must be reserved for institutional integrity and
independence. 374 Third, each institution must maintain its own assets and liabilities. 375 Finally,
any and all joint activities must be incompliance with the Ethical and Religious Directives. 376
Consequently, Catholic health care institutions commit formal cooperation if the management of
the non-Catholic entity that performs immoral procedures falls under the Catholic executive
management, if one does not adequately delineate the earnings from immoral procedures or if the
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Catholic entity provides space or support for the non-Catholic entity to perform these
procedures.377
The above mentioned changes to the Ethical and Religious Directives and the retraction
of what the United States Bishops say in its commentary on the Congregation for the Doctrine of
the Faith’s document on sterilization point to a faulty interpretation of Cooperation, which
connects to its poor use of the object of the act in the appendix to the third edition of the Ethical
and Religious Directives. Though not an explicitly written teaching, the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith simply reaffirms a traditional interpretation of Cooperation, based on a
Thomistic understanding of the object of the act, one that forbids both formal cooperation and
immediate material cooperation in intrinsically evil acts.
d. The United States Bishops’ 2018 Articulation of Cooperation
In 2018, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops published the sixth edition of
the Ethical and Religious for Catholic Health Care Services, which offers new directives for
collaborative arrangements, and a new introduction to the Principle of Cooperation. This
subsubsection briefly illuminates this.
To begin with, the United States Bishops define formal cooperation quoting Pope John
Paul II’s definition in Evangelium Vitae, “Formal cooperation ‘occurs when an action, either by
its very nature or by the form it takes in a concrete situation, can be defined as a direct
participation in an [immoral] act…or a sharing in the immoral intention of the person committing
it.’” 378 Moreover, they insist that formal cooperation not only includes holding the same
intention as the principal agent, but also participating directly in the immoral act. 379 In addition,
they contend that one formally cooperates even if one does agree with the intention of the
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principal agent, but simply uses one’s participation as a means to some other end. 380 The above
discussion identifies this as implicit formal cooperation. 381
In contrast, they define material cooperation as disagreeing with the principal agent’s
intention, not participating directly in the immoral act (including as a means to another end), but
contributing causally, not essentially. 382 In addition, they hold that some instances of this are
morally wrong, while others are justifiable. Then, they delineate factors for consideration: moral
object of the cooperator; how much the cooperator’s act causally contributes to the evil act, and
how important the goods are to be preserved or harms to be avoided.
Importantly, the United States Bishops, in contrast to the articulation of Cooperation in
the third edition of the Ethical and Religious Directives replace object with intention. 383
Moreover, in accord with editions following the third, they continue to prohibit immediate
material cooperation and uniquely any material cooperation with abortion.384 The following
subsection considers contemporary authors on Cooperation.
iii. Contemporary Contributions to Cooperation
This subsection discusses two contributions to the development of Cooperation. Luke
Gormally highlights important differences between a consequentialist interpretation of
Cooperation and one that is consistent with Thomistic virtue ethics. M. Cathleen Kaveny offers a
mirror principle to Cooperation, that accounts for appropriation of evil.
a. Rejecting the ‘No Difference Argument’
Christopher Kutz in Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age highlights an
important deficiency in consequentialism, which bases the determination of right action on the
consequences of one’s act. 385 According to Kutz, consequentialism does not account for
wrongdoing, where choosing otherwise does not have an impact on the outcome of a scenario. 386
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For example, since one pilot’s decision to not drop his bombs in an air raid does not change the
outcome for innocent civilians, consequentialism does not account for such an ethical
decision.387 Luke Gormally in “Why Not Dirty Your Hands? Or: on the Supposed Rightness of
(Sometimes) Intentionally Cooperating in Wrongdoing,” attributes the latter form of reasoning,
which he calls the “‘no difference’ argument,” to consequentialism.388 Contrary to the
implication of the title of his paper, which makes use of a common cliché for complicity, 389 he
subscribes to a Thomistic virtue ethic that emphasizes intention and affirms the existence of
absolute moral norms determined by Natural Law.390 Gormally rejects the above mentioned line
of reasoning by revealing the faulty logic issuing from consequentialism. 391 Second, he affirms
the traditional Christian position that actions form character, and therefore, one intention in
cooperation is primary. The following articulates the Thomistic action theory that underlies
Gormally’s critique of consequentialism’s version of Cooperation.
First, Gormally connects human dignity with the good through the first principle of
Natural Law: Insofar as the good leads to human flourishing it ought to be sought and evil,
leading to diminution, ought to be avoided. 392 Insofar as connaturality abides between the good
and flourishing human nature, objective moral absolutes that guide human action also exist. 393
Moral absolutes, such as the prohibition of killing innocent people and exclusion of adultery,
correspond to respect for the good in each and every human person due to their dignity. 394 Most
importantly, Gormally indicates that moral absolutes constitute types of action that have
reference to practical reason issuing as proposals for choice. 395 Proposals, as reasons for action
constitute the Moral Object. 396 While virtue ethicists often make a distinction between the Moral
Object and the remote end, both incorporate intention, which consists of an act of the will as
choice for a particular proposal configured by reason. 397
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Gormally uses Thomistic action theory to debunk four erroneous propositions that
consequentialism engenders. 398 First, consequentialism perpetuates a myth that one is equally
responsible for the foreseeable consequences of refusing to cooperate as one is for
cooperating. 399 Second, the right choice depends on a calculation of utility and disutility based on
foreseeable consequences. 400 Third, there are no moral absolutes; the right circumstances or
goals can justify any action. 401 Fourth, all effects are important for calculating the utility of
action.402 By implication, Double Effect and Cooperation do not matter. 403
In a consequentialist framework, the right action gives rise to the best state of affairs,
regardless of intention as means or end. 404 It presumes that humans have more control than they
actually do; for instance, not only to control outcomes, but also to judge what the best outcome
in fact is.405 Moreover, consequentialism neglects the formative nature of acts. One becomes
virtuous by choosing virtuous acts; conversely, one becomes vicious by choosing vicious acts. 406
Gormally defends a Thomistic action theory as foundational for Cooperation. In
articulating the errors of consequentualism, he demonstrates the formative role of intention.
b. M. Cathleen Kaveny’s Appropriation of Evil
In Evangelium Vitae, Pope John Paul II insists that it is immoral to support intrinsically
unjust laws that permit immoral acts such as abortion or euthanasia. 407 However, Gerard Magill
recalls in “Complicity of Catholic Healthcare Institutions with Immoral Laws,” John Paul II
permits politicians to support laws that restrict immoral procedures in societies where
overturning permissive laws entirely is not possible, a notion that John Finnis articulates in
“Helping Enact Unjust Laws without Complicity in Injustice.” 408 In “Voting and Complicity in
Wrongdoing,” M. Cathleen Kaveny notes that Joseph Ratzinger, unlike several United States
Bishops and clergy, with moderation applies Cooperation to citizens voting for politicians who
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support laws that permit immoral acts. 409 She contends that individuals who highjack
Cooperation to mobilize for pro-life politicians misuse the principle, which traditionally helps
one identify and avoid sinful acts that support other sinful acts. 410 Just like the lack of integrity in
the analogy between slavery and abortion, so the lack of integrity in the use of material
cooperation to mobilize voters to support pro-life politicians does more damage to the cause than
good.411
In “Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation’s Mirror Image,” Kaveny argues for a mirror
principle to Cooperation, appropriation of evil, what I call the Principle of Appropriation that
accounts for dilemmas where agents must decide whether or not to utilize the fruits or
byproducts of another’s evil act. 412 In Cooperation, the morally conscientious cooperator
deliberates to what extent one’s acts may licitly contribute to a principal agent’s evil act. 413
Alternatively, in Appropriation the morally conscientious agent (the appropriator) considers
whether one may appropriate the evil results of another agent’s (auxiliary agent) evil act to
complete one’s end. 414 Kaveny indicates that the similarity between the two consists in an
auxiliary agent performing an action that facilitates or supports the principal agent’s efforts in
performing his or her own act. 415
In short, Kaveny sees the development of Appropriation as consistent with the
reemergence of a Thomistic virtue theory that focuses on morality of action from the first-person
perspective since it proceeds from intention and forms character. 416 Intent on forming wellequipped confessors, under the manualists, morality becomes increasingly extrinsic with
increasing emphasis on the objective causality of action and less attention to how intention forms
character.417 With such a prospective focus, manualists simply do not adequately account for
how the appropriation of other’s evil acts impact character. 418 The retrieval of the first-person
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perspective of morality, true to Aquinas, opens the door to considering not only how one’s
actions may contribute to another’s evil actions or goals, as in Cooperation, but also how
another’s evil may contribute to one’s own actions or goals, as in Appropriation . 419 Essentially,
Kaveny identifies an irreducible difference between Cooperation and Appropriation that is the
difference between the first-person perspective of the auxiliary agent and the first-person
perspective of the principal agent, respectively. 420
In practice, moral analysis consists of a snapshot of a scenario. For Kaveny, Cooperation
and Appropriation constitute two unique perspectives for moral analysis that explain some
dilemmas. Their irreducibility means that one or the other is a better fit for a given situation, the
determination of which boils down to whether the decision maker is using or contributing to
another’s bad action. 421 To illustrate, Kaveny deconstructs Russell E. Smith’s use of Cooperation
to explain why researchers ought not to use aborted fetuses in research. 422 Although Smith
identifies the use of electively aborted fetuses for research as proximate, mediate, contingent,
material cooperation, his objection to their use in research has to do with the further denigration
of the lives of the aborted children insofar as researchers treat them merely as instruments for
medical progress. 423 Moreover, he argues that research on electively aborted fetuses gives
scandal insofar as it gives the impression of formal cooperation in evil. 424 For Kaveny, the
weakness of Smith’s argument is that the primary ethical dilemma is a problem of appropriation,
not cooperation. 425
Kaveny holds that the difference between intention—purposeful causality, 426 wishing—
desire uncoupled from causation, 427 and prediction—a judgment that an event will happen, 428
illustrates exactly who is morally culpable for which action. Agents are responsible for the
means that they intend, less for what they wish, and not at all for what they predict. 429 Kaveny
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exemplifies the uniqueness regarding the moral scrutiny for wishing by explaining that parents
wishing for an organ for their dying child do not necessarily wish for the death of a would-be
donor.430 In wishing, one may pick and choose which mean lead to desired ends, without regard
for causation.431 Intending, on the other hand, according to Kaveny includes the choosing of
specific causal means to achieve one’s end. 432 Unlike intending or wishing, predicting only
involves the intellect, which judges based on evidence the likelihood that a particular event may
happen.433
In light of these distinctions, Kaveny illustrates the dilemma of using electively aborted
fetuses for research. 434 First, she insists that the problem is one of appropriation, not cooperation.
Second, although the researchers predict the availability of the fetuses for research, they do not
necessarily intend the abortion. 435 Moreover, she asserts that they certainly wish for and predict a
successful outcome for their research, which depends on a steady supply of fetal tissue, but this
does not constitute intending the fetuses’ death, since wishing is uncoupled with causality. 436
Kaveny presents two other concepts for Cooperation and Appropriation that account for
contamination: seepage and self-deception. 437 Seepage occurs when the description of one’s act
by another influences the self-concept of one’s own acting. 438 For instance, if an abortionist
presumes that a researcher making use of fetal tissue approves of his immoral act, and the
researcher begins to approve of abortion. Self-deception occurs when one deceives oneself into
accepting the immoral intentions of the other. 439 For example, if a researcher begins to intend
more abortions to increase the stock of fetal tissue for research.
c. Double Effect and Appropriation
If Appropriation is similar to Cooperation, then the conditions of Double Effect that
apply analogously to Cooperation should apply to Appropriation.
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The first two conditions of Double Effect and Cooperation pertain to intention, as Moral
Object and remote end. First, for Double Effect the Moral Object in question must be either good
or indifferent.440 For Cooperation, the cooperator’s act must be morally good or indifferent. 441
Therefore, for Appropriation the appropriator’s act must be morally good or indifferent. Second,
for Double Effect the agent must intend the good effect and not the bad effect. 442 For
Cooperation, the cooperator must not intend the evil of the principal agent. 443 For Appropriation,
the principal agent must not intend or ratify the act of the auxiliary agent. 444 In Cooperation, a
cooperator intending the evil of the principal agent constitutes formal cooperation, just as an
appropriator ratifying the evil act of an auxiliary agent constitutes formal appropriation, both of
which are unquestionably immoral. 445
The third condition of Double Effect is that the bad effect must not cause (or be the
means to) the good effect. 446 In Cooperation, the principal agent, not the cooperator, must be the
primary cause of the evil act, which she appropriates from the cooperator. 447 In Appropriation the
principal agent utilizes the evil act or byproduct to accomplish one’s goal. Accordingly, the
principal agent must not depend on the auxiliary’s evil act in an inexorable way to accomplish
his task. Just as the third condition for Cooperation rules out immediate material cooperation, so
it should rule out immediate material appropriation.
The fourth condition for Double Effect necessitates that one have a proportionate reason
to permit the foreseen, yet unintended evil effect. 448 Similarly, for Cooperation, the more serious
the evil of the principal agent, the more serious the justification for accepting the mediate
material cooperation, of which distance and dispensability play a crucial role in determining.
Consequently, for Appropriation, the principal agent must have a proportionate reason for
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appropriating the immoral act of an auxiliary agent. Just as distance and dispensability play a
role in justifying cooperation, it ought to play a role in appropriation.
d. Appropriation Fetal Tissue Remains of Elective Abortion
Insofar as the bishops unequivocally forbid any form of material cooperation in abortion,
it is very likely that they would forbid any form of appropriation as well, including the use of
fetal tissue remains of electively aborted children. 449 Regardless, the topic illustrates how
Appropriation works. First, in principle, doing research on fetal tissue is a morally indifferent
act. Second, so long as the researchers do not intend the evil of the auxiliary agent, that is, the
death of the child, they are not guilty of formal appropriation. Third, so long as the auxiliary
agent’s act of abortion does not connect inexorably to the object or goal of the researcher, the
principal agent avoids both formal cooperation and immediate material appropriation. Finally,
the researcher must have a proportionately justifiable reason to use electively aborted fetuses for
research, such as a severe shortage of other sources or an extremely high cost. Moreover, the
foreseeable good must be great as well, such as a cure for the flu. Practically speaking, however,
I agree with Kaveny that such a justifiable scenario is most unlikely. 450
This section articulates the Principle of Cooperation, comparing, yet differentiating it
from Double Effect. This chapter discusses proficiencies in health care ethics consultations, the
benefits and limitations of principlism, and the complexities of the Principle of Cooperation. The
following chapter applies the preceding to the use of prophylactic, sterilizing procedures and
emergency contraception in victims of sexual assault.
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CHAPTER FIVE – OOPHORECTOMIES AND EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION
This chapter uses Natural Law, the Moral Object, and the Principle of Double Effect to
ethically justify procedures that physically defined are sterilizing and contraceptive, respectively.
5A. Risk Reducing Bilateral Salpingo-Oophorectomies
This section explores the ethical decision-making regarding prophylactic operations that
both preempt the development of cancer in patients carrying the breast-cancer susceptibility gene
1 (BRCA1) or BRCA2 mutations, and has an unintended, yet foreseen sterilizing effect. The first
subsection explores the history, clinical context, and medically indicated procedures for BRCA1
and BRCA2 mutation carriers. The second subsection uses the Principle of Totality and the
Principle of Double Effect to justify risk-reducing bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies in BRCA
mutation carriers. The third subsection explores factors that health care ethics consultants may
encounter concerning confidentiality and genetic discrimination, especially in light of the
complexity of genetic testing. Finally, the fourth subsection utilizes the organizational ethics
paradigm to elucidate how Catholic health care institutions that prohibit sterilizations may
nonetheless permit bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers.
i. Clinical Explanation
Both BRCA1 and BRCA2 are tumor suppressor genes, some mutations of which
significantly increase one’s risk for developing breast, ovarian, or prostate cancer. 1 Not all
mutations of these genes have the same effect; some are more deleterious than others. 2 The
following subsection elucidates the history of identifying the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes
responsible for increasing one’s susceptibility to the abovementioned cancers. Then, it articulates
its physiological role. Finally, it explains various options for addressing the condition.
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a. Discovering BRCA1 and BRCA2
According to Joi L. Morris et al., physicians knew as early as the mid-nineteenth century
that breast cancer had a heritable connection because of its devastating impact on certain
families.3 In the 1970s Mary-Claire King began researching heritable links in breast cancer. 4 By
the 1980s, she uses statistical analysis of women with breast cancer to demonstrate an autosomal
dominant link to some cases, which counters the dominant theory at the time, namely that
multiple genes and environment cause cancer. 5 She focuses on discovering one gene responsible
for engendering breast cancer, which she dubs BRCA1 for breast cancer gene 1. 6 Using Southern
blotting, King’s team genotyped 173 different markers from family members of breast cancer
patients.7 By 1990, she narrows the location of BRCA1 to chromosome 17—an enormous
accomplishment before the completion of the Human Genome Project. 8
After King announces this achievement, scientists throughout the world set out to
discover BRCA1’s precise location on the chromosome and to sequence the gene. 9 In 1994,
Mark Skolnick and his team of researchers at Myriad Genetics and the National Institute of
Health successfully sequenced BRCA1. 10 In the early 1990s, scientists know that BRCA1
explains some cases of breast cancer, but not all, which sparks another race to discover the
BRCA2 gene. 11 In September 1994, Michael Stratton and Richard Wooster narrow its location to
chromosome 13. 12 In October 1994, Yoshoi Miki identifies several mutations that engender
breast cancer in its carriers. 13 In 1996, Myriad Genetics begins providing genetic testing for
which it receives a patent in 1998.14 In 2013, however, the United States Supreme Court
overturns this patent. 15
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b. Cancer Inhibition
In the abstract of their review article, “Role of BRCA1 and BRCA2 as Regulators of
DNA Repair, Transcription, and Cell Cycle in Response to DNA Damage,” Kiyotsugu Yoshida
and Yoshio Miki explain that for one to understand the damaging role mutations to the BRCA1
and BRCA2 gene, it is important first to know what these respective proteins do as tumor
suppressors.16 They elaborate on the respective functions that BRCA1 and BRCA2 play in DNA
repair, transcriptional response to DNA damage and cell cycle check pointing. 17 Many types of
damage occurs to DNA, but one of the most destructive to life is Double Strand Breaks, which
consists of a complete break in both chains of a helical strand of DNA. 18 This poses a serious
risk, since no template remains to guide either end’s repair process. 19 When this occurs, DNAdamage binding protein triggers a protein kinase cascade that initiates several processes to
correct the error. 20 In mammals, the protein kinase ATM phosphorylates (adds a phosphate)
several substrates including BRCA1 that initiates homologous recombination, which is one of
two mechanisms for repairing the DNA. 21 According to Yoshida and Miki, evidence indicates
that BRCA1 plays an important role in regulating the Rad50-Mre11-NBS1 complex, while
BRCA2 regulates the Rad51 protein, both of which play an important role in homologous
recombination. 22
In addition, BRCA1 and BRCA2 regulate transcription when DNA damage occurs. 23
Transcription consists of the complex process whereby RNA polymerase uses a DNA template
to produce a strand of messenger RNA, which functions as a template for protein synthesis.
When DNA damage occurs, it is important to limit the transcription of messenger RNA so that
the cell does not produce faulty proteins. When DNA damage occurs, BRCA1 regulates the
activity of RNA polymerase II, the complex responsible for messenger RNA transcription. 24 In
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addition, BRCA1 is a co-activator of the cell cycle inhibitor p53.25 BRCA2’s role is less clear,
but nonetheless present, and important. 26
Finally, BRCA1 and BRCA2 provide checkpoints for cellular responses to DNA damage
during the cell cycle. 27 The cell cycle consists of the entire process of DNA replication and
mitotic cellular division. 28 DNA replication occurs during the S-phase of interphase. The G2 phase consists of a repair phase for mistakes that occur during replication. When DNA damage
occurs, the ATM phosphorylation of BRCA1 plays an important role in arresting the cell cycle
during the G 2 -phase just before mitosis begins. 29 Again, BRCA2’s role is less direct, but still
important for the arresting the cell cycle when DNA damage occurs. 30
Yoshida and Miki indicate that scientists identify over 200 deleterious germ line
mutations to the BRCA1 gene alone. 31 The three-abovementioned functions represent only a few
of the roles that such mutations may interrupt giving rise to cancer in its carriers. Undoubtedly
more processes remain to be discovered.
c. Prophylactic Treatments
In the general population, 12 percent of women develop breast cancer in their lifetime,
while 55 to 65 percent of women with a deleterious BRCA1 mutation and 45 percent of women
with a harmful BRCA2 mutation develop breast cancer by the age of 70. 32 Moreover, studies
suggest that while 1.3 percent of women in the general population develop ovarian cancer in
their lifetime, 39 percent of women who inherit a BRCA1 mutation and 11 to 17 percent of
women who inherit a BRCA2 mutation develop ovarian cancer by the age of 70. 33 With such an
increase in risk, some physicians perform risk-reducing bilateral mastectomies and risk-reducing
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies—the removal of the ovaries and Fallopian tubes. 34 While such
operations reduce the risk of developing breast and ovarian cancers, they do not eliminate the it
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altogether.35 It is still possible for cancer to originate in the scar tissue or the remaining primary
peritoneal.36 This section explores the effectiveness of a variety of prophylactic options.
In 2007, the American Cancer Society recommends that women with BRCA1 or BRCA2
mutations begin a surveillance regimen of alternating breast magnetic resonance imaging and
mammograms every six months. 37 The American Cancer Institute recommends that women
testing positive for the abovementioned mutations begin this surveillance regime at 25 years of
age.38 Some suggest women begin ten years before the age of a diagnosed family member, but no
earlier than age 20.39 Even surveillance comes with a risk, since mammograms utilize X-rays that
expose women to radiation. 40 Because of this, some recommend using mammograms at 35,
utilizing magnetic resonance images only until then.41 Unfortunately, surveillance is not 100%
accurate in catching and preventing lethal cases of breast cancer; as such, many physicians
recommend other means of risk-reduction.42
Women with the BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation who get breast cancer have a 30% chance
of developing cancer in the other breast—contralateral breast cancer—in the ten years following
the initial diagnosis. 43 Yet not all carriers with breast cancer opt for bilateral mastectomy or even
unilateral mastectomy for the affected breast. 44 In fact, only 50% of North American carriers opt
for bilateral mastectomy when diagnosed with breast cancer, even though it reduces one’s risk of
developing breast cancer by 97% in the other breast. 45 Morris et al, indicates that the decision to
remove one’s breasts is highly personal, and depends on many factors. 46
The BRCA1 mutation not only increases one’s chance of getting cancer, but of acquiring
a higher-grade as well. 47 For instance, 75% of cancers in BRCA1 carriers are estrogen-receptornegative, and 69% are triple negative or estrogen receptor-negative, progesterone-receptornegative and human epidermal growth factor receptor 2-negative. 48 BRCA2 carriers, on the other
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hand, have the increased risk of developing cancer, but not the higher proportion of high-grade
cancers; rather, their proportion is comparable to the general population (77% ER-positive and
16% triple negative). 49
Surveillance and risk-reducing surgery are not the only options for reducing cancer risk.
It is also possible for one to take tamoxifen, which when digested by the cytochrome P450
enzymes isoform CYP2D6 and CYP3A4, produces high affinity metabolites, afimoxifene and
endoxifen, for the estrogen receptor, 50 to which it antagonistically binds, inhibiting the
transcription of genes. 51 Since tamoxifen reduces one’s risk of developing estrogen receptorpositive cancer, it is medically-indicated for BRCA2 mutation carriers, but not for BRCA1
mutation carriers. 52 Still, it only reduces one’s risk of getting estrogen receptor-positive breast
cancer by 50% in BRCA2 mutation carriers. 53 In addition, oral contraceptive use for five years
reduces one’s risk of developing ovarian cancer by at least 40%. 54 Current research does not
indicate that oral contraception either reduces or increases one’s chances of getting breast
cancer.55
For BRCA-mutation carriers, as the abovementioned statistics indicate, the number one
risk factor for cancer is age. 56 Consequently, current guidelines recommend risk-reducing
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA-mutation carriers between the ages of 35 and 40
after completing childbearing. 57 In an effort to stave off surgical menopause, and in light of the
serous origin of ovarian cancer in the Fallopian tubes, some physicians are opting for bilateral
salpingectomies alone, followed later by oophorectomies. 58 This practices is not, however,
considered standard of care by the National Comprehensive Cancer Network. 59 Lynn M.
Hartmann and Noralane M. Lindor in “The Role of Risk-Reducing Surgery in Hereditary Breast
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and Ovarian Cancer,” say the jury is out as to whether or not bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies
before menopause actually reduces BRCA-mutation carriers’ risk for breast cancer. 60
According to the United States Preventative Services Task Force risk-reducing bilateral
mastectomies decreases a mutation carrier’s chances of getting breast cancer by 85-100% and
breast cancer mortality by 81-100%.61 Bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies reduce a mutation
carrier’s chance of getting ovarian cancer by 69-100% and of getting breast cancer by 37100%.62 While no option is perfect, clearly the risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy and bilateral
salpingo-oophorectomies have the best statistical results. The following subsection considers the
ethics surrounding such prophylactic procedures.
ii. Double-Effect Reasoning
Ethically, bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies pose several dilemmas. The surgeon not
only removes healthy organs, but also renders the patient sterile; both of which seems to violate
important Catholic ethical principles—the Principle of Totality and prohibition against direct
sterilization. 63 The following demonstrates that Totality justifies bilateral salpingooophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers. Moreover, Double Effect justifies bilateral
salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers, even though it renders the patient sterile.
This justification depends on Pope John Paul II’s understanding of intention and the Moral
Object in Veritatis Splendor.64
a. Totality
In his Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas articulates his formulation of the Principle of
Totality in response to the question as to whether or not it is ever possible to maim or mutilate
another person. 65 He argues that certain conditions warrant maiming the body, but this is
permissible since the parts of the body are for the sake of the whole. 66 To explicate, he uses an
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example from a previous question concerning members of a state. 67 Just as it may be necessary
to remove a person from a community for the good of the whole—keeping that individual from
sinning and harming others—so it may be necessary to remove a decaying bodily member for the
good of the whole person. 68 This justifies amputation of diseased limbs, but not health organs.
Pope Pius XII develops Aquinas’s articulation of Totality. In his “Address to the First
International Congress on the Histopathology of the Nervous System,” he highlights an
important distinction between the analogy of the community and the physical human person. 69 In
“Pope Pius XII and the Principle of Totality,” Gerald Kelly observes that Pius XII distances
himself from Aquinas’s analogy of the community, because he does not support the totalitarian
governments that subjugate the individual for the whole. 70 Unlike living organisms, communities
do not have a unity subsisting in them; therefore, Pius XII argues that they constitute moral
entities, rather than, physical entities. 71 Therefore, in deference to their natural finality, physical
entities that possess a subsisting unity may dispose of their members, integral parts, and organs
immediately and directly. 72 This, however, is not true for authority regarding members of state. 73
In 1953, Pius XII addresses the 26 th assembly of Italian Urologists defending the removal
of healthy organs that exacerbates an unhealthy condition. 74 He argues that three conditions must
exist for one to justifiably remove a healthy organ that aggravates another condition: 1) the
healthy organ’s presence causes harm or threat to the whole person; 2) the damage or threat can
only be avoided by removing the healthy organ and its effectiveness is certain; and 3) one can
reasonably expect the benefit to compensate for the negative effect. 75 He emphasizes that the
healthy organ does not constitute the threat, but its functioning directly or indirectly causes for
the whole body a serious threat. 76 For such cases, he advances the application of Totality not
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only for the removal of diseased organs that threaten the whole, but also the removal of healthy
organs that harm or threaten the whole.
To illustrate, Pius XII argues that a surgeon may licitly remove healthy testicles from a
man suffering with prostate cancer, even though it renders him sterile, because the removal of
the testicles indirectly slows the growth of cancer by reducing the presence testosterone, which
accelerates the cancer’s growth. 77 This case meets the three-abovementioned criteria. First, the
presence of the healthy testicles accelerates the growth of prostate cancer by producing
testosterone. Second, the only effective way to remove the threatening presence of testosterone—
at that time—was to perform an orchiectomy, removing the testosterone producing testicles.
Third, the positive effects—slowing the growth of life-threatening cancer—outweigh the
negative, sterilizing effects of losing one’s testicles.
In contrast, Pius XII argues that the abovementioned criteria do not justify a surgeon
removing a woman’s oviducts to prevent pregnancy in one who has a condition that worsens
during pregnancy. 78 First, the healthy Fallopian tubes do not contribute either directly or
indirectly to the condition in question. Second, removing the Fallopian tubes is not the only way
to prevent the dangerous condition of pregnancy from occurring. Third, although one may argue
that one’s life is more important than one’s openness to life in the marital act, the inability to
satisfy the first two criteria renders this point feeble for defending the act by Totality.
Bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers meets the three criteria
that Pius XII offers in his address to the urologists. Even though one may argue that the organ is
cancer free and healthy at the moment, the statistical likelihood of it becoming cancerous in
BRCA mutation carriers constitutes a genuine threat to the whole person, especially considering
how deadly ovarian cancer is. 79 Because of the significant, increased risk of developing ovarian
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cancer and the lack of reliable surveillance, following the recommended guidelines of having
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies between the age of 35 and 40 constitutes the best method of
preventing ovarian cancer. 80 Although bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies render patients sterile,
the lifesaving positive certainly outweighs the negative.
b. Double-Effect Reasoning
Aquinas is the first to formulate an argument using Double-Effect Reasoning in his
Summa Theologica.81 In II-II, q. 64, a. 7, he explains how one may justifiably kill another person
in self-defense.82 He begins with the premise that an act may have more than one effect, not all
of which one intends. 83 In morally licit, lethal self-defense, he maintains with Augustine that one
must not actually intend to kill one’s assailant; rather, one must intend self-defense.84 The death
of the assailant is praeter intentionem, beside intention.85 In addition, he contends that one’s
action must be proportionate to the assailant’s assault. 86
From an appropriate understanding of several key terms one may derive a set of criteria
that configures a contemporary formulation of the Principle of Double Effect. First, one must
understand what Aquinas means by intention. In Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory,
John Finnis indicates that Aquinas uses intention in both a broad sense and a narrow sense. 87
Broadly speaking, intention concerns ends. 88 In On Evil, Aquinas makes a distinction between
intending something as a remote (ulterior) end (finis operantis) versus as a proximate end (finis
proximus).89 Intention, as the proximate end forms the act’s species, which Aquinas identifies as
the Moral Object. 90 In the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologica, he highlights an important
distinction between the proximate end (means) and the remote end, namely that one chooses
(electio) a means for an end, 91 while one intends (intentio) a remote end. 92 The latter constitutes
the narrower sense of intention, while the broader sense includes intention as choice of the will. 93
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To illustrate, Finnis refers the reader to Aquinas’s On Evil, where Aquinas offers the example of
one wanting to steal in order to give alms. 94 Narrowly speaking, the person has a good intention,
to give to the poor, but the act is evil because the means chosen is evil—stealing; therefore,
broadly speaking, the intention is evil. Finnis insists that Aquinas is using the broad sense of
intention in his discourse on self-defense.95 As such, both the proximate end and the ulterior end
must be good for the act to be good.
Another important concept for Aquinas that relates to intention is praeter intentionem.96
In “Per se and Praeter Intentionem in Aquinas,” Duarte Sousa-Lara identifies three distinct uses
of praeter intentionem in Aquinas’s works: 1) to indicate that one does not will a moral evil per
se; 2) to identify unforeseen outcomes that may affect an action; and 3) to refer to foreseen, but
unintended effects of action that, in turn, do not specify the act. 97 Sousa-Lara contends that
Aquinas uses the third form for Double-Effect Reasoning in his discussion of killing in selfdefense.98 Insofar as the agent does not intend to kill the assailant, but merely to defend oneself
from an unjust aggressor using lethal force, the evil effect of the death of the attacker remains
outside one’s intention. Foreseeing the death of the assailant by means of lethal defense does not
change the Moral Object. It does not affect the species of the act since it remains outside of
intention. This builds on the principle that knowing (foreseeing) does not entail causing.
Concerning Aquinas’s understanding of intention, one may derive two or three of the
conditions of Double Effect. First, the Moral Object of the Act must be good or neutral. 99
Second, one must not intend the evil effect, but the good effect. 100 Third, from a casuistic
perspective, for instance, following that of Jean Pierre Gury, the bad effect must not cause the
good effect.101 From a Thomistic perspective, however, the third is simply a restatement of the
first, namely, that one must not choose evil means for a good end.
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Finally, Aquinas has a proportionality clause in his argument for self-defense: one’s use
of self-defense ought to be proportionate to the force that the attacker uses in the assault. 102
Double Effect does not justify the use of lethal force to counter non-lethal threats. Causally, one
must have a serious reason for causing the evil effect; that is, the good must outweigh the bad. 103
Having summarized an account of Principle of Double Effect that adequately accounts
for intention from a Thomistic perspective, I now apply it to bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies
for BRCA mutation carriers. First, I argue that this procedure is not evil in its species but
depends on the broad interpretation of intention of the will that includes both the proximate end
and the ulterior end. Accordingly, it meets the first three conditions of Double Effect. Finally, the
lifesaving risk-reduction satisfies the proportionality condition of Double Effect.
c. Object of the Act
The first, and arguably most important condition for the Principle of Double Effect is that
the Moral Object of the Act must be good or indifferent. 104 Using the broad sense of intention,
Aquinas maintains that the intention morally specifies an act. 105 Recall that the proximate end of
an act determines the Moral Object. 106 Therefore, above all, one must determine whether the
means chosen in the act is good or evil.
For Aquinas, morality centers on the will. 107 In particular, the will intends goods that the
intellect rationally configures. 108 Regarding species of acts, it is possible to consider actions from
the perspective of their voluntariness, that is, on the moral order (genus moris); and
independently thereof, that is, purely as physical acts on the metaphysical order (genus
naturae).109 Insofar as the orders differ, so the ends differ, and consequently, the objects differ. 110
As such, one act may have two species, one of the moral order and the other of the physical
order.111 For example, on the physical order, an act may be killing, but on the moral order, that
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is, in its voluntariness, the act is one of self-defense. The physical species of the act is evil
insofar as it results in the death of another, but morally, the act is good insofar as the agent
intends something good, self-defense. Although distinct in nature from the ontological order,
human actions, constitutive of the moral order, by analogy have a fullness of being that
corresponds both to reason and being. 112 It is precisely the Moral Object’s correspondence to
reason, or the lack thereof, which renders it good or evil.113 In self-defense, the agent intends
(intentio) a good end—preservation of one’s life. At the same time, regarding the proximate end,
the will chooses (electio) a particular means to this end, hitting an attacker on the head with a
bat. The intellect rationally configures the good such that the will may choose and then command
(praeceptum) a particular action. 114 Consequently, a human action is only good or evil insofar as
reason configures it; otherwise it is morally indifferent. 115
Purely from the perspective of the physical order, bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies
constitute the removal of organs, which renders the patient sterile. If one conflates the moral and
the physical order, one may conclude that bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies under any
circumstance are immoral insofar as they render patients sterile. This reduction of orders
constitutes the Naturalistic Fallacy. 116 The above demonstrates that a morality true to the
Thomistic tradition maintains the distinction of orders. 117 As such, morally, it is not enough to
merely consider the physical act alone. Rather, one must take into account the will and more
specifically intention, both as the ulterior end and proximate end. 118 For BRCA mutation carriers,
the ulterior end is the preservation of one’s life. The means chosen (finis proximus) is the
removal of organs that have a high likelihood of becoming cancerous—the Fallopian tube and
the ovaries. As such, ethically, from the perspective of the proximate end chosen, bilateral
salpingo-oophorectomies are good because they constitute a means that greatly diminishes one’s
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chance of getting ovarian cancer. 119 Furthermore, this satisfies the first condition of Double
Effect, which necessitates that the Moral Object is either good or neutral. 120
The ulterior end—the preservation of one’s life—is good, and with the addition of a
corollary—one does not intend the evil of sterilization—this satisfies the second condition, that
one intends the good effect and not the bad. 121 In other words, so long as one does not intend the
bad effect, it is outside of one’s intention, even if foreseen. 122 Bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies
for BRCA mutation carriers satisfies the third requirement that the bad effect not cause the good,
since it is not the sterilization that diminishes one’s risk of getting cancer, rather, it is the
removal of the potentially cancerous organs that causes both. Finally, it meets the fourth
condition of proportionality insofar as the good of foreseeably preserving one’s life from the
likelihood of developing deadly ovarian cancer outweighs the negative effect of sterilization.
Moreover, since no viable alternative exists for either preventing ovarian cancer or catching it
early, it is not only the best, but also the only medically-indicated option.123
This subsection demonstrates that the Principle of Double Effect does justify bilateral
salpingo-oophorectomies in BRCA mutation carriers. The next subsection considers other ethical
challenges for BRCA mutation carriers and their clinicians.
iii. Health Care Ethics Consultations
Genetic testing is a relatively new development in medicine with several important
ethical implications. Antonella Surbone, in “Social and Ethical Implications of BRCA Testing,”
defines genetic testing as “any analysis to detect genotypes, genetic mutations, or chromosomal
changes, not including analysis of proteins or metabolites directly related to a manifest disease,”
which can lead to genetic exceptionalism, that is, treating patients with genetic disorders
differently than patients with other diseases. 124 As the above demonstrates, genetic testing for
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BRCA mutations plays an important role in testing for heritable cancer mutations. At the same
time, it raises questions about reliability of testing, genetic discrimination, and sharing of
information with third parties, including family members. The following addresses these ethical
issues.
a. Genetic Testing
Genetic testing, even for a well-known and relatively straightforward condition like
BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutations does not always provide a simple answer. In fact, testing for
genetic mutations is quite complex. In 2004, Kiyotsugu Yoshida and Yoshio Miki, in their
review article, “Role of BRCA1 and BRCA2 as Regulators of DNA Repair, Transcription, and
Cell Cycle in Response to DNA Damage,” identify no less than 200 possible mutations that have
potentially deleterious effects in BRCA1 alone. 125 In 2010, Ake Borg et al., in “Characterization
of BRCA1 and BRCA2 Deleterious Mutations and Variants of Unknown Clinical Significance in
Unilateral and Bilateral Breast Cancer: The WECARE Study,” detect 470 unique sequence
variants in both unilateral and contralateral breast cancer patients, of which they contend 113 are
deleterious, 57 on BRCA1 and 56 on BRCA2, reducing the estimate significantly. 126 Borg et al.
categorizes the 357 other variants as variants of unknown clinical significance. 127 These account
for some of the ambiguous results that 10% of test-patients receive, but not all. 128 Although
patients with negative results tend to develop cancer at the same frequency as those with
ambiguous results, the latter tend to experience greater frustration and anxiety. 129 Genetic
counseling fills a void for those seeking guidance, especially with unclear results.
b. Genetic Discrimination
More than a lack of clarity concerning results and their implications, genetic
discrimination deters some women with a family history of breast cancer from receiving genetic
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testing, especially when they plan on using insurance to cover the cost.130 Women fear
discrimination from employers or insurance companies, because of implications of a pre-existing
condition for insurance acceptance. 131 In addition, some women fear living with the looming risk
of getting cancer, or being seen as less than ideal marital partners. 132 This not only puts many atrisk women at greater risk, because they are not engaging in meticulous surveillance or
prophylactic treatments, but this hurts research too, since fewer women are willing to participate
in studies.133
In 2008, the United States Congress passed the Genetic Information Non-discrimination
Act.134 This law specifically addresses discrimination from health insurance companies and
employers.135 Title I, concerning insurance companies, prohibits insurers using genetic
information to make decisions about eligibility, coverage, underwriting, or premiums. 136 In
addition, insurers may not request or require individuals or family members to provide genetic
information.137 Title II, concerning employment, prohibits employers from using genetic
information to make decisions regarding hiring, firing, promotions, pay, or job assignments. 138
While legislation addresses some discrimination, it does not deal with social discrimination or
the spiritual or psychological impact. In fact, because of the deep impact such personal
knowledge may have on individuals’ self-concept, and because of little that can be done
clinically before the age of 25, many experts advice not performing genetic testing on minors or
sharing one’s genetic status until later.139
c. Confidentiality
This raises an important issue regarding confidentiality and the ethical dilemma of
sharing important information that may impact other family members, especially regarding
genetic information. Legally, in the United States, the Health Insurance Portability and
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Accountability Act of 1996 delimits confidentiality in healthcare. 140 If healthcare workers do not
respect patient’s confidentiality, the trust between patient and caregiver will undoubtedly erode.
Confidentiality is important and strict, but not unlimited. 141 Albert Jonsen et al, in Clinical
Ethics: A Practical Approach to Ethical Decisions in Clinical Medicine maintains that when the
patient’s health depends on sharing information, the principle of beneficence justifies an
exception to confidentiality. 142 In addition, the principle of non-maleficence demands that if
withholding information poses a threat or harms to a third party, one must not withhold it. 143
Clint Parker, in “Disclosing Information about the Risk of Inherited Disease,” presents a
vignette of a physician in an ethical dilemma with two sisters, one of whom has been diagnosed
with a BRCA mutation and the other who has an increased risk. 144 Mrs. Durham, the sister
diagnosed with the BRCA mutation is estranged from her sister, Mrs. Weir, and does not want to
tell her sister that she has cancer. 145 Parker insists that the physician must not violate
confidentiality, by telling Mrs. Weir about Mrs. Durham’s diagnosis, nor should he do
nothing.146 Instead, if after persistently trying to convince Mrs. Durham to disclose the
information to her sister does not work, Parker contends that the physician should advise Mrs.
Weir that it is in her best interest to have genetic testing for a BRCA mutation. 147 He contends
that this approach maintains the confidentiality of Mrs. Durham, and also provides for the needs
of her estranged sister, Mrs. Weir. 148
Parker blurs the lines of confidentiality to solve a dilemma between confidentiality and
the potential threat to a third party. If this were the sacrament of reconciliation, such an act
would constitute an indirect violation of the seal—using confidential information outside the
confessor-penitent relationship. Needless to say, the patient-physician relationship is
qualitatively different, but the example nonetheless highlights the use of confidential information
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from one patient for another does constitute an exception to confidentiality. The principle of nonmaleficence demands such an exception for the third party. 149 To be sure, the threat that
exceptions to patient-physician confidentiality poses means that sharing personal information
will always be tenuous.
While this subsection highlights the complexity of ethical implications of genetic testing,
the following explains the ethical consistency of a Catholic hospital that prohibits sterilizations,
but allows prophylactic, but physically sterilizing procedures.
iv. Catholic Health Care Policy
Gerard Magill and Lawrence Prybil, in Governance Ethics in Healthcare, develop a
paradigm for organizational ethics rooted in skills for health care ethics consultations and
professionalism. 150 The first component is foundational, embodying the concept of identity, it
focuses on the organizational stewardship of the mission of the organization answering the
leitmotif question: “Who are we?” 151 The second component is process, focusing on decisionmaking that is participative deliberation and in the executive oversight context, answers the
leitmotif question: “How we function?,” which concerns the concept of accountability. 152 The
third component is practical, focusing on best practices for standards of conduct, in the context
of organizational culture, it answers the question, “What we do?,” thereby embodying the
concept of quality. 153 In the following, I utilize the three-abovementioned components of
organizational ethics to articulate a consistent application of the prohibition on sterilizations and
the use of bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers in Catholic Health Care
Institutions.
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a. Prohibiting Sterilization
Again, the first component of the organizational ethics paradigm concerns the
institution’s identity. 154 The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Ethical and
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, defines mission of every Catholic health
care institution in the United States.155 For the Church, health care is a constitutive part of the
healing mission of Christ. 156 The Ethical and Religious Directives “reaffirm the ethical standards
of behavior that flow from the Church’s teaching about the dignity of the human person.” 157 The
United States Bishops base these ethical standards on the Revelation of Jesus Christ and the
Natural Law, which the Church authoritatively interprets. 158
The Catholic Church deeply roots its prohibition on sterilization in its teaching on
marriage and the human person that corresponds to the prohibition on contraception. 159 Many
conflate the Church’s prohibition of contraception with its prohibition of abortion, attempting to
identify both as violations of the fifth commandment “thou shall not kill.” 160 Martin Rhonheimer,
in Ethics of Procreation and the Defense of Human Life: Contraception, Artificial Fertilization,
and Abortion, argues that contraception primarily violates the virtue of chastity. 161 He attributes
the misconception to John Paul II’s connection of contraception with abortion in Evangelium
Vitae, where he notes that abortion acts as a failsafe for contraception, both of which thereby
contribute to the so-called culture of death. 162
In the same paragraph, however, John Paul II says that contraception “contradicts the full
truth of the sexual act as the proper expression of conjugal love…[and] is opposed to the virtue
of chastity in marriage.” 163 This is precisely what Rhonheimer, argues Pope Paul VI teaches in
Humanae Vitae.164 Although Paul VI connects the Church’s prohibition to contraception with the
Inseparability Principle—that the unitive and procreative significance of marriage are
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inseparable and ought to remain so in every act—this alone does not suffice. 165 Rhonheimer
insists that periodic continence, a constitutive part of responsible parenthood, also provides a
means for growing in chastity; that is, virtuously integrating the sexual drives under the domain
of reason and will. 166 This integration of the bodily with the spiritual is precisely what raises
sexual drive to the order of personal love. 167 Insofar as contraception eliminates the need for
periodic continence—a natural means for growing in chastity—it violates the virtue of
chastity.168 This explanation avoids the reduction of contraception to merely the physical act of
taking an anovulant. Rather, it takes into account intention, the human person, and virtue.
Therefore, for Paul VI, John Paul II and Rhonheimer, the use of contraception is wrong
insofar as the intention, understood as the Moral Object, consists in a vicious choice against
chastity.169 When, however, the agent’s intention changes, for example, a victim of sexual assault
preventing conception, the Moral object changes to one of self-defense, which is clearly not a
means to circumventing chastity. 170 Although the physical act of taking an anovulant is the same,
the intention—as the proximate end—is very different. One is to circumvent chastity, the other to
defend oneself from conceiving through an unjust sexual assault.
That the same physical act can have two different Moral Object demonstrates the
importance of intention for determining the morality of the act, both as proximate end and
ulterior end. As the above indicates, there are exceptions to the rule prohibiting operations that
render one sterile. 171 For this reason, the United States Bishops, in the Ethical and Religious
Directives while prohibiting direct sterilization, permit procedures that induce sterility “when
their direct effect is the cure or alleviation of a present and serious pathology and a simpler
treatment is not available.” 172 One must go beyond the mere physical act to the intention of the
person. As the above demonstrates, when physicians use bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies in
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BRCA mutation carriers to remove organs that will very likely become cancerous, they intend to
maintain the health of the patients, not to sterilize for the purpose of responsible parenthood.
b. Non-BRCA Mutation Carriers
Becket Gremmels et al., in “Opportunistic Salpingectomy to Reduce the Risk of Ovarian
Cancer,” argue that a patient and physician may opt for bilateral salpingectomies, even though
the risk of developing ovarian cancer is low in non-BRCA mutation carriers, because the
screening options for ovarian cancer are so poor. 173 On June 7, 2016, the National Catholic
Bioethics Center, the publishers of the article, released a statement indicating their disagreement
with the views of the authors on this topic. 174 They argue that without a heightened risk for
cancer, the average risk of developing ovarian cancer is not proportionate to the irreversible loss
of fertility.175 Such a statement does not limit the use of bilateral salpingectomies or bilateral
salpingo-oophorectomies for BRCA mutation carriers only; in fact, they admit that genetic
testing, family history, and other means may justify such a decision to pursue bilateral
salpingectomies, but average risk does not suffice. 176 I concur with their statement for two
reasons. First, current medical guidelines do not medically-indicate bilateral salpingectomies or
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies for women with an average risk for developing ovarian
cancer.177 Second, physicians and patients may use this procedure as a means to circumvent the
Church’s prohibition on sterilizations. Using bilateral salpingectomies to sterilize women not
only violates the mission of a Catholic hospital, it defies medically-indicated guidelines.
Moreover, such an abuse gives scandal and renders institutions vulnerable to lawsuits of
malpractice and discrimination.
The Church’s teaching against sterilization relates deeply to its mission, but is also a
source of conflict with other providers that see contraceptive services as a vital part of women’s
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healthcare.178 Moreover, opponents level seemingly countless lawsuits against Catholic
healthcare institutions, claiming that they do not provide adequate care by denying contraception,
including sterilization to its patients. 179 Rather than caving to popular opinion, I suggest that
Catholic institutions use this as an opportunity to re-evangelize regarding its teaching. In fact,
one of the benefits of health care ethics boards is the education of hospital directors and staff.
Paul VI indicates that the prohibition against contraception is not a prohibition against
responsible parenthood. 180 For this reason, Catholic Healthcare Institutions ought to provide
effective alternatives to contraception as a means for responsible parenthood that includes
training for staff, patients and the community in acceptable methods for responsible
parenthood.181 For some opponents, no alternative to contraceptive services suffices, but failing
to offer any alternative renders one vulnerable to false criticism, namely, that the Church is
against all forms of birth control.
This section orients the use of bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies in BRCA mutation
carriers in the context of the Church’s prohibition of sterilization, advising against the use of
bilateral salpingectomies for women with an average risk for ovarian cancer, since it contradicts
current medical guidelines and may be subject to abuse. In the face of opposition, I contend that
Catholic health care providers ought to use ethics boards to re-evangelize staff and directors and
to implement practices amenable to Church teaching regarding responsible parenthood.
Using the ethical Principle of Totality and Double Effect, this section evaluates the use of risk
reducing bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies in BRCA mutation carriers. Keeping the Moral
Object in the moral order, this section demonstrates the liceity of such procedures. The following
section holds that a non-consequentialist definition of the Moral Object of self-defense from
conception after sexual assault precludes recourse to the Principle of Double Effect.
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5B. Emergency Contraceptive for Victims of Sexual Assault
In the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, 6th edition, the
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops assert that women have the right to defend
themselves from conception in cases of sexual assault. 182 Because of the Church’s strict
prohibition of abortion, 183 which begins from the moment of fertilization, the United States
Bishops insists that the method must not remove, destroy, or interfere with a conceptus. 184 This
section explores the ethical principles that justify such a position. In particular, it articulates the
Moral Object of self-defense, of which the use of emergency contraception constitutes for
victims of sexual assault. Second, it illustrates how the Principle of Double Effect is not
necessary to defend such a stance, so long as one does not define the object consequentially.
i. Clinical Analysis
This subsection elucidates the complex physiological events that constitute the ovulatory
cycle in women and the impact that emergency contraceptives such as levonorgestrel have on it.
a. Menstrual-Ovulatory Cycle
The ovulatory cycle consists of the recurrent process whereby the female body undergoes
physiological changes in anticipation of fertilization and implantation. This involves three
primary organs, 1) the brain—hypothalamus and the pituitary gland, 2) the uterus, and 3) the
ovaries, in response to complex interactions of hormones. Marc A. Fritz and Leon Speroff, in
Clinical Gynecologic Endocrinology and Infertility, articulate the process in three phases: 1)
follicular, 2) ovulation, and 3) luteal. 185 Similarly, they breakdown the events in the uterus to five
phases: 1) menstrual emdometrium, 2) proliferative, 3) secretory, 4) anticipation of implantation,
and 5) endometrial breakdown.186 This subsection discusses each of these in detail.
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Ovulation begins in the ovaries when females reach puberty. 187 At puberty, the germ cell
mass consists of between 300,000 to 500,000 cells, of which only 400 to 500 ovulate. 188
Apoptosis or programmed cell death in follicles, also called atresia, begins even before birth,
when the number of follicles exceeds 6 million and continues until menopause. 189 The body
rescues a few follicles from atresia, which mature to ovulation. Although several follicles grow
only one dominant follicle matures to ovulation per cycle in a process called folliculogenesis,
that is, the development of a primary follicle into a mature oocyte, which takes 85 days. 190 The
development of a primordial follicle right up to the point of ovulation is the follicular phase of
ovulation in the ovaries. 191
Within the brain, the hypothalamus releases gonadotropin releasing hormone in a
pulsating manner. 192 With a half-life of just 2-4 minutes, the body can regulate gonadotropin
releasing hormone with a high degree of specificity. 193 Gonadotropin releasing hormone induces
the anterior pituitary to release both luteinizing hormone and follicle stimulating hormone. 194
Under the influence of follicle stimulating hormone, the number of granulosa cells around
primordial follicles increases and form an intragranulosa cavity, which Emma Call and Sigmund
Exner discover and name Call-Exner bodies. 195
The primordial follicle becomes a primary follicle when the granulosa cells, that is, the
cells which surround and nourish the oocyte become cuboidal and multiply to at least 15 in
number.196 The basal layer separates the granulosa cells from the stromal cells that differentiate
into theca interna and theca externa depending on their proximity to the oocyte.197 Once the
intragranulosa cavity, also called an antrum appears, the follicle enters the antral phase. During
the preantral phase, however, follicle stimulating hormone induces the production of an
aromatase enzyme system that converts androgen to estrogen in granulosa cells. 198
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Synergistically, follicle stimulating hormone and estrogen increase the production of follicle
stimulating hormone receptors in granulosa cells that increase the number of granulosa cells and
the production of estrogen. 199 This increases the production of follicular fluid, which generates
the production of the antrum, thereby pushing the follicle from the preantral phase to the antral
phase.200
Early in the antral phase, the granulosa cells only have follicle stimulating hormone
receptors and luteinizing hormone receptors are only on the theca interna cells.201 There,
luteinizing hormone induces the production of androgen, which feeds the production of estrogen
by aromatase in the granulosa cells, thus producing a higher proportion of estrogen. 202 All
follicles do not develop, because there is a tendency for granulosa cells to produce a more potent
molecule, 5 reduced androgen, which inhibits aromatase’s activity, thus reducing the presence
of estrogen and inhibiting follicular development. 203 Another inhibiting factor is estrogen that
provides a negative feedback loop with the hypothalamic-pituitary gland, reducing the amount of
follicle stimulating hormone available to other follicles. 204 Consequently, only the follicle that
has the most number of follicle stimulating hormone receptors and the highest amount of
estrogen matures to ovulation. Eventually, the granulosa cells of the mature antral follicle
acquire luteinizing hormone receptors, which enables the corpus luteum to function after
ovulation.205 In fact, follicle stimulating hormone induces the growth of luteinizing hormone
receptors in the granulosa cells. 206
Primates regulate folliculogenesis through peptide members of the transforming growth
factor- family, including activin and inhibin, which the granulosa cells produce. 207 Inhibin
inhibits follicle stimulating hormone, but not luteinizing hormone secretion, while activin
increases the secretion of follicle stimulating hormone. 208 In theca cells, inhibin and activin
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regulate androgen synthesis. 209 Activin increases the activity of aromatase in granulosa cells. 210
Follistatin, a peptide secreted by the pituitary cells, suppresses follicle stimulating hormone
synthesis and secretion. 211 Moreover, it binds to activin, decreasing its activity.212 Researchers
have yet to complete the full picture regarding the impact that these and other growth factors
have on ovulation in humans.
In the late follicular phase, estrogen increases according to an exponential growth
curve—slow at first then rapid—peaking at 24-36 hours before ovulation. 213 The elevation in
estradiol triggers the luteinizing hormone surge. 214 The average luteinizing hormone surge lasts
48-50 hours, but 14-27 hours suffice to fully mature the oocyte. 215 Ovulation typically occurs 1012 hours after the luteinizing hormone peak.216 Luteinizing hormone, not estrogen, stimulates
both the production of progesterone and the expression of progesterone receptors in the
granulosa cells of the dominant follicle. 217 In addition, luteinizing hormone instigates
luteinization, that is the process by which the postovulatory follicle differentiates and becomes
the corpus luteum. 218 Additionally, luteinizing hormone stimulates the resumption of meiosis in
the oocyte.219 Progesterone levels have to be just right in order for the luteinizing hormone surge
to occur. If the progesterone levels, which originate endogenously from the adrenal gland before
the luteinizing hormone surge, 220 are too high before the estrogen surge, the luteinizing hormone
surge does not occur. 221 This is how the administration of exogenous progesterone prevents
ovulation and works as a contraceptive.
Follicle stimulating hormone, luteinizing hormone, and progesterone instigate activity of
proteolytic enzymes in the follicular fluid that degrade the collagen in the follicular wall, thus
enabling the oocyte along with the cumulus oophorus to escape the ovary. 222 Stimulated by the
gonadotropin surge, granulosa and theca cells produce two plasminogen activators, of which
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unique inhibitors regulate. 223 These plasminogen activators activate plasminogen in the follicular
fluid to produce plasmin, which generates active collagenase that breaks down the follicular
wall.224 Inhibitors prevent the activators from being active except at the precise moment of
ovulation.225 Prostaglandins activate plasminogen activators. 226 In addition, they cause smooth
muscle contractions of the ovary that aid in expelling the oocyte-cumulus cell mass. 227 The
follicle stimulating hormone surge in mice induce granulosa cells in the cumulus mass to release
hyaluronic acid, which separates the cumulus from the basement membrane of the follicle. 228 In
addition, follicle stimulating hormone stimulates the production of luteinizing hormone receptors
in the granulosa layer that differentiates into the corpus luteum. 229
In terms of timing, the luteinizing hormone surge generally occurs on day 14 of the
ovulatory cycle and ovulation commences between 12 and 36 hours later. 230 In general, there is a
six-day window in which fertilization may occur. 231 This is because sperm may survive up to
five days in the female reproductive tract, 232 and the oocyte is fertile for only 24 hours after
ovulation.233 The extreme window is six days prior and 3 days after ovulation, which makes for a
nine-day window. 234 However, the majority of conceptions happen when coitus occurs within
three days before ovulation. 235 It takes about 3 to 4 days for an ovum to traverse the fallopian
tube and enter the uterus and implantation ensues about 2-3 days after entering the uterus. 236
Implantation follows as soon as 6 and as late as 12 days after ovulation. 237
The luteal phase lasts between 11 and 17 days. 238 Even before ovulation, granulosa cells
increase in size developing vacuoles that contain lutein. After ovulation, theca and stroma cells
become theca lutein cells, even as granulosa cell continue to enlarge, and angiogenesis, that is,
vascularization of the surrounding tissue occurs. 239 The luteinized granulosa cells, in response to
luteinizing hormone produce vascular endothelial growth factor and angiopoietins, which induce
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angiogenesis. Vascularization, which peaks by day 8 or 9, 240 is essential for transporting lowdensity lipoprotein cholesterol to the luteal cells that use it to produce progesterone.241
Progesterone levels peak 8 days after the luteinizing hormone surge. 242
The corpus luteum rapidly declines 9-11 days after ovulation, if pregnancy does not
occur.243 In humans, nitric oxide acts as a luteolytic factor, activating the production of
prostaglandin F2 .244 Matrix metalloproteinases act as proteolytic enzymes and degrade the
corpus luteum. Pervasively present throughout luteal phase, tissue inhibitors of
metalloproteinases keep matrix metalloproteinases inactive. Activin-A eventually blocks tissue
inhibitors of metalloproteinases’ activity, allowing the matrix metalloproteinases to degrade the
corpus luteum. 245 When pregnancy does occur, the blastocyst, even before implantation produces
human chorionic gonadotropin, which rescues the corpus luteum from luteolytic demise. 246
Human chorionic gonadotropin inhibits the expression of matrix metalloproteinases by
increasing the production of follistatin, a glycopeptide that binds to activin-A.247
Once the corpus luteum deteriorates, steroidogenesis of estrogen and progesterone
diminishes along with the decrease in inhibin, which permits an increase in follicle stimulating
hormone in the pituitary. 248 This constitutes the luteal-follicular transition. The decrease in
steroids estrogen and progesterone, remove the negative feedback suppression of gonadotropin
releasing hormone in the pituitary, thus allowing for an increase in gonadotropin releasing
hormone.249 The consequent elevation in follicle stimulating hormone saves a dominant follicle
from atresia.250
Concomitant to activity in the ovaries is activity in the uterus. In particular, the most
active portion of the uterus constitutes the endometrium. The withdrawal of progesterone, due to
the demise of the corpus luteum triggers menses. 251 Upon the completion of menses, the
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endometrium enters the phase of menstrual endometrium that constitutes a phase of regeneration
originating in both epithelial and stromal stem cells.252 After 5-6 days the entire uterine cavity is
re-epithelialized over a stromal fibroblast layer. 253
Next, the uterus enters the proliferative phase, which correlates with the ovarian follicle
grow and an increase in estrogen production. 254 Although estrogen is not necessary for the early
proliferative phase, it contributes to the increase in vascular endothelial growth factor, which
induces angiogenesis in the stromal cells. 255 In addition to growth in size, microvillous and
ciliated cells appear around the openings of glands and aid the distribution of secretions during
the secretory phase. 256 Finally, lymphocytes and macrophages accumulate in the stroma cells. 257
After ovulation, the endometrium no longer increases in height, but glands and spiral
vessels continue to grow, increasing the tortuosity of the endometrium. 258 Consequently, the
endometrium secretes glycoproteins, peptides, immunoglobulins, and plasma into the
endometrial cavity, reaching a peak 7 days after the midcycle gonadotropin surge, just in for
blastocyst implantation. 259
During the implantation phase, the endometrium consists of three layers: 1) the basalis, 2)
the stratum spongiosum, and stratum compactum. 260 Endometrial stromal cells, originating from
primitive uterine mesenchymal stem cells, differentiate into decidual cells, beginning during the
luteal phase under the influence of progesterone and other factors. 261 They have the potential to
aid the blastocyst in implantation or to breakdown the endometrium with the withdrawal of
estrogen and progesterone support. 262
If implantation does not occur, then estrogen and progesterone support wanes with the
demise of the corpus luteum. 263 Lysosomes are ubiquitous in the endometrium and the integrity
of their membranes depends on progesterone. 264 So, when it declines, the lysosomes release
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enzymes that degrade the endometrium. Vascular endothelial growth factor increases the blood
flow to the endometrium releasing influencing the expression of matrix metalloproteinases and
releasing white blood cells. 265 Just as tissue inhibitors of metalloproteinases keep the matrix
metalloproteinases inactive while progesterone is high in the corpus luteum, so it does so in the
endometrium. 266 The breakdown of the endometrium by enzymes and the increase blood flow
induces menstrual bleeding. 267 At the same time, however, vasoconstrictors and estrogen
promote healing of the remaining tissue in anticipation of the next cycle. 268
This subsubsection elucidates the complex network of hormones, transcription factors,
and enzymes emanating from the hypothalamic-pituitary plexus of the brain, ovaries, and
endometrium to regulate the menstrual-ovulatory cycle.
b. Physiology of Contraceptives
This subsection analyzes methods of emergency contraception. Today, there are four
contraceptive methods available for emergency contraception: copper intrauterine device, oral
contraceptive pills combining estrogen and progestin, ulipristal acetate, and progestin-only
levonorgestrel. 269 All methods impact the physiological dynamics of the menstrual-ovulatory
cycle, thereby impeding conception. In addition, copper intrauterine devices unquestionably act
as an abortifacient by preventing implantation of blastocysts. 270
In 1984, the United States Food and Drug Administration approves the TCu-380A
intrauterine device contraceptive. 271 Today, CooperSurgical markets the copper intrauterine
device as Paragard TCu-380A intrauterine device. 272 As foreign bodies, non-medicated
intrauterine devices induce a sterile inflammatory response that causes minor tissue injury to the
endometrium. 273 Copper intrauterine devices release free copper and copper salts that have an
additional biochemical impact on the endometrium, its secretions and the cervical mucus inhibit
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the mobility of sperm. 274 Martti Ämmälä et al. suggest that an increase in cytokine production
that copper intrauterine devices induce may account for its antifertility effects. 275
Maria Elena Ortiz and Horacio B. Croxatto, in “Copper-T Intrauterine Devices and
Levonorgestrel Intrauterine System: Biological Bases of Their Mechanism of Action,” indicate
that the ordinary mechanism of action associated with chronic use, is not necessarily the same as
post-coital insertion. 276 Thus it is important to distinguish the usual mechanism of preventing
pregnancy, which I illustrate in the above paragraph, versus the exceptional, which constitutes its
mechanism for preventing pregnancy as an emergency contraception inserted post-coitally.277
Their research indicates that chronic use of copper intrauterine devices prevents fertilization
from ever occurring by creating an environment that is hostile to both sperm and oocytes. 278
However, as an emergency contraception, copper intrauterine devices prevent implantation, if
fertilization occurs. 279 Although current recommendations restrict insertion of copper intrauterine
devices to 5 days after implantation, Norman D. Goldstuck insists that this recommendation is
faulty, because evidence indicates that copper intrauterine device are just as effective at
preventing pregnancy after implantation occurs. 280 He insists that researchers base the
recommendation on the philosophical position that pregnancy begins with implantation, not its
clinical effectiveness at preventing or halting pregnancy. 281 The indisputable abortifacient quality
of copper intrauterine device and their prolonged contraceptive function preclude its use in
Catholic hospitals as an option for emergency contraception.
There are three pill options for emergency contraception: 1) combined pills containing
both estrogen and progestin, 2) ulipristal acetate, and levonorgestrel. Using combined pills for
emergency contraception is obsolete, however, it involves taking one dose followed by a second
dose in twelve hours within 120 hours postcoital. 282 Ulipristal acetate is a progesterone receptor
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modulator that suppresses follicular growth and delays endometrial maturation. 283 The United
States Food and Drug Administration approved Ella for emergency contraception in 2010.284
Another antiprogestin is mifepristone, however, it works as a first trimester abortifacient, and is
not approved for use as an emergency contraception in the United States. 285
Today, the most commonly prescribed emergency contraception is the progestin only pill
containing levonorgestrel. 286 The original formulation consists of two .75mg pills of
levonorgestrel taken 12 hours apart within 120 hours after unprotected sex. 287 Studies, however,
indicate that a single 1.5mg dose is just as effective as two doses of .75mg taken with a 12 hour
internal.288 Consequently, two-dose levonorgestrel emergency contraception pills are no longer
available in the United States. 289 The United States Food and Drug Administration approved Plan
B One-Step in 2009.290 Generic forms include Next Choice One Dose, My Way, Take Action
and AfterPill.291
Evidence indicates that levonorgestrel works “primarily by preventing or delaying
ovulation and by preventing fertilization.” 292 Lena Marions et al., in “Emergency Contraception
with Mifepristone and Levonorgestrel: Mechanism of Action,” conclude that the increase in
progestin inhibits the luteinizing hormone peak prior to ovulation, thus inhibiting or delaying
ovulation.293 Donald C. Young et al., in “Emergency Contraception Alters ProgesteroneAssociated Endometrial Protein in Serum and Uterine Luminal Fluid,” concludes that at high
levels progestin alters protein synthesis in the endometrium, lowering the secretory proteins in
the uterus, thereby affecting sperm mobility. 294 After ovulation, progestin appears to have little
effect on the endometrium. 295 When administered before the luteinizing hormone peak, progestin
levels affect the maturation of glandular and stromal components of the endometrium. 296 Insofar
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as the administration of levonorgestrel after ovulation has little effect on both the ovaries and the
endometrium, it prevents pregnancy less effectively when administered after ovulation. 297
Fritz and Speroff, in Clinical Gynecologic Endocrinology and Infertility, assert that
levonorgestrel does not act as an abortifacient. 298 At the same time, they admit that
levonorgestrel may prevent implantation. 299 Norman D. Goldstuck highlights the ambiguity
regarding the definition of pregnancy and thus the definition of abortifacient versus emergency
contraception.300 He attributes this to the definition of an emergency contraception by the Centre
for Disease Control and the World Health Organization as anything that acts before
implantation.301 Goldstuck argues that since it is difficult to epistemically determine when
pregnancy occurs or which stage it is in during the first trimester, he sees no inconsistency in
using an abortifacient like Mifepristone (RU 486) and calling it an emergency contraception. 302
The Church’s understanding of an abortifacient includes anything that deliberately and directly
kills the human being from conception to birth, which clearly includes the time before
implantation.303 Consequently, the United States Bishops in their Ethical and Religious
Directives, prohibit any treatments that directly interfere with implantation. 304 Kathleen Mary
Raviele, in “Levonorgestrel in Cases of Rape: How Does It Work?,” holds a distinction between
three distinct actions: 1) contraceptive—preventing conception, 2) interceptive—preventing
implantation, and 3) contragestive—reversing implantation. 305 The latter two constitute
abortifacient actions insofar as they interrupt a conceptus’s normal progression.
Consistent with the Church’s understanding of an abortifacient, Marie T. Hilliard, in
“Moral Certitude and Emergency Contraception,” argues that clinicians ought to administer a
test for the luteinizing hormone surge to ensure with moral certitude—as opposed to statistical
probability or absolute proof—that levonorgestrel acts as an anovulant, not an abortifacient. 306
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She bases this on the premise that once the luteinizing hormone surge occurs emergency
contraception alone cannot prevent ovulation. 307 For this reason, she insists that one ought to
administer levonorgestrel only before the luteinizing hormone surge occurs. 308
Although more precise means exist for determining the exact day of ovulation, such as
administering a serum progesterone test, Hilliard contends that these are not practical because
many emergency departments do not have them readily available and it does not provide
sufficient certitude to ensure that fertilization cannot occur. 309 She acknowledges one study that
indicates that administering meloxicam, a cyclooxygenase-2 inhibitor with levonorgestrel
prevents ovulation after the luteinizing hormone surge. 310 More information is available today
regarding the use of cyclooxygenase-2 inhibitors as an anovulant, including Nicole C. McCann
et al.’s “The COX-2 Inhibitor Meloxicam Prevents Pregnancy When Administered as an
Emergency Contraceptive to Nonhuman Primates.” 311 McCann et al., determine that meloxicam
alone is effective at preventing pregnancy when administered to breeding macaques for 5 days
prior to ovulation. 312 They conclude that meloxicam delays, but does not prevent ovulation.313
Raviele highlights evidence from Durand et al.’s study on levonorgestrel, 314 which
suggests that it does not effectively prevent ovulation when given 4 days before ovulation. 315
Consequently, levonorgestrel, as an emergency contraception, does not primarily act as an
anovulant. In another study, Durand et al. determine that levonorgestrel given before the
luteinizing hormone surge, alters the pattern of luteal phase secretion of glycodelin-A, a natural
killer cell inhibitor, thus providing a hostile environment for blastocysts attempting to implant in
the endometrium. 316 They conclude that levonorgestrel acts primarily as an abortifacient, or an
interceptor. Both Durand et al. and Palomino et al. 317 determine that levonorgestrel given on the
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day of the luteinizing hormone surge does not prevent ovulation or affect progesterone receptors,
plasma levels of glycodelin-A or L-selectin ligand or integrin. 318
Regarding sperm, Raviele cites several studies including Yeung et al. 319 and Brito et al. 320
The acrosome reaction is necessary for the spermatozoa to attach to the zona pellucida of the
egg.321 If the acrosome reaction occurs early, before it reaches the egg, then the sperm loses its
fertilizing capacity. 322 At high concentrations, levonorgestrel acts as a weak agonists to
progesterone receptors and at high concentrations (200-800ng/ml) it induces the acrosome
reaction in sperm. 323 Yeung et al. determine that levonorgestrel only affects sperm at high
concentrations. 324 Brito et al.’s results verify those of Yeung et al. 325 In light of this information,
Raviele recommends re-evaluating the use of levonorgestrel as an emergency contraception. 326
She advises that clinicians should not give levonorgestrel as an emergency contraception from
days -4 to -2, because of its probable interceptive impact on the conceptus. 327
Although against using levonorgestrel as an emergency contraceptive, Raviele contends
that one could administer meloxicam as an emergency contraception. 328 Raviele bases her
conclusion on evidence that meloxicam prevents ovulation in women even after the luteinizing
hormone surge. 329 As such, the primary concern is ovulation, that one can rule out with a
progesterone test. If the result is less than or equal to 2.0ng/ml, then one can administer
meloxicam with the assurance that it acts as an anovulant. 330 A. Patrick Schneider II et al., in
“Appreciation for Analysis of How Levonorgestrel Works and Reservations with the Use of
Meloxicam as Emergency Contraception,” point out the practical challenge of attaining a
progesterone level, which could take as long as four days. 331 They contend that because evidence
indicates meloxicam could act as an abortifacient, an absolute protection for the human embryo
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from the moment of conception, precludes its use as an emergency contraception. 332 I contend
that Hilliard’s argument invoking moral certitude suffices to supplant this position. 333
In 2010, Ron Hamel declares the notion that levonorgestrel acts as an abortifacient a
lie.334 To which Edward J. Furton responses that the debate is not closed; evidence points in both
directions.335 The above discussion demonstrates that the debate continues. While several
methods exist, levonorgestrel remains the standard emergency contraception. 336 However, the
above suggests that meloxicam may be a better emergency contraception in the future since it
acts as an effective anovulant, even when given on or after the luteinizing hormone surge. 337
With the presumption of moral certitude that the contraceptive acts as a contraceptive and not as
an abortifacient, the following subsection examines the use of the Principle of Double Effect to
justify such an act.
ii. Principle of Double Effect
After addressing the clinical use of emergency contraception, I now consider its use
ethically. Some ethicists use the Principle of Double Effect to justify using contraception to
prevent conception after sexual assault. 338 However, the following subsection demonstrates that
an accurate articulation of the Moral Object dissolves any need for recourse to Double Effect.
Ethical objections to contraception necessitate a clear delineation between it and defending
oneself from conception. Since the two acts are physically indistinguishable, it is all the more
important to provide an adequate account of the difference in Moral Objects of the Acts.
a. Object of the Act
In the Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas, in his explanation for killing in self-defense,
first devises three criteria that evolve into the Principle of Double Effect. 339 Of the three, the
first, which contemporary ethicists reformulate as a prohibition against willing an act with an
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evil Moral Object, is by far the most complex and deserving of attention, to which I devote this
entire subsection. 340 The bulk of the argument depends on the precise meaning of the Moral
Object, the importance of which Pope John Paul II re-emphasizes in Veritatis Splendor.341 In
accord with Aquinas, John Paul II reaffirms that “the morality of the human act depends
primarily and fundamentally on the ‘object’ rationally chosen by the deliberate will.” 342
Consequently, having an accurate understanding of the Moral Object and its relationship to the
will is essential.
Aquinas observes that acts sometimes have two effects, one intended the other
unintended.343 He describes the unintended effect as praeter intentionem, which literally means
beside the intention of the act. 344 In other words, it is outside the realm of intention. To illustrate,
using force, one may intend to protect oneself from an assailant, but at the same time
unintentionally kill the attacker. Even though one may foresee the death of an assailant in one’s
act of self-defense, in accord with Augustine, 345 Aquinas insists that one ought never to intend to
kill another person. 346 Cavanaugh highlights the centrality of not intending to kill for both
Augustine and Aquinas. 347 Both object to intending to kill because it violates an exceptionless
moral norm.348
Finnis in Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth, explains that Augustine is
against any action that violates an exceptionless moral norm; 349 a view which he articulates in
two works concerning lying: De mendacio350 and Contra mendacium.351 In De mendacio,
Augustine says that it is worse to steal than to suffer murder.352 Finnis calls this an early
formulation of the Socratic Principle, which Augustine solidifies in the later Contra mendacium,
contending that it is better to suffer wrong than to do it. 353 Democritus of Abdera first formulates
the argument that it is better to suffer evil than to do it. 354 However, Plato attributes this dictum
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to Socrates, who not only teaches it, but also lives by it. 355 Finnis holds that Paul’s maxim from
Romans 3:8, that one may not do evil that good may come from it, is a reformulation of the
Socratic Principle. 356 Thus Augustine contends that no amount of good justifies performing an
evil act.357
Peter Abelard in his Ethics contends that external physical acts do not constitute sin;
rather, sin abides in voluntary consent. 358 Consequently, for Abelard, the goodness of an act
depends entirely on intention. 359 Accordingly, the physical works that proceed from one’s
intention are indifferent. 360 Abelard is not a relativist; he holds that intention is right or wrong
according to its conformity with God’s will. 361 Servais Pinckaers in “A Historical Perspective on
Intrinsically Evil Acts,” cautions against accusing Abelard of denying intrinsically evil acts. 362
For Pinckaers, Abelard is responding to the legalism of his time and placing the essence of sin
back in reason and the will, rather than external action or desires. 363 Unfortunately, in accord
with his famous dictum sic et non, Abelard rejects too completely his adversaries, throwing out
desire and consequences altogether. 364
Peter Lombard, in his Sentences responds to Abelard in an attempt to safeguard
Augustine’s prohibition against certain intrinsically evil acts. 365 In most cases, Lombard agrees
with Abelard that intention is the cause of evil in an action. 366 However, he makes an exception
regarding the per se mala, that is, acts which are evil in themselves including: stealing from the
poor; falsifying a will; or adultery to save another’s life. 367 These acts, which are evil in
themselves, cannot be done without some transgression; regardless of the disposition of the
intention.368
In his Scriptum super sententiis, Aquinas disagrees with Lombard’s conclusion that per
se mala are not wrong according to the will, intention, or purpose (finis).369 To the contrary, he
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says an external act is good or bad according to the will, but not only because of the intention of
the will (intentio), but also because of the choice of the will (electio).370 The distinction between
intending and choosing is of supreme importance for Aquinas, but it is not always clear. Recall,
Finnis indicates that Aquinas speaks of intention broadly and narrowly. 371 Broadly speaking,
intending simply means willing that includes intending and choosing. 372 Finnis argues that this is
how Aquinas uses intention in his discussion regarding Double-Effect Reasoning. 373 Narrowly
speaking, however, Aquinas contrasts intending with choosing. 374 In the narrow sense,
intentions concern ends, while choices concern means—which are actions—ordered to ends. 375
To distinguish the object of intending from the object of choosing, Aquinas uses the
proximate end (finis proximus), which he associates with the choice of the will (electio) and the
ultimate end (finis ultimus), which he associates with the intention (intentio).376 Concerning
actions, there may be more than one end, hence the distinction between proximate and ultimate
end.377 However many ends exist, the ultimate end co-ordinates the proximate end. 378 The
goodness of an external act depends on both the goodness of the proximate end or that which the
will chooses and the goodness of the ultimate end, the purpose that one chooses an act. 379
In the same commentary, Aquinas identifies the proximate end with the Moral Object of
the Act.380 Terminologically, he equates the ultimate end with the remote end. 381 In addition, he
insists that the object gives the species to acts. 382 Again, in On Evil, Aquinas holds that acts
receive their species from the object, not the remote end. 383 The more precise meaning of object
becomes increasingly difficult to pin down not only in the later writings of Aquinas, but
especially in the commentators that follow, as Duarte Sousa-Lara demonstrates in “Aquinas on
the Object of the Human Act: A Reading in Light of the Texts and Commentators.” 384 In
particular, a distinction that Aquinas makes between the material and formal element of the
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object leads some commentators, such as John of Saint Thomas to conclude that the Moral
Object is a physical object. 385 Sousa-Lara demonstrates that for Aquinas, the Moral Object of a
human act is not a physical effect or thing, but a single object of choice with a quasi-material and
formal element. 386
In this case, Aquinas uses the Aristotelian description of matter and form as an analogy
for the relationship between the object of intention (finis ultimus or finis operantis) and the
object of the act, that is the object of choice (finis proximus or finis operis). Sousa-Lara, in
“Aquinas on Interior and Exterior Acts: Clarifying a Key Aspect of His Action Theory,” explains
that Aquinas differentiates the object of intention from the object of choice by the distinction
between interior act of the will and external act of the will, respectively. 387 Thus, Aquinas
considers the moral species of the act formally with regard to the object of the interior act. 388 For
example, one who steals for the purpose of committing adultery is more an adulterer than a
thief.389 Thus, according to the analogy of form and matter, just as form gives shape to matter, so
the ultimate end qualifies the Moral Object.
In using this analogy, Aquinas is not saying that the proximate end is material. Nor is he
saying that the Moral Object receives its entire intentional content from the ultimate end. Indeed,
Aquinas is very clear that exterior acts, insofar as they are voluntary not only abide in the moral
order, but also have their own intentional content. Martin Rhonheimer, in Natural Law and
Practical Reason: A Thomistic View of Moral Autonomy, shows that for Aquinas this intentional
content is rational insofar as he attributes this to reason. 390 The moral quality of the Moral Object
depends on its conformity to its proper matter (materia debitae) or proper circumstances
(materia circumstantiae), which reason derives. 391 In The Perspective of Morality: Philosophical
Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics, Rhonheimer explains at great length the intelligible
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nature of the Moral Object, which he calls basic intentional content. 392 As a quick aside, the
proximate end does not always have to have an intelligible or intentional content associated with
it, in which case the proximate end is purely instrumental and receives all of it from the ultimate
end only.393 It is essential to understand that for Aquinas, a practical concept is different than a
speculative or theoretical concept.
To highlight the distinct quality of a moral act, Finnis in draws attention to an important
distinction that Aquinas makes concerning orders in the prologue to his Commentary on
Aristotle’s Politics.394 Aquinas argues that there are four irreducibly distinct orders: natural,
logical, moral, and technical. 395 These orders correspond to exclusive sciences or methods of
knowing: 1) physics and metaphysics; 2) logic and mathematics; 3) moral philosophy; and 4)
artistic and technical. 396 Finnis asserts that the irreducibility of these orders means that principles
apply uniquely, even if analogically to the respective orders. 397 Moreover, each order has a
distinct object or end. 398
Knowledge pertaining to the natural order is speculative, while knowledge pertaining to
action, either moral or technical, is practical. 399 David Hume famously formulates the argument
that ought-statements are not derivative of is-statements.400 This is a way of saying that practical
knowledge is different from speculative knowledge. This, however, does not mean that oughtstatements are irrational. 401 Moreover, it is not a different faculty that formulates practical
reason, but the same intellect that formulates speculative arguments devises practical arguments,
but the intellect acts in a distinct manner, by extension. 402 Since moral acts are in a different
order, reason formulates them according to practical syllogisms, rather than theoretical
syllogisms.403 Practical syllogisms may contain theoretical premises, but the conclusion is a
statement, or better an act of striving or doing. 404
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The failure to maintain the distinction between practical knowledge and speculative
knowledge results in the Naturalistic Fallacy, 405 which asserts that the Natural Law is derivative
of laws of nature. 406 Rhonheimer identifies the Naturalistic Fallacy as a physicalism. 407 He
attributes this to the manualist tradition of moral theology, which is casuistic, that is, taught using
cases.408 Hermeneutically, this approach presumes a third-person perspective regarding morality.
In other words, it presumes that an observer can identify the Moral Object of the Act simply by
viewing the person’s external action. Prima facie, this seems to jive with Aquinas’s action
theory; after all, he does identify the external act with the Moral Object. 409 However, if one can
observe the Moral Object from the third-person perspective, then it is no longer in the moral
order, but the natural order.
In “‘Materia ex qua’ and ‘Materia circa quam’ in Aquinas,” Sousa-Lara observes that
Aquinas connects the Moral Object with materia circa quam, not materia ex qua.410 In addition,
in De Veritate, Aquinas identifies the Moral Object with the materia circa quam.411 Sousa-Lara
equates the materia ex qua as the physical dimension of an act. 412 For example, in the natural
order, the act of marital love is indistinguishable from adultery or fornication. For Sousa-Lara,
the materia ex qua is the physical act of coitus. 413 The materia circa quam, that is, the Moral
Object, according to the moral order, determines the species of the act. 414 The coital act,
considered materia ex qua has restricted potency for receiving form from the materia circa
quam. In fact, he observes that the act has potential to be of three different forms specifically:
conjugal love, fornication, or adultery. 415 Thus, from the third-person perspective, although one
cannot necessarily know the Moral Object or remote end, it nonetheless limits the options. After
all, a person buying flowers is not driving a car.
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Just as Aquinas uses the hylomorphic phenomenon of form and matter to illustrate the
relationship between the ultimate end and the proximate end, 416 so he uses such an analogy to
illustrate the formal role of the materia circa quam with regard to the material role of the materia
ex qua.417 Sousa-Lara associates both the materia circa quam and the materia ex qua with the
external act; however, each signifies something different regarding the external act. 418 Recall,
that for Aquinas, the external act is part of the moral order only insofar as it is voluntary, that is,
the will configures it. 419 Since Sousa-Lara associates the materia circa quam with the Moral
Object, this constitutes what the will chooses. 420 The materia ex qua, on the other hand,
regarding the external act, constitutes the physical content of the act, which the will
commands.421 Thus, the materia circa quam, that is, Moral Object in the moral order, morally
configures the materia ex qua, that is, the object of the commanded act in the natural order.
This subsection demonstrates how an accurate account of Aquinas’s Moral Object of an
Act keeps it in the moral order, rationally formulated and proceeding from the will. The Moral
Object is clearly distinct from the ultimate end (object of intention) insofar as he understands it
as the proximate end (Moral Object of a choice). Moreover, regarding the external act he uses
materia circa quam to identify and distinguish the Moral Object in the moral order, from the
external act in the physical order that the will commands—the materia ex qua.
b. Nominalism, Manualism, and Proportionalism
After Aquinas, a divide arises between the Dominican emphasis of the experience of
beatitude through the intellect and the Franciscan emphasis of beatitude through the will in
love.422 In the wake of this divide William of Ockham introduces nominalism, which rejects
universals.423 This subsubsection demonstrates the influence that nominalism has on the
methodology of moral theology, especially regarding manualism and proportionalism.
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For Ockham, the only thing that exists is the reality of individual beings. Forms or
natures exist in name only. In the Platonic sense universals are forms. In the Aristotelian sense,
the form inheres in beings. In turn, the universal constitutes the nature of individual beings.
Regarding action, natures influence inclinations. 424 In humans, the object of practical reason is
the good that they naturally incline to. 425 Because human nature is universal—shared by all
individuals of the same species—it is possible to formulate Natural Laws that articulate good for
human behavior.
Insofar as God creates and providentially governs humanity according to the eternal law,
the natural law constitutes a human participation in the eternal law. 426 Finnis, in Natural Law and
Natural Rights explains that for Aquinas participation conjoins two concepts: causality and
similarity.427 God causes humans to share in the light of reason, in a manner that is similar to the
divine.428 In this regard there is a difference between the intelligible nature of other animals and
the intelligent nature of humans. 429 Animals participate in the divine law passively insofar as
they follow their inclinations, 430 whereas humans take an active role in the divine providence
insofar as they use reason to formulate ends and their will to achieve them. 431 Since law itself
constitutes a measure according to reason for action, only rational beings truly participate in
law.432 The illuminating power of reason enables one to grasp the good in actions, including
desires and inclinations. 433 Moreover, the voluntary nature of human action entails freedom and
the possibility for self-mastery.434 Thus, Rhonheimer describes this participatory role of the
humans in the eternal law as participated autonomy. 435 Accordingly, Pinckaers indicates that for
Aquinas, freedom proceeds from both reason and the will. 436 Consequently, nature, which
includes the restrictions of inclinations, desires, bodily nature itself, and reason limit freedom.
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Contrary to Aquinas’s limited autonomy, Ockham argues for a freedom of
indifference.437 Again, influenced by the Franciscan emphasis on the will, Ockham understands
freedom to proceed entirely from the will. 438 Since there are no universals, for Ockham, each
individual stands in absolute freedom from the influence of natures. 439 Since each choice stands
in complete freedom, there is no longer any need to stress growth in virtue. 440 Just as human
freedom is absolute, so God’s freedom is omnipotent. 441 In fact, for Ockham, the veracity of all
laws depends on nothing other than its divine command. 442 No rational foundation grounds them.
The absolute freedom of God means that God could change them at any moment. Consequently,
under the influence of Ockham, the emphasis of moral theology becomes law and obligation. 443
Moreover, Natural Law is no longer based on human nature and its inclinations, but entirely on
divine command. 444 In this sense, it is entirely extrinsic to the human person.
Ockham’s nominalism continues to influence moral theology right up to the present day.
In the manualist tradition of the seventeenth through the early twentieth century, the
hermeneutical method is casuistic, that is, case-based.445 The conscience has a central role in
discerning proper courses of action that stand in the void between freedom of indifference and
moral obligation that God externally imposes. 446 The manualists not only blur the line between
the internal and external act, but seem to eliminate any real consideration for the internal at all in
favor of a morality that is entirely discernable from the third-person perspective. 447 Thomas Petri
in Aquinas and the Theology of the Body: The Thomistic Foundation of John Paul II’s
Anthropology, quotes John McHugh and Charles Callan’s manual highlighting the extrinsic
nature of morality. 448 McHugh and Callan hold that morality is “the agreement or disagreement
of a human act with the norms that regulate human conduct with reference to man’s last end.” 449
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The casuistic approach of the manuals to morality is underequipped to deal with the
complex dilemma of contraception. For example, John T. Noonan, Jr., in Contraception: A
History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists, observes that the most
popular manual, Jean-Pierre Gury’s Compendium of Moral Theology, addresses contraception
purely from the physical dimension, objecting to it merely on the basis that it violates the
prohibition of onanism—extra-vaginal ejaculation. 450
Peter Knauer attempts to breathe new life into moral theology with his article, “The
Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect.” 451 Like Abelard and Aquinas, Knauer
refocuses moral theology on intention and the will. Unfortunately, he identifies moral evil with
intending or causing physical evil, without a commensurate reason. 452 Josef Fuchs calls this
physical evil pre-moral evil453 and Louis Janssens calls it ontic evil. 454 In part, because moral
acting involves causing physical evil, Knauer uses the criteria of proportionality in the Principle
of Double Effect to argue for what Richard McCormick calls an “extended notion of the
object.” 455 Knauer, understands both the finis operis and the finis operantis as ends, however, he
understands the first to have a causal relationship to the second. 456 In other words, the Moral
Object of the Act (finis operis) causes the remote end (finis operantis). Moreover, the Moral
object is good if there is commensurate reason to justify it, that is, if the remote end is good
enough.457 For Knauer, such a statement is not the same as saying the ends justify an evil means,
because presumably one has not yet determined that the means is good or evil yet, since one
cannot know this without a consideration of the end. 458
Rhonheimer in “Intentional Actions and the Meaning of Object: A Reply to Richard
McCormick,” objects to the proportionalist methodology, because it weighs the consequences of
actions, not actions themselves. 459 Put another way, proportionalism reduces moral decision-
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making to discerning whether or not to cause certain effects. This makes morality eventistic,
since an action’s value rests on its effect and has no use for the perspective of the acting
person.460 The object of intention swallows the Moral Object, totally neglecting its inherent
intentional character, which Rhonheimer calls the basic intentional content. 461 Rhonheimer
explains that the Moral Object has an intention, formed by reason, which he and Aquinas
describe as the object of choice. 462 For Rhonheimer, the basic intentional content of the Moral
Object is precisely what keeps it in the realm of the moral order. 463
In accord with a proportionalistic understanding of the Moral Object, Knauer contends
that a couple might discern that using contraception is a viable option for them, so long as they
have a commensurate reason, such as economic or health reasons. 464 Since the Moral Object has
no rational or intentional value itself, choosing to contracept is indistinguishable for Knauer from
choosing to periodically abstain. 465 Accordingly, the expanded notion of the object, essentially
amounts to saying that the intentional content of the object comes from the remote end (object of
intention).466 Unfortunately, as Rhonheimer indicates, this relegates moral decision-making to
the purely physical realm, rendering it eventistic. 467 So, moral decision-making has little to
nothing to do with a deliberate will choosing a certain kind of behavior, 468 that is, a human action
with a basic intentional content, 469 what Aquinas calls the forma a ratione a concepta.470
c. The Object: Contraception and Self-Defense
In accord with Aquinas’s action theory, John Paul II’s understanding of the Moral Object,
and Paul VI’s argument against contraception, 471 Rhonheimer carefully identifies the Moral
Object of contraception. 472 This subsubsection follows Rhonheimer’s articulation of the Moral
Object of contraception and how he distinguishes it from one of self-defense, which using
emergency contraception to prevent conception after sexual assault constitutes.
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First, Rhonheimer explains Paul VI’s argument in Humanae Vitae that the contraceptive
choice violates the natural law. 473 According to the Natural Law, the two fundamental meanings
of human sexuality, the unitive and the procreative, are inseparable. 474 This is the Inseparability
Principle, which Paul VI refers to in Humanae Vitae.475 In other words, humans, on their own
initiative may not break this connection, which contraception does. 476 The Inseparability
Principle builds on an adequate anthropology, 477 one that accounts for the bodily and spiritual
dimensions of the human person. 478 Consequently, for Rhonheimer, the human body is not
merely the object of human action, but part of the subject. 479 Therefore, the bodily reality of
procreation receives its full human specification from spiritual love. Moreover, the spiritual love
specifies the procreative dimension of the body. 480
Precisely because this concerns a choice, which abides on the moral order, each choice
for the marital act must be open to the procreative significance, not its procreative functionality,
that is, physically intending to conceive. 481 Consequently, sterile couples may engage in the
marital act and still be open to the procreative dimension of the marital act. 482 Likewise, fertile
couples, in accord with the call to responsible parenthood, may choose to practice periodic
continence, abstaining from the conjugal act, except during the infertile times, without violating
the Inseparability Principle. 483 Thus, Rhonheimer identifies the Moral Object of the marital act as
loving bodily union, which serves procreation by its very nature. 484
To identify the Moral Object of contraception, Rhonheimer does not have recourse to the
Inseparability Principle, but the virtue of chastity. 485 He argues that periodic continence is a
constitutive means for growth in chastity for married couples insofar as it helps them to grow in
self-mastery.486 This is what Pius XI says in Casti Cannubii487 and Paul VI says in Humanae
Vitae.488 By implication, not only a couple’s engagement in the marital act constitutes a conjugal
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act, but their intentional abstinence also forms a conjugal act, that is an act of mutual love. 489 The
contraceptive choice, on the other hand, renders needless the specific sexual behavior—periodic
continence—that responsible parenthood entails. 490 Moreover, it is a choice against virtuous selfcontrol by abstaining from the sexual act. 491
Precisely because Rhonheimer places the contraceptive choice in the moral order, he is
able to morally qualify its use as an emergency contraceptive in an act of self-defense, in cases of
sexual assault. 492 Rhonheimer recalls the response of three theologians regarding whether or not
a woman could have recourse to contraception in the face of rape, including for example
Congolese nuns in the war-torn Congo. 493 Rhonheimer finds their arguments tending toward
physicalism insofar as they focus the debate on the physical effect of contraception, namely,
temporary sterilization. 494 According to Rhonheimer, Francesco Hürth considers the physical act
one of sterilization in the absolute sense, but on the moral level, that is, in the relative sense, it is
not an act of contraception, but self-defense, since the woman does not both freely and
deliberately desire or will sexual intercourse and to deprive the act of its reproductive
potential.495 Palazzini and Lambruschini use Double Effect and Totality to justify the woman’s
recourse to contraception. 496 Rhonheimer objects to this, because of its casuistic formulation. 497
Just like Knauer, they are formulating the argument in such a way that one needs sufficient
reason to choose an immoral act—contraception. 498
Rhonheimer, however, insists that since the act in question is not merely on the natural
order, it is not a question of finding sufficient reason to choose an act that is per se immoral, but
a matter of accurately formulating the Moral Object as one of self-defense on the moral order. 499
Again, the proportionalists’ expanded notion of the object amounts to rendering the intentionality
of the object indistinguishable from the ulterior intentions. 500 Consequently, the formulation of
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the object by proportionalists is just as casuistic as that of the manualists. In particular, the
eventistic and physicalistic formulation of the object demonstrates this. 501 Insofar as force
removes the sexual act, on the woman’s part, from the realm of freedom, the choice to use
contraception constitutes an act of self-defense from the unwanted effect of conceiving.502
d. Genus Moris
I now discuss the derivation of the other criteria of Double Effect. Just as Ockham’s
nominalism and the casuistic methodology of the manualists and the proportionalists obscures
the Thomistic meaning of the Moral Object, so it obfuscates Double Effect. This subsubsection
demonstrates this. Moreover, it contrasts the consequentialist and Thomistic formulation in its
application to emergency contraception for sexual assault victims.
In the Secunda Secundae of the Summa Theologica Aquinas uses Double-Effect
Reasoning to explain how one may use self-defense to unintentionally kill an assailant. 503 An
action may have two effects one intended and the other unintended (praeter intentionem).504
Praeter intentionem means accidental. 505 Sousa-Lara explains that Aquinas is asserting that the
evil effect must not constitute the Moral Object. 506 This jives with Aquinas’s agreement with
Augustine that one must not intend to kill the assailant. 507 Moreover, this agrees with Finnis’s
assertion that Aquinas is using the broad sense of intention here, which includes both intending
as choosing the Moral Object (proximate end) and intending the ultimate end. 508
Ethicists often use the example of performing a hysterectomy on a pregnant woman with
a cancerous uterus. 509 Insofar as cancer constitutes a grave threat to the mother’s life, the
situation necessitates a hysterectomy. Ethically, this procedure entails a choice to save the
mother’s life, by removing a grave threat. Unfortunately, the surgery foreseeably results in the
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death of the child. Using this example, I illustrate the difference between the consequentialist and
the non-consequentialist formulation of Double Effect.
Cavanaugh contends that Gury’s version of Double Effect, 510 which Joseph T. Mangan
reproduces in his “An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect,” 511 represents a
contemporary formulation. 512 Under the influence of nominalism and the casuistic hermeneutic,
Gury adopts a cause-effect articulation of Double Effect. 513 For Gury, the criterion pertaining to
the Moral Object identifies it as a cause. 514 Thus, he indicates that the cause itself must be good
or indifferent.515 In non-consequentialist terms, the Moral Object must be good.516 Put another
way, the Moral Object must not be an intrinsically evil act.
In the case of a pregnant woman with a cancerous uterus, the procedure in question is the
hysterectomy. Using cause-effect terminology, it is difficult to distinguish the physical act of the
hysterectomy from the Moral Object that one chooses in performing a hysterectomy. For this
reason, Rhonheimer claims that by using causal language consequentialists reduce actions to
events.517 Understanding the Moral Object as a cause removes the personal perspective. 518
Consequentially, one is simply performing a physical procedure: a hysterectomy. In purely
physical terms, one is removing a cancerous, gravid uterus.
A non-consequentialist formulation of the Moral Object takes into account the
perspective of the acting person.519 In other words, it describes in terms of striving or willing
what the acting person chooses. 520 At the same time, it avoids the pitfalls of so narrowly defining
the Moral Object that it does not account for its physical consequences. 521 For example,
Cavanaugh accuses John Finnis, Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle in “‘Direct’ and ‘Indirect’: A
Reply to Critics of our Action Theory,” 522 of so narrowly defining the object of a craniotomy that
it conceptually excludes the death of a child. 523 Cavanaugh contends, however, that it is
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impossible to define a craniotomy without the death of a child. 524 Therefore, taking into account
the consequences of the act, which include the unintended, yet foreseen death of a child, one may
say that the physician and patient choose to remove the grave threat of a cancerous, gravid uterus
using a hysterectomy, foreseeing, but not intending the death of a child. This non-consequential
formulation accounts for what the acting person chooses with due regard for the foreseen, but
unintended consequences.
The next two criteria derive from the same statement. Since Aquinas uses intention in the
broad sense, one may conclude that he not only prohibits intending the evil effect as a means, but
also as a remote end. Casuistically, one must only intend the good effect, not the bad. 525 Nonconsequentially, this means that the evil effect must not be the ultimate end of one’s intention. 526
Moreover, insofar as praeter intentionem means accidental, it does not mean unforeseen as in a
mishap.527 To the contrary, Aquinas presumes that one foresees the unintended evil. For this
reason, Cavanaugh stresses the intended/foreseen distinction. 528 Concerning the abovementioned
example, one must not intend the death of the child. Rather, foreseeing the death of the child, one
intends the restoration of health to the mother.
The third criterion, casuistically, insists that the evil effect must not cause the good
effect.529 This articulation highlights the non-personalistic formulation of action, which
Rhonheimer criticizes as being physicalistic and eventistic. 530 According to such a construction,
effects cause effects. Since Aquinas only understands morality in terms of persons in action, he
has no analogous criterion. However, Thomistic ethicists often describe this criterion as one must
not choose an evil means to attain a good end. 531 This, however, is indistinguishable from the
first criterion that insists one’s Moral Object must not be evil.
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Consequentially, ethicists often maintain that a hysterectomy is distinct from a direct
abortion, because one performs the physical procedure on the uterus, rather than the child. 532 The
above discussion concerning the definition of contraception demonstrates that a physicalistic
definition of the Moral Object does not suffice. Rhonheimer, for example, observes that although
the physical act of a female athlete taking an anovulant to prevent menstruation to compete in a
sporting event is the same as a woman taking an anovulant to prevent conception, the Moral
Objects differ. 533 The former is indifferent, while the latter is immoral, because it constitutes an
alternative to an act of continence, which is constitutive of responsible parenthood and an
inherent means to growth in chastity. 534
Finally, Aquinas insists that one’s means must be proportionate to one’s end. 535 Once
again, the consequentialists use cause-effect language to articulate this criterion. Therefore, in
consequential terms, the final criterion insists that one must have a proportionately serious reason
to cause an evil effect. 536 Insofar as removing the cancerous uterus saves the mother’s life, this is
proportionate to the negative effect, the death of the child.
For Aquinas, disproportionate means imply a change in the Moral Object. 537 For
example, if one uses deadly force to repel an attacker who clearly does not use deadly force, it is
difficult to say that one is really defending oneself, rather than intending to kill another person. A
corollary to the fourth criteria is that one must have no alternative. 538 Presumably, the only
medically indicated procedure is a hysterectomy for a woman with a gravid, cancerous uterus.
Thus, a casuistic argument in favor of using a contraceptive is as follows. First, the act in
question must be either good or indifferent. Rhonheimer indicates that unless one maintains the
moral character of the Moral Object, it is impossible, to distinguish it from a contraceptive
choice, physically defined. 539 Thus, Palazzini and Lambruschini cannot get past the physicalistic

285

notion that the choice is inexorably one to sterilization. 540 As such, it is difficult to avoid the
proportionalistic trap of finding commensurate reason to justify one’s means.541 In this sense, the
whole argument stands or falls on the re-defined proportionate criteria. Regarding the second and
third criteria, it is hard to see how the evil effect does not cause the good effect—no conception,
or that the one does not intend the evil effect—physically defined as sterilization.
Rhonheimer’s definition of the Moral Object as self-defense resolves the tension in the
argument and renders it unnecessary to use Double Effect. By defining the Moral Object as selfdefense, one avoids the need to justify evil. One is simply using the means available to prevent
conception from taking place without a loving bodily union. Only when one does not clearly
differentiate the Moral Object from a physical event, does it become difficult to justify or find a
commensurate reason to use a contraceptive method to prevent conception.
This section shows that a non-consequentialist description of the Moral Object—one that
clearly distinguishes the object of choice from intention and keeps it in the moral order—of selfdefense from sexual assault excludes any necessity of recourse to Double Effect.
This chapter uses a non-consequentialist definition of the Moral Object and the Principle
of Double Effect to justify risk reducing bilateral salpingo-oophorectomies in BRCA mutation
carriers and the use of emergency contraception to prevent conception in victims of sexual
assault. The following chapter considers ethical justifications for sex reassignment surgery in
patients with gender dysphoria and using contraception for non-contraceptive benefits.
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CHAPTER SIX – SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY AND CONTRACEPTION
This chapter considers the ethics surrounding sex reassignment surgery for gender
dysphoria and the use of contraceptives in Catholic hospitals for non-contraceptive benefits.
6A. Sex Reassignment Surgery for Gender Dysphoria
Two recent articles in Health Care Ethics USA: A Quarterly Resource for the Catholic
Health Ministry argue that the Principle of Double Effect and the Principle of Totality and
Integrity justify the use of sex reassignment surgery in patients diagnosed with gender
dysphoria.1 This section demonstrates how Catholic theological anthropology not only precludes
the so-called ideology of gender—that underlies justifications for sex reassignment therapies—
which Pope Francis along with his predecessors condemn, 2 but also does not admit justification
for sex reassignment surgery by means of Double Effect or Totality, especially in light of an
accurate articulation of the Moral Object.
The first subsection explicates the definition of sex, gender, gender dysphoria, and
current therapies. The second subsection examines three categories that the Church uses to reject
gender ideology: medical, philosophical, and theological. The third subsection demonstrates how
an accurate understanding of Totality and Double Effect, which includes a Thomistic
understanding of the Moral Object, excludes the possibility of sex reassignment surgery for
gender dysphoria.
i. Sex, Gender, and Gender Dysphoria
This subsection explains the complex categories of sex, gender, and gender dysphoria.
The first subsubsection explicates the multivariable definition of biological sex utilizing intersex
conditions to clarify and highlight its complexity. The second subsubsection discusses the origins
and development of the concept of gender. The third subsubsection reveals the evolution of the
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concept of gender dysphoria, especially as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fourth Edition3 and Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth
Edition4 reflect it. Finally, the fourth subsubsection briefly discusses sex reassignment therapies.
a. Defining Sex
Defining sex biologically as male or female is not as easy as it may at first appear. This is
true not only because of the variance of terminology, but also because of the many factors that
contribute to even a somatic definition. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fifth Edition identifies sex with the biological indicators of male and female, which I
further elucidate in this subsubsection, whereas it identifies the lived experience of man or
woman as gender, which I discuss in the following subsubsection. 5
Several physiological criteria exist for defining sex, including: genetic, gonadal, ductal,
and phenotypic or genital. 6 Genetically, in its most unambiguous form, the male and female
karyotypes consist of 46,XY and 46,XX, respectively. There may, however, be several unique
combinations of sex chromosomes including, but not limited to: 45,X (Turner Syndrome),
47,XXX, 47,XXY (Klinefelter Syndrome), 47,XYY. In addition, early in embryonic
development, mitotic errors may give rise to cell populations with unique chromosomal
complements, called mosaicism. 7 For instance, it is possible to have a 46,XX/46,XY karyotype,
which constitutes 50% of cases of true hermaphroditism. 8 Strictly speaking, however, one is
genetically male if one has a Y chromosome and female if one does not, regardless of the
number of X chromosomes one may have additionally. 9
The variety of genotypes, including mosaics, gives rise to the various expressions.
Klinefelter syndrome, for instance consists genetically of one or more Y chromosomes in
combination with one or more X chromosomes, which results in male hypogonadism
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(underdeveloped male sex organs). Turner syndrome is a partial or complete monosomy of the X
chromosome that engenders hypogonadism in phenotypic females. 10 In both Klinefelter
syndrome and Turner syndrome, the sexual identity is less ambiguous, but simply
underdeveloped.
Alternatively, there are forms of hermaphroditism—true and pseudo—that make sexual
identity externally more difficult to pinpoint. The gonads refer to the germ cells that migrate,
becoming testes in males and ovaries in females. Although initially neutral, the gonads have an
inherent tendency to develop femininely, “unless influenced by Y chromosome-dependent
masculinizing factors.” 11 In terms of ductal development, females develop Müllerian ducts and
males develop Wolffian ducts. Phenotypic or genital sex refers to the respective external sex
organs. Hermaphroditism consists of a combination of almost any variety of the abovementioned structures.
True hermaphroditism occurs when one has both testicular and ovarian tissue. This
phenomenon is very rare. Genetically, half are mosaics, while the other half have a 46,XX
karyotype with an active SRY gene that has either translocated to an autosomal chromosome, or
one of the sex chromosomes has a cryptic chimerism. 12 Pseudo-hermaphroditism, on the other
hand, occurs when one has sexually the opposite genitals of the gonads. For instance, a female
pseudo-hermaphrodite has ovaries, but male genitalia; and a male pseudo-hermaphrodite has
testes and female genitalia. Female pseudo-hermaphrodites are genetically female, 46,XX, but
have ambiguous or virilized (masculinized) genitalia caused by excessive exposure to androgen
steroid during gestation, which originates from congenital adrenal hyperplasia. 13 Male pseudohermaphrodites are genetically male, but due to problems with either androgen synthesis or
androgen insensitivity, the male ducts and/or external genitalia do not fully develop.
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As complex as disorders of sex development are, there is less disagreement about its
treatment than conditions relating to gender, despite the variety of historical approaches. 14
Perhaps this is because it is evident that these conditions are largely somatic, rather than,
psychosocial. In 2006, several groups wrote “Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex
Disorders.” 15 The move is to classify intersex conditions genetically, even though they present
somatically differently. 16 The above analysis demonstrates that while intersex conditions
manifest in the gonads, ducts, and genitals, they originate genetically. Thus, even in intersex
conditions, the genetic classification of individuals according to a binary sexual classification is
possible.
b. Defining Gender
Much more complex, not only because of the divergence in terminology, but also because
of the underlying theories is the definition of gender. The following largely represents an
elucidation of the understanding of gender in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fifth Edition and the social constructionist perspective that underlies it.
Sex or sexual refers to the biological indicators of male or female, including
chromosomes, gonads, and genitalia. 17 However, it is precisely because of the intersex condition
that the need arose for another term to denote the lived experience of a person as a man or
woman.18 John Money is the first to use the term gender to highlight such a difference. 19 Gender
denotes the lived role of an individual as a boy or girl, man or woman. 20 The American
Psychological Association defines gender as a social construct that one attributes to male and
female individuals. 21 One’s natal gender—the gender assigned at birth—may not constitute one’s
gender identity. 22 One may, therefore, reassign one’s gender. Gender identity, though often in
coordination with traditional masculine and feminine roles, may constitute neither, in which case
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one identifies as non-binary.23 Transgender refers to those who “transiently or persistently
identify with a gender different from their natal gender.” 24 Transsexual, on the other hand, refers
to those who have undergone a social transition from male to female, or female to male, that may
include somatic transition with cross-sex hormone treatment and/or sex reassignment surgery. 25
Sociologist, Linda L. Lindsey, argues that society and culture largely construct gender
roles.26 In “Gender Identity,” Lawrence S. Mayer and Paul R. McHugh 27 attribute the concept of
gender as a social construct to feminist writers such as Simon de Bouvoir, 28 Ann Oakley, 29
Suzaane J. Kessler and Wendy McKenna, 30 Gayle Rubin, 31 and Judith Butler. 32 In “On the
Construction of Gender, Sex and Sexualities,” Jeanne Marecek et al., hold that knowledge is a
collaborative product of society. 33 Merecek et al. indicate that social constructionists do not
mean to say that gender, sex, and sexuality are inherently built by society as opposed to biology,
environment, or innate, but that society constructs the terms and concepts they represent. 34
Moreover, these linguistic constructs influence how one understands gender and sex. 35 Social
constructionists are interested in processes; for example, how terms change in meaning over
time.36 Judith Butler, for instance, understands gender according to a performativity theory of
doing.37 In other words, gender is not being, but doing. In addition, they do not understand the
human person as distinct from society, insofar as both are mutually dependent upon each other. 38
Consequently, social constructionists understand gender, not as a personality trait, but as a social
process.39 Additionally, they understand the concepts and terms that reflect biology and sex and
sexual to be social constructs as well, which also falls under the purview of social processes. 40
Marecek et al. dedicate the remainder of the paper to demonstrating the relativism of both
biology and gender.41
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According to such a constructionist understanding of sex, sexuality, and gender, the
concept of transexualism arises, which not only implies the possibility of changing one’s gender
in a binary sense, but in a non-binary sense as well. 42 As Margaret H. McCarthy indicates in
“Gender Ideology and the Humanum,” many contemporary theorists attempt to raze any notion
that gender is attributable to sex or the body. 43 Inherent in the constructionists view is the notion
of a disembodied will and the dictatorship of relativism. 44 Although Merecek et al. deny that they
are asserting that gender, sex, etc. is socially constructed as opposed to being nature-determined,
in practice, this is what social constructionism does. 45 Such a relativistic disposition not only
presumes that the authentic person is the soul, but that the body is a tabula rasa. Both
anthropological theories contrast with the Catholic understanding of the human person and have
origins in Enlightenment philosophy as I demonstrate in the next subsection.
c. Gender Dysphoria
Here, I follow the development of the clinical understanding of gender dysphoria as
relevant diagnostic texts articulate. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition identifies gender dysphoria as a disorder concerning identity, 46 whereas
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, no longer views the
condition as such. 47 Rather, it identifies the clinical problem with the experience of dysphoria,
that is, the distressing experience of identifying as transgender, which one may presumably
resolve by changing the individual’s sex. 48 It no longer considers the transgender condition
pathological.49 The respective approaches inform the increasing affinity for sex reassignment
therapies.
According to Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition,
gender identity disorders “are characterized by strong and persistent cross-gender identification
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accompanied by persistent discomfort with one’s assigned sex.”50 The name for the condition
suggests that the pathology consists in having the experience of a gender different from one’s
natal birth. Accordingly, one may not have an intersex condition, increasingly called a disorder
of sexual development in the literature (Criteria C). 51 At the same time, one must have a
persistent discomfort with one’s natal sex or the gender role assigned to it (Criteria B), and a
strong identification with the opposite gender (Criteria A). 52 In other words, one must not only
experience discomfort with one’s given gender, but one must identify with the opposite gender.
Finally, there must be evident distress or impairment of social, occupational, or other areas of life
(Criteria D).53
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, in changing
the name to gender dysphoria removes the pathology from the incongruent experience of having
a gender unique to one’s natal sex and places it on the distress that such an experience causes. By
de-pathologizing the transgender experience, they open the door to transsexual therapies. Alice
Dreger, in “Why Gender Dysphoria Should No Longer Be Considered a Medical Disorder,”
highlights the intentional motivation behind this change of approach. 54 It further delineates
criteria for diagnosis in two subgroups based on age—children and adolescents and adults. 55 It
defines gender dysphoria more concretely for children, having more criteria that must be met (six
instead of two). 56 In both cases, the patient must experience the incongruence for at least six
months.57 Children must present with either a strong desire to be the opposite gender or the
insistence of being the opposite gender. 58 Moreover, they must present with five more distinct
behavioral patterns, such as cross-dressing, a strong preference for: playing the opposite gender
role in make-believe, opposite gender toys, opposite gender playmates, rejection of same-sex
playmates, a strong dislike of one’s sexual anatomy, and strong desire for primary/secondary
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sexual characteristics that match one’s experienced gender. 59 Finally, this experience must
impair the child’s functioning socially or in school, for instance. 60
In adolescents and adults, patients present with marked incongruence between one’s
experienced gender and the assigned gender, with a strong desire to be rid of primary and
secondary sex characteristics of one’s natal gender and a strong desire to have the primary and
secondary sex characteristics of the opposite gender. 61 In addition, there may be a strong desire
to be treated as opposite of one’s natal gender and a conviction that one has the typical feelings
or reactions of the other gender. 62 As with children, the experience of dysphoria must interfere
with one’s social, occupational, or other areas of one’s life. 63
Prevalence varies, but overall, more natal males experience gender dysphoria than natal
females.64 Rates of persistence from childhood to adolescence or adulthood vary between 2.2%
and 30%.65 Until 1923, when Magnus Hirschfeld argues to the contrary, 66 clinicians did not
distinguish gender dysphoria from homosexuality. 67 There is, however, a strong correlation
between gender dysphoria and same sex attraction. Sexual attraction among individuals varies,
especially in men, however, most experience sexual attraction to one’s natal sex. 68 Natal males
who present later in life with gender dysphoria tend to be attracted to natal females. 69 Differential
diagnoses include nonconformity to gender roles, transvestic disorder, body dysmorphic
disorder, psychotic disorders including schizophrenia, and other clinical presentations. 70
Comorbidities include emotional and behavioral problems most commonly anxiety, disruptive
impulsive control, and depression. 71
d. Sex Reassignment Therapies
Expert opinions diverge on appropriate treatment for gender dysphoria. Some encourage
the pursuit of counseling that helps one identify with one’s natal sex. 72 Others encourage people
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struggling with gender dysphoria to change the body to match the so-called inside. The latter
advocate the use of hormone replacement therapies and sex reassignment surgeries to facilitate
the transition.73 There are multiple types of sex reassignment surgery. These include male-tofemale and female-to-male operations that consist of genital reconstruction, breast augmentation,
chest reconstruction, and hysterectomy. In addition, less invasive procedures include facial
feminization surgery, vocal cord surgery, and Adam’s apple shaving. Some delineate between
top or bottom procedures. Top sex reassignment surgeries refer to procedures that address the
secondary sexual characteristics from the chest up to the face, while bottom sex reassignment
surgeries refer to procedures that change the genitals.
This subsection addresses the complex definitions of sex, gender, gender dysphoria, and
possible treatments. The following subsection analyzes three categories which the Catholic
Church uses to preclude sex reassignment therapies.
ii. Objections to Sex Reassignment Therapies
On December 12, 2016, the Committee on Doctrine of the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops sent a memorandum to bishops addressing the rapid increase in people
identifying as transgender. 74 The committee highlights its concern that the Affordable Care Act
recognizes gender identity as a protected category for antidiscrimination and the implications
that this may have for Catholic Healthcare Services. 75 The committee objects to sex reassignment
therapies on three grounds: medical, philosophical, and theological. 76 This subsection
illuminates these three categories.
a. Medical
To be sure, researchers in the field face many challenges when it comes to data for
gender dysphoria patients and outcomes of procedures. In part, this is due to the relatively small
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number of individuals presenting with gender dysphoria (0.005% to 0.014% in adult males and
0.002% to 0.003% in adult females). 77 But it may also be due to limited responses to surveys and
poor therapeutic outcomes. 78 Lawrence S. Mayer and Paul R. McHugh in “Gender Identity”
examine scientific research and find little to no evidence that medical procedures to change
gender have any psychological benefit. 79 Moreover, in spite of the predominant view that gender
identity originates at birth, they find no scientific evidence to support this belief. 80
Mayer and McHugh offer two well-documented cases that contradict the plasticity of
gender that social constructionists advocate. 81 First, John Money’s most famous patient is David
Reimer.82 After a botched circumcision, physicians used both surgical and hormonal intervention
attempting to raise Reimer as a girl.83 In spite of attempts to conceal the truth, Reimer selfidentified as a boy. 84
Second, Mayer and McHugh offer a follow up study by William G. Reiner and John P.
Gearhart of 16 genetic males with cloacal exstrophy—deformed bladders and genitalia—which
underwent surgical procedures to construct female genitalia and were to be raised as girls. 85
According to the article, two subjects were raised as male, 8 of the 14 others self-identified as
male during the course of the study, five persistently declared themselves female and one refused
to respond.86 In addition, all showed moderate-to-marked male-typical behavior. 87
Mayer and McHugh argue that the abovementioned findings indicate that biological sex
is clear, binary, and stable from almost all humans.88 Moreover, exceptions to sex-typical
behavior do not contradict this biological reality, nor can surgery or social conditioning change
it.89 Mayer, speaking on behalf of Johns Hopkins Psychiatry Department, concludes that human
sexual identity is mostly built into one’s constitution by both genetics and embryogenesis. 90
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Even if gender lacks the plasticity that constructionists defend, perhaps the incongruence
lies in biology itself. For example, Robert Sapolsky suggests a neurobiological derivation for
cross-gender identification. 91 He suggests that people with cross-gender identification have a
brain that is opposite their biological sex. 92 Other researchers presume a similar line of thinking
as they develop experiments to confirm biological differences between transgender and cisgender brains including Nancy Segal, 93 Michael Bostwick and Kari A. Martin,94 Giuseppina
Rametti et al., 95 Emiliano Santarnecchi, 96 Hsaio-Lun Ku et al., 97 and Hans Berglund et al. 98
Mayer and McHugh find the above-mentioned studies inconclusive and mixed. 99 Even if
studies could demonstrate conclusively that neurological differences exist in cross-gender
individuals, this does not necessarily imply that these differences are biological or innate; rather,
one could just as easily implicate environment or psychology. 100 Accordingly, the only way to
unequivocally establish biological causality is to “conduct prospective, longitudinal, preferably
randomly sampled and population-based studies.”101 Unfortunately, to attain statistical
significance, many of these studies would need to be larger than is realistically possible to
achieve.102 To the contrary of the above-mentioned studies and a constructionist understanding
of gender, Meyer and McHugh show that scientific evidence overwhelmingly supports the
position that biological development and sex corresponds with gender identity. 103 Consequently,
research ought to look for social and psychological origins for cross-gender identification. 104
Paul W. Hruz, in Experimental Approaches to Alleviating Gender Dysphoria in Children,
highlights that current research indicates that gender dysphoria is a multifactorial condition with
genetic and environmental origins. 105 He faults the rapid transition to non-psychiatric
interventions for gender dysphoria to the strong ideological agenda that redefines the meaning
and purpose of human sexuality. 106 In addition, he attributes the rise in children presenting with
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gender dysphoria to social affirmation. His article also raises challenges that research and
treatment for gender dysphoria faces. Insofar as interventions supportive of gender transition
contrast with Catholic anthropology, doing so, even for research purposes, may constitute
proximate material cooperation with evil. 107 In addition, Hruz underlines that children and
adolescents do not have the maturity to give informed consent to procedures that have lifelong
consequences. 108 For Hruz, the high rate of spontaneous remission supports a cautious
psychological approach that is antithetical to prevailing medical practice. 109 Positively, he
contends that Catholic hospitals stand in a unique position to occupy the void of reason, by
treating patients in a manner consistent with their dignity and integrity. 110
Body dysmorphic disorder is similar to gender dysphoria with some pronounced
differences.111 Suffers obsess or fixate on an aspect of one’s body that one believes to be
disproportionate with the rest of the body. 112 In body dysmorphic disorder individuals exhibit
preoccupation with physical appearance not attributable to concern with body fat or weight. 113
This may involve fixation over a body part, such as one’s nose, hairline, or genitalia, or it may
pertain to one’s perception of musculature. 114 As with gender dysphoria, individuals experience
social anxiety and functional impairment. 115 Comorbidities include anxiety, depression, and
obsessive-compulsive disorder. 116 They often seek cosmetic surgery, but experience
dissatisfaction with results. 117 They are high risk for suicide, especially in adolescents. 118
In “A New Way to Be Mad,” Carl Elliott explores the phenomenon of patients presenting
with an obsessive desire to live as an amputee, which John Money calls apotemnophilia and
relates to gender dysphoria. 119 Apotemnophilia is distinct from acrotomophilia, which is a sexual
attraction to amputees. Elliott highlights the similarity between gender dysphoria regarding
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identity and selfhood. 120 Suffers describe themselves as amputees. 121 He speculates that cultural
fixation on self explains why so many describe desires using reference to self and identity. 122
Elliott argues that apotemnophilia is more like gender dysphoria, because suffers tie
amputation more closely to their identity than in body dysmorphic disorder, where the individual
simply believes that an aspect of one’s body is disproportionate. 123 He argues that just as culture
creates apotemnophilia so it creates the transsexual by introducing the terminology and offering
sex reassignment surgery as a solution.124 Ian Hacking uses the phrase semantic hacking to
describe this phenomenon. 125 Elliott points to the less than controversial relationship between
psychiatry and surgery throughout its history including clitoridectomies for excessive
masturbation and frontal lobotomies, as evidence for questioning the use of sex reassignment
surgery as a remedy for gender dysphoria or amputations as a cure for apotemnophilia. 126
b. Philosophical
There are a number of philosophical tendencies that predominate in the ideology of
gender, including, but not limited to: anthropological dualism, physicalistic determinism, and
existential voluntarism. This subsubsection elucidates these tendencies and their disagreement
with Christian anthropology.
Advocates of the ideology of gender presume an anthropology that relegates sexuality to
choice, at best, largely rooted in anthropological dualism that originates in Rene Descartes’
Meditations on First Philosophy.127 Anthropological dualism emphasizes the separation between
the body and the soul and the superiority of the latter, which Martin Rhonheimer calls
spiritualism.128 Although historically present in various heterodox doctrines such as Gnosticism
and Manichaeism, it is especially pronounced in the Rationalism. 129 Descartes advocates radical
dualism whereby two unique substances exist, yet abide in a tenuous relationship. 130
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Descartes methodically questions everything from his sense perception to his own
existence and even the existence of God. 131 He ultimately concludes that the only thing certain is
“Cogito, ergo sum.”132 This dictum becomes the subjective foundation for all knowledge and
being.133 In this process, he divorces the spiritual from the corporeal establishing two mutually
opposing substances. 134 The mind becomes the sole principle of truth and being, whereas, he
relegates the body to the unintelligible. 135 Since the mind or soul exists independently of the
body, Descartes conceives of the human person merely as the soul, trapped, so-to-speak, within
the body.136 Hence he rejects Boethius’s definition of the human person as a rational animal. 137
Similarly, Rhonheimer attributes such an anthropological dualism to Karl Rahner’s
definition of the human person as a spirit in the world. 138 Rather, Rhonheimer, following
Aquinas insists that the human person constitutes a substantial unity of body-soul composite. 139
The soul is not the human person; rather, the human person is a composite of these two subpersonal entities. 140 The body with its natural inclinations and desires contribute more than just
neutrally to morality.
Concomitant to the development of continental rationalism is the expansion of British
Empiricism, with its emphasis on knowledge derived from physical evidence. 141 Empiricism,
which originates with Francis Bacon, corresponds with the Scientific Revolution that emphasizes
experimentation, induction, and material and efficient causality over formal and final
causality.142 Science describes and predicts interactions between physical objects, which become
the basis for the laws of physics. 143 The nature of matter itself and its inherent purpose are of
little consequence. Not only is sense knowledge of primary importance, it becomes the sole
source of truth. The universal laws of physics govern not only the inanimate objects of the world,
but also the more complex animate beings, which constitute merely a complex conglomeration of
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the former. While Rationalism emphasizes the division between the body and the soul, the
superiority of the soul, and the denigration of the body, Empiricism reduces the body to the
interaction between its constitutive parts. For both, the body is only a slightly more complex
combination of parts than a cotton gin, which the laws of physics govern. Hence, on the one
hand, the body is undifferentiated matter and on the other, physicalistic or biological
mechanisms determine it.
However, the Empiricist David Hume calls into question even the apparent cause-effect
relationships between material bodies, insisting that they too originate from sense experience,
and are therefore, a posteriori, not a priori.144 In other words, the laws of physics, for Hume,
constitute synthetic rather than analytic propositions. Put another way, the laws of physics
depend on sense experience for their confirmation and formulation and are not self-evidently true
merely according to the formulation of the terms as if analytic.
Immanuel Kant further severs the divide between the mind—noumenon—and the
external world or thing-in-itself—phenomenon—by responding to Hume in his Critique of Pure
Reason.145 Kant argues that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible through reason. 146 Unlike
the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley, 147 which denies the existence of the material world external
to that of ideas, or the problematic idealism of Descartes, which doubts the existence of an
external world, Kant knows the world through a transcendental idealism, which uses sense
experience and reason to formulate the synthetic a priori.148
Although Kant attempts to resolve the anthropological, dualistic divide that Rationalism
and Empiricism creates, he only succeeds in solidifying it in his metaphysics. In Kant’s ethics,
the divide is between the person and action, since the right action depends on a good will
configured by the duty to an externally formulated moral law. 149 Rhonheimer, in The Perspective
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of Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics criticizes Kant’s ethics
because it takes it away from the first-person perspective. 150 In “Karol Wojtyla, Sex
Reassignment Surgery, and the Body-Soul Union,” Jacob Harrison indicates that Wojtyla
dislikes the evacuation of bodily, human experience from morality in Kant’s ethics. 151 Wojtyla
finds a synthesis for this division between bodily human experience and duty in Aquinas. 152
In addition to being dualistic and deterministic, the ideology of gender builds on an
existential voluntarism. The problematic idealism of Descartes renders the body insignificant, at
best, and deceptive or burdensome, at worst. Since the body lacks meaning, it becomes the role
of the mind to give it meaning and definition. Consequently, constructionists utilize what I call
an existential voluntarism to define the person and the body. It is existential insofar as the
individual gives definition to the body, just as in contemporary existentialism the individual
defines his or her purpose for existing. 153 It is voluntaristic insofar as such an act presumes
absolute freedom. Theological voluntarism, which emphasizes the omnipotent will of God over
the omniscient intellect, originates with Duns Scotus. 154 In Schopenhauer 155 and Nietzsche156 the
will provides the content of intelligibility. Speaking to this tendency, John Paul II, in Veritatis
Splender says, “a freedom which claims to be absolute ends up treating the human body as a raw
datum, devoid of any meaning and moral values until freedom has shaped it in accordance with
its design.” 157 Not only is the body relative, but the ethics that govern the body are relative too.
Each individual is free to ascribe meaning to the unintelligible body. It is in this philosophical
milieu that Bruce Jenner tells Diane Sawyer that he feels like a woman trapped in a man’s
body.158
In Amoris Laetitia Pope Francis, denies the omnipotent freedom which the ideology of
gender presumes insisting that as creatures humans must receive creation as a gift. 159 Francis
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challenges the faithful to help young people accept their bodies as created—male and female. 160
In a General Audience on Man and Woman, Francis speculates that people attempt to cancel out
sexual difference because they do not know how to confront it. 161 However, he warns that
removing difference only creates problems. 162 Instead, he recommends listening to others as
means to understanding the other. 163
c. Theological
While Descartes builds his philosophy on doubt, Christian anthropology builds on a
foundation of trust. It presumes ontological and epistemic realism; namely, that the human
person, beginning with the bodily senses, accurately perceives the world. Implicitly, this means
that God is trustworthy. Because God creates according to an intelligible and immutable order,
humans are able to engage with the world and even perceive God’s handiwork in creation.
Furthermore, Christian anthropology is holistic; the human person is not merely a soul
trapped in a body. Following the proceedings of the Fifth Lateran Council, John Paul II asserts
that for the human person, “the rational soul is per se et essentialiter the form of the body.” 164
The human person is not merely the soul; rather, the human person constitutes the substantial
unity of body and soul. 165 The unity between the body and the soul is so strong that the very
definition and existence of the human person depends on it. Indeed, Aquinas holds that in
death—the separation of the body from the soul—the human person dies. 166 In an address to the
18th International Congress of the Transplant Society, John Paul II defines death of the person as
a single event, which consists of the total disintegration of the unitary and integrated whole that
is the personal self. 167
John Paul II addresses human sexuality in his Theology of the Body, which is largely an
extended theological commentary on Scripture passages that form the foundation for Christian
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theological anthropology beginning with Genesis 1-3.168 Far from a literalist account of how God
creates the world, Genesis 1-3 is a theological explication of the human condition. 169 God creates
everything from nothing. Humans, however, are unique in that God creates them in His own
image and likeness. 170 God gives humans stewardship over the rest of creation. 171 God also
creates humans, male and female. 172 It is precisely in this difference between male and female,
which manifests a difference in the human person, that it is possible for humans to mirror the
communion of persons in the Triune God. 173 Concretely, this is actualized in the marital act,
which is also the means for fulfilling the command to be fruitful and multiply. 174
In chapter 5 of his book, Sex and Virtue, John S. Grabowski highlights the challenges that
sexual difference poses for an adequate philosophy of human nature. 175 Equality and difference
are two important Scriptural features that one must preserve. 176 Grabowski distinguishes between
essentialists and constructionists. 177 This is analogous to the divide between biology or nature
and environment or nurture. Essentialists point to biological difference and emphasize that sex is
part of nature.178 As the above articulation demonstrates, constructionists argue that one largely
constructs gender and sexuality through culture and society. 179 Extreme essentialism tends
toward determinism, which clashes with human freedom, while extreme constructivism—
reflective of a dualistic separation of the person from the body—denies the integral impact the
body has on the human person. 180
Grabowski holds that human sexuality is not a difference of essence, since such a
difference implies a difference of natures. If natures are different, then equality is also lost.
Neither does he argue that human sexuality is merely a cultural construct. Rather, he argues that
human sexuality is based on the person. Just as the relations between persons in the Trinity
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account for the respective persons therein, so relations give definition to human persons. Of
course, for humans, the capacity for communion is reflected in the body by sexual difference.
Elliott Bedford and Jason Eberl, in “Is the Soul Sexed? Anthropology, Transgenderism,
and Disorders of Sex Development,” hold that sexual difference transcends even the level of the
body to the soul as well. 181 They contend that strictly speaking, the soul is not sexed since it is
immaterial; however, insofar as it connects from the moment of creation with a sexed body it
constitutes an inseparable accidental quality of the human being. 182 Therefore, they hold that the
soul is sexed. 183 Edward Furton, in “The Soul Is Not Sexed,” argues that Bedford and Eberl’s
perspective not only diverges from traditional Thomistic anthropology, but that it also introduces
undesirable possibilities, such as, the possibility that God places the wrong soul in the wrong
body.184 In addition, according to such a formulation, it runs aground of dualistic tendencies
insofar as it connects sexual difference to the soul.
Bedford and Eberl respond to Furton’s critique in “Actual Human Persons Are Sexed,
Unified Beings,” asserting that the soul in abstract—logically without reference to the body—is
not sexed, however, in accord with Aquinas, just as the soul is individuated after creation by its
connection to the body, so the soul is sexed, so-to-speak, after its connection to the body. 185
Therefore, insofar as the soul and the body do not exist ontologically or temporally before each
other and the so-called sexing of the soul takes place precisely because of its connection to a
sexed body, it is impossible for God to put the wrong soul in the wrong body. 186 In particular,
Bedford and Eberl are concerned about the individuation and sex of the soul during the time after
death—when the soul is separated from the body—and before the resurrection. 187 Although the
human person dies, they contend that the inseparable, accidental quality of sex that the body
confers on the soul abides. 188 By asserting that the sexing of the soul is not an essential
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characteristic of the soul, he successfully avoids Furton’s critique that God or some other entity
could mistakenly place the sexed soul in the wrong body.
In addition to arguing that the soul is sexed by the body, so-to-speak, they assert that
intersex conditions and disorders of sexual development do not pose issues regarding ontology,
but merely epistemology. 189 In other words, while intersex conditions may render it difficult for
one to determine one’s biological sex, it does not mean that one cannot determine which binary
sex one belongs to ontologically or biologically. In fact, as the first subsubsection in the previous
subsection demonstrates, genetic determination of biological sex does support such a view.
Consequently, the sexual body influences the human person and contributes to one’s
fulfillment. 190 In other words, every human person is a sexual human person, which also relates
to the human vocation of love. 191 For Grabowski, and John Paul II, human persons are unique
precisely because they are created in the image and likeness of God. In Mulieris Dignitatem,
John Paul II explains that having been endowed with a rational intellect and a free will, humans
have the capacity to love in their nature, which entails the capacity for relationship.192 They are
able to relate to God and one another. Humans relate to one another as a community of
persons.193 But the primary form of human relations is the communion of persons physically
manifest by the marital act, whereby husband and wife become one flesh.194 This is possible
precisely because of the physical differences between the sexes, which also manifests the
inherent complementarity and speaks to the longing for communion that every person
experiences. 195
Analogously, just as the eternal love between the Father and the Son engenders the
spiration of the Holy Spirit, so the communion of persons manifest in the marital act engenders
human life by giving rise to offspring. For this reason, marriage and the family constitute a
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primordial cell for larger communities. 196 Whenever a husband and a wife engender a child
through the marital act, they are cooperating in the sacred act of creation of a new human
person.197 While the mother and father contribute the biological seeds for creation, God creates
the human soul. 198
God does not create arbitrarily; rather each individual has a particular calling or vocation
that has eternal implications. Charity is the form of all vocations. 199 In other words, God calls
everyone to make a sincere gift of oneself for the sake of others. 200 This form of love is selfsacrificial, in that it considers the wellbeing of the other before oneself. It constitutes the agape
love, which Christ demonstrates by his death on the Cross. 201 While most are called to the
married life, some are called to a vocation of charity that entails celibacy. 202 Regardless, one’s
sexuality is foundational for forging one’s life of charity. Put another way, everyone lives out his
or her vocation through his or her sexuality. 203 In the married life this entails the marital act,
while in celibate vocations it does not.
While society focuses on conjugal relations as the ultimate expression of one’s sexuality,
for the Church, sexuality has a deeper meaning. John Paul II argues for a spousal meaning of the
body, which corresponds to the masculinity and femininity of the human person. 204 Insofar as
sexuality characterizes the human person it also forms how one lives out one’s vocation to
Christian charity. 205 Every man has a vocation to fatherhood, while every woman has a vocation
to motherhood. 206 This is not restricted to mere physical parenthood. 207 Indeed, some are called
to spiritual fatherhood or motherhood, as is the case with priests and religious. 208 Essentially, a
woman’s femininity shapes how she loves just as a man’s masculinity shapes how he loves.
This subsection demonstrates the incompatibility of the ideology of gender, which
underlies arguments in favor of sex reassignment therapies, on the basis of three categories:
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medical, philosophical, and theological. The following subsection considers sex reassignment
surgery in light of the Principle of Totality and Double Effect.
iii. Totality and Double Effect
This subsection shows that the Principle of Totality and the Principle of Double Effect do
not justify sex reassignment surgery in patients with gender dysphoria, especially in light of the
above-discussed implications for anthropology.
a. The Principle of Totality and Integrity
In general, respect for the human person precludes the mutilation of one’s body.
Whenever something causes harm to even the smallest part of one’s body, it harms the whole
person. Theologians argue that the human body belongs to God. As such, no one is
unequivocally free to harm oneself or another. However, circumstances arise when it is
necessary to perform operations that harm the body but benefits the whole person. The Principle
of Totality and Integrity justifies such acts.209 The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, insists that everyone has a
right and duty to protect and preserve the body and its functional integrity; however, one may
sacrifice the latter to maintain the health or life of the person, if no other permissible means
exists.210 The following constitutes an articulation of the Principle of Totality as Aquinas and
Pius XII articulate it and theologians apply it to sex reassignment surgery.
In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas addresses circumstances that may warrant maiming
the body.211 He argues that removing a healthy member of a person’s body does harm to the
whole person, and therefore, is unlawful. 212 However, one may lawfully remove a diseased body
part, if doing so benefits the whole person. 213 This line of reasoning justifies the amputation of
diseased limbs. This constitutes a rudimentary form of the Principle of Totality.
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In 1735, Claudius Amyand performed the first successful appendectomy on an 11-yearold boy.214 While Aquinas’s articulation justifies the removal of diseased limbs or organs, it does
not yet address circumstances whereby one may need to surgically damage healthy tissue to get
to and extract diseased organs or remove healthy organs that exacerbate medical conditions. Pius
XII develops the Principle of Totality in an “Address to the Delegates at the 26 th Congress of
Urology,” that covers such circumstances. 215 Although it renders the patient sterile, Pius XII
argues that one may remove a prostate cancer-sufferer’s testicles (bilateral orchiectomy), since
male hormones—that the testicles produce—speed the growth of prostate cancer. 216
He offers three conditions that must be met to justify the removal of a healthy organ that
exacerbates another condition. 217 First, the continuing function of the organ in question must
cause serious damage or constitute a threat. 218 Second, the only way to avoid this damage or
threat is to mutilate (remove) this organ, and that the effectiveness of doing so it well assured. 219
Finally, the positive effect of removing the organ must outweigh any negative effects. 220
Becket Gremmels argues in “Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Catholic Moral
Tradition: Insight from Pope Pius XII on the Principle of Totality,” that one struggling with
gender dysphoria may meet the three criteria for the Principle of Totality and Integrity that Pius
XII proposes to justify sex reassignment surgery. 221 First, he acknowledges that theologians
traditionally argue against sex reassignment surgery because it renders the patient sterile. 222
Gremmels insists that for one struggling with gender dysphoria, his or her genitalia contribute to
and exacerbate gender dysphoria, thereby meeting the first criteria and the first part of the second
criteria.223 However, Gremmels is unsure if sex reassignment surgery meets the second criteria—
well-assured effectiveness—and the third criterion. 224
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Gremmels argues that although the Principle of Totality normally refers to parts of the
body for the sake of the whole, one may envision sacrificing body parts for the sake of other
parts of the person. 225 To explain, he introduces a Cartesian, dualistic understanding of the
human person. 226 In “The Principle of Totality Does Not Justify Sex Reassignment Surgery,” I
explain the incongruence between the Cartesian, dualistic understanding of the human person
and the integral understanding of the human person as body-soul unity.227 Similarly, John F.
Brehany, in “Pope Pius XII and Justifications for Sex Reassignment Surgery,” indicates that the
first criteria could never be met since a real disjunction between the body and the soul cannot
exist.228
Brehany insists that Natural Law limits the scope of application for the Principle of
Totality.229 He refers to a previous statement by Pius XII regarding immanent teleology of
human nature and a hierarchy of values, which he argues contextualizes and limits the use of the
Principle of Totality. 230 Brehany observes that Pius XII offers two instances that fail to respect
the hierarchy and teleology due to Natural Law: one, destroying one’s freedom to relieve a
psychological disorder, and two, “overcoming sexual repression through immoral behavior,”
both of which sex reassignment surgery attempts to do.231 E. Christian Brugger, in “Catholic
Hospitals and Sex Reassignment Surgery: A Reply to Bayley and Gremmels,” argues that this
same statement by Pius XII places a duty upon health care workers to affirm each person in the
sex that nature determines. 232 Finally, Brehany understands Pius XII’s third criterion for the
Principle of Totality to only apply in circumstances that constitute life and death, which gender
dysphoria does not include. 233
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b. The Principle of Double Effect
Carol Bayley, in “Transgender Persons and Catholic Healthcare,” argues that the
Principle of Double Effect justifies the use of sex reassignment surgery in persons with gender
dysphoria.234 This subsubsection articulates the Principle of Double Effect and demonstrates
how in the context of Catholic anthropology sex reassignment surgery is not morally permissible.
First, I elucidate the Principle of Double Effect. Second, I summarize Bayley’s argument. Third,
I pinpoint the Moral Object of the Act for sex reassignment surgery.
Like the Principle of Totality, Aquinas is the first to introduce Double-Effect Reasoning
in the Summa Theologica.235 In response to the question of killing in self-defense, Aquinas
observes that some actions have a good and a bad effect, one intended and the other
unintended.236 For example, in self-defense, one may intend to save one’s life by an action that
has an unintended effect of killing an assailant. 237 Self-defense, however, is not a veil for an
immoral intention. Aquinas agrees with Augustine that one should never intend to kill another
person, even for a good ulterior motive—saving one’s life. 238 Consequently, Aquinas insists that
one’s defensive act must be proportionate to the assailant’s attack. 239
T. A. Cavanaugh, in Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil, offers a
contemporary formulation of the Principle of Double Effect. 240 First, the act in question must be
good in itself, or at least indifferent. 241 In other words, the Moral Object must be good or neutral.
Second, the agent must intend the good effect, and not the bad effect. 242 In Thomistic terms, the
bad effect must be praeter intentionem—beside the good effect. 243 Cavanaugh argues that
foreseen is the best way to describe the will’s relationship to the bad effect. 244
Third, the bad effect must not cause the good effect. 245 This third criterion arises from a
casuistic approach to ethics, that is, a third-person approach. 246 During the manualist period of
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ethics, that is, when instructors taught ethics from manuals, ethicists focus on the perspective of
the outside observer, as opposed to the first-person perspective. 247 From the perspective of the
acting person one may reword this third criterion as no good end justifies an evil means (Moral
Object).248 Fourth, there must be a proportionately grave reason for performing the act with such
a negative consequence. 249 This corresponds to Aquinas’s concept of using proportionate means
to repel an attack, for instance. 250 One corollary to the fourth criterion is that no legitimate
alternative may exist. 251
Bayley argues that one may justify sex reassignment surgery for patients presenting with
gender dysphoria. First, in accord with the first criterion of Double Effect, she insists that sex
reassignment surgery is morally neutral. 252 Second, Bayley asserts that the good effect is that the
inside experience matches the outside of the person. 253 The sterilization does not cause the good
effect, but merely constitutes an unintended, yet foreseen consequence of correcting a birth
defect.254 Although not stated explicitly, presumably sex reassignment surgery is not only
proportionate to the pathology, but the only legitimate alternative.
Bayley’s line of reasoning contends that transgenderism is analogous to disorders of
sexual development. 255 She holds that hormonal delivery and brain structure influence gender
dysphoria.256 Consequently, since physicians are willing to utilize the whole gamut of procedures
to correct anomalies associated with mastectomies or so-called bottom correcting surgeries on
patients recovering from cancer or disorders of sexual development, respectively, then they
ought to perform them on patients with the pathology of gender dysphoria. 257The problem with
this line of reasoning lies in the faulty anthropology, which Bayley utilizes to formulate her
argument. Bedford and Eberl argue that there is an essential difference between procedures that
treat disorders of sexual development and sex reassignment surgery, which reflects an
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anthropological difference. 258 Accordingly, disorders of sexual development do not challenge the
binary sexual complementarity, but only make sense in the context of such a binary milieu. 259
As the above section demonstrates, advocates for sex reassignment surgery hold three
anthropological positions that are contrary to Catholic anthropology: Cartesian dualism,
materialistic determinism, and existential voluntarism. Bayley, holds that the internal sex of the
person may differ from one’s natal sex. 260 Bedford and Eberl refer to this as the subconscious sex
or the sex of the mind. 261 Cartesian dualism is inherent in this position, because it presumes a
dichotomous relationship between one’s internal experience and the external body. In addition,
advocates hold the mutually exclusive positions that culture and society construct gender and
that biology determines it. 262 Presumably, if biology determines the subconscious sex of the
mind, then the transgender experience merely constitutes a birth defect that one ought to correct
with sex reassignment surgery. 263 Contrarywise, if gender is merely constitutive of social or
cultural construction, then it does not depend on biology at all; rather, one is free to change one’s
biology to accord with one’s socially-constructed subconscious sex, which reflects existential
voluntarism. As the above demonstrates, advocates of gender ideology use both arguments to
justify sex reassignment surgery. Both contradictory positions cannot be correct; however, both
can be wrong.
Bayley intimates that sex reassignment surgery is no different than a surgical procedure
in patients with disorders of sexual development and therefore, the act itself is neutral. 264 The
action itself refers to the Moral Object, which constitutes one of the three criteria that determine
the morality of the act according to the Catechism of the Catholic Church: object, end, and
circumstances. 265 For Beford and Eberl, the difference between therapies to treat disorders of
sexual development and sex reassignment surgery not only reflects a difference in anthropology,
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but also a difference in the Moral Object. 266 The following elucidates the Moral Object, in
general, and in particular, for sex reassignment surgery.
For Aquinas, all actions have ends. 267 Properly speaking, human actions proceed from a
deliberate will, that is, reason configures an action such that the will chooses it as a good end. 268
What is last on the order of execution is first on the order of intention; therefore, actions begin
with intention. 269 In other words, whenever one sets out to do something, one has a purpose in
mind for doing it. The purpose is what Aquinas identifies as the intention or end of the act—the
second of the three above-mentioned criteria that determine the morality of an act. 270
In contrast, the Moral Object constitutes a means chosen for an end, which constitutes an
action.271 Insofar as the Moral Object is an action, which the will chooses and executes, Aquinas
distinguishes between the internal and external act; the former concerns intention/end, while the
latter concerns choice/Moral Object. 272 Concerning the exterior act, Aquinas insists that materia
circa quam identifies the Moral Object which reason configures and presents to the will as an
object of choice. 273 The external act, materia ex qua, on the other hand, identifies the physical act
itself, devoid of intention. 274 Because the Moral Object has intentional content, Aquinas uses
proximate end to distinguish the Moral Object from the ulterior end. 275
Ethicists get into trouble when they equate the Moral Object with either the physical act
devoid of intentional content, that is, the external act materia ex qua, or when they equate it with
the intention, that is, the purpose of the act. Both tendencies occur when one approaches moral
decision making from a third-person perspective, rather than a first-person perspective.
Manualists, for example, tend to equate the Moral Object with merely the physical act itself. By
way of illustration, manualists define the sin of contraception as coitus interruptus.276
Conversely, proportionalists such as Peter Knauer, equate the Moral Object with intention. 277
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Knauer establishes proportionalism in opposition to the manualists, but he retains the
physicalistic methodology, defining moral evil as the causing of evil in the world.278 Both
commit the Naturalistic Fallacy. They assume that the moral order derives from the natural
order.279 To avoid this ethical pitfall, one must maintain the first-person perspective of ethics, not
defining moral evil in purely physical terms. Consequently, Gremmels moral intuition is correct
to reject an ethical objection against sex reassignment surgery merely because it results in the
physical condition of sterilization. 280
In accord with the above-mentioned philosophical theories, Bedford and Eberl determine
that the immediate (or proximate) end, that is, the Moral Object in question, sex reassignment
surgery for patients experiencing gender dysphoria is bodily or personal integration. 281 Insofar as
Catholic theological anthropology denies such a dualistic understanding of the body-soul
composite of the human person, such a presumptive Moral Object is immoral. 282 At the same
time, they reject a reductive materialistic concept that presumes a divide between the sex of the
mind and the sex of the body.283
Therefore, strictly speaking, sex reassignment surgery is not immoral because of the
physical consequence of sterility which it unequivocally induces, but because it presumes to
correct a problem that cannot exist—an internal sexual identity that diverges from one’s socalled external sex. Of course, as Brugger suggests, such a line of reasoning not only calls into
question sex reassignment surgery, but any therapies that collude with the patient in such a way
that one presumes to alter another’s biological sex so as to accord with one’s internal gender. 284
In a culture where action—especially physical intervention—seems to outweigh apparent
inactivity, the appropriate response to gender dysphoria is accompaniment, which the Ethicists of
The National Catholic Bioethics Center advise. 285 By accompanying individuals suffering with
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gender dysphoria one not only avoids causing irreparable harm, but also aides them in achieving
authentic human flourishing.
This section reveals that a Thomistic understanding of the Moral Object steeped in the
context of Catholic anthropology, prohibits an argument in favor of sex reassignment surgery for
patients presenting with gender dysphoria either with recourse to either the Principle of Totality
or Double Effect. The following section examines the use of contraceptives for noncontraceptive benefits.
6B. Non-Contraceptive Benefits of Contraceptives
This section analyzes the clinical mechanism of several contraceptive methods focusing
on intrauterine devices and implants, because of the complexity of their physiological
mechanism of action and the longevity of their use. Second, I articulate a Thomistic
understanding of the Moral Object so as to distinguish utilizing a contraceptive medication as a
contraceptive versus using it for its non-contraceptive benefits. Third, in light of the negative
side effects, including potential abortifacient activity, I use the Principle of Double Effect to
further analyze and justify the potential use of contraceptive medications for non-contraceptive
benefits.
i. Clinical Analysis
This subsection analyzes the clinical use of intrauterine devices as a contraceptive. Then,
it explores the use of implants as contraceptives. Finally, it considers the non-contraceptive
benefits of both.
a. Intrauterine Devices as a Contraceptive
According to Marc A. Fritz and Leon Speroff, historically, the first intrauterine devices
are stem pessaries, that is, small button-like structures with stems that cover the opening of the
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cervix.286 Carl Hollweg is the first physician to patent such a device, which he originally
intended to support the uterus, not, however, to act as a contraceptive. 287 According to Lazar
Margulies in “History of Intrauterine Devices,” Richard Richter is the first physician to patent an
intrauterine device as a contraceptive, utilizing silkworm, catgut, and a wire that extends through
the cervix.288 Karl Pust replaces the wire with a catgut string. 289 In the late 1920s, Ernest
Graefenberg experiments with metallic rings of various alloys of gold, silver, copper, nickel, and
zinc.290 Great Britain, Canada, and Australia use these early intrauterine devices, while the
United States and continental Europe largely reject them because of high rates of expulsion and
infection.291
In 1960, Margulies develops the first plastic intrauterine device called Margulies Coil. 292
The turgid plastic tail proves precarious for sexual partners. In response, Jack Lippes offers the
first intrauterine device with a filament thread at the first international conference on intrauterine
devices in 1962.293 In subsequent years entrepreneurs develop alternate devises, which lead to
wide utilization during the 1960s and 1970s. However, the Dalkon Shield proves dangerous
because its multifilament plastic-covered tail transmits bacteria giving rise to many cases of
pelvic inflammatory disease. 294 Subsequent lawsuits and negative publicity—from the lawsuits
and allegations that intrauterine devices cause infertility—lead to a bad rap for all intrauterine
devices and their use diminishes during the 1980s and 1990s. 295 In 2009, only 2% of women who
use contraceptives in the United States choose an intrauterine device. 296
In the late 1960s, Jaime A. Zipper and Howard J. Tatum develop the first intrauterine
device that uses copper. 297 Although there is no consensus, Fritz and Speroff hold that copper
prevents implantation of a fertilized ovum. 298 Daniel R. Mishell in “Intrauterine Devices,” argues
that copper-bearing intrauterine devices disrupt the ability of sperm to survive and move into the
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fallopian tubes. 299 Mishell holds that the low number of ectopic pregnancies indicates that
fertilization rarely occurs. 300 The ESHRE Capri Workshop Group in “Intrauterine Devices and
Intrauterine Systems,” argues that since insertion of a copper intrauterine device in early luteal
phase is highly effective as an emergency contraceptive, it must perform some post-fertilization
action, producing an embryotoxic environment. 301 In the United States, TCu-380A, also called
ParaGard represents the copper intrauterine device still in use today. 302 While it is only approved
to prevent pregnancy for 10 years, wearing it for 20 years carries a small risk for pregnancy. 303
The levonorgestrel-releasing intrauterine system, marketed as Mirena ® and manufactured
by Schering-Oy,304 has been available in Europe since 1990 and the United States since 2000.305
This device prevents pregnancy for at least 5 years by releasing 20μg of levonorgestrel per day,
in the first year, and 11μg by the end of the fifth year. 306 Similar to copper intrauterine devices, it
induces an immunological response as a foreign body causing the endometrium to release
leukocytes and prostaglandins. 307 In addition, the levonorgestrel thickens the cervical mucus
preventing the transport of sperm through the cervical canal. 308 As Mishell, indicates both copper
intrauterine devices and levonorgestrel-releasing intrauterine systems induce an inflammatory
response, which causes leukocytes to phagocytize the sperm. 309 In addition, levonorgestrelreleasing intrauterine systems act as abortifacients by thinning the endometrium, preventing
implantation should fertilization occur. 310
b. Long-Acting Contraceptives
There are two unique, long-acting contraceptives available for market in the United
States: implants and depot-medroxyprogesterone (Depo-Provera). 311 As with intrauterine
devices, the advantage for long-acting contraceptives is that they do not require a high degree of
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user compliance in order to get a high degree of contraceptive efficiency. This subsubsection
discusses the history and mechanism of these two contraceptives.
The Population Council develops the first implant, which they market as Norplant and
receives approval for use in Finland in 1983.312 The United States Food and Drug Administration
approves it for use in the US in 1991; however, because of profit and liability disputes, the
United States market withdrawals it in 2002.313 Norplant consists of six small capsules
containing levonorgestrel, which leaches 39μg into the body per day elevating plasma
progesterone levels providing at least five years of pregnancy prevention.314 Norplant’s primary
mechanism of action is anovulation. 315 In addition, the elevated levels of progesterone impair
sperm ascent to the fallopian tubes. 316 It also appears to inhibit endometrial development, thereby
preventing implantation, should fertilization occur. 317 However, Sheldon et al. argue that it is
very unlikely that fertilization occurs, since they did not observe elevations in human chorionic
gonadotropin, which the trophoblast produces in order to maintain the function of the corpus
luteum, for which survival of the pregnancy depends. 318
There are two United States Food and Drug Administration-approved contraceptive
implants in the United States: Implanon and Jadelle. 319 The United States Food and Drug
Administration approves Organon-manufactured Implanon in July 18, 2006.320 Implanon is an
etonogestrel 65mg single-rod implant that a physician implants under skin of the woman’s
underarm.321 It constitutes a slow-release progestin that last for at least three years. 322 Note that
progestin refers to synthetic progesterone analogues. 323 Jadelle, United States Food and Drug
Administration-approved in 1996, similar to Implanon, consists of two thin rods each containing
75mg of levonorgestrel, wrapped in steroid-permeable silastic tubing. 324 Fritz and Speroff say
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that implants are a good method of contraceptive for women of reproductive age that are
sexually active and want to stave off pregnancy for 2 to 3 years. 325
There are three primary mechanisms for implants. First, progestin suppresses luteinizing
hormone at both the pituitary and hypothalamus, which is necessary to induce ovulation. 326 In
some women ovulation does occur toward the end of five years, but the luteal is insufficient. 327
In addition, progestin affects cervical mucus causing it to thicken and decrease, which inhibits
sperm penetration. 328 Finally, progestin suppresses the estradiol-induced cyclic maturation of the
endometrium. 329 Consequently, if fertilization does occur—of which there is no evidence—
implantation will not ensue. 330
The last contraceptive to consider is depot-methroxyprogesterone acetate marketed as
Depo-Provera. Historically, Searle and Upjohn simultaneously discover depotmethroxyprogesterone acetate in 1956.331 The United States Food and Drug Administration first
approves Upjohn’s medroxyprogesterone acetate, the active ingredient in Depo-Provera, in 1959
to treat amenorrhea—the absence of menstruation—irregular uterine bleeding and
miscarriages.332 In 1960, the United States Food and Drug Administration approves DepoProvera to treat endometriosis—the growth of endometrial tissue outside the uterus. 333 In 1974,
the United States Food and Drug Administration rescinds its approval of Depo-Provera for
treating miscarriages and endometriosis. 334 In 1972, the United States Food and Drug
Administration approves it for treating inoperable and metastatic endometrial and renal cancer. 335
Although the United States Food and Drug Administration notes the effectiveness of 150mg
injections at preventing pregnancy, it repetitively questions its safety because of two long-term
animal studies in which beagles develop breast cancer and monkeys develop endometrial
cancer.336 In Contraceptive Risk: The FDA, Depo-Provera, and The Politics of Experimental
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Medicine, William Green follows, in detail, the chronological development of the United States
Food and Drug Administration’s eventual approval of Depo-Provera in 1992.337
The current prescribed dosage remains a 150mg injection every three months. 338 The
mechanism is slightly different from the abovementioned implants insofar as the progestin level
are high enough to completely block luteinizing hormone surges, thereby completely preventing
ovulation.339 In addition, the cervical mucus thickens and the endometrium changes. 340 Depotmethroxyprogesterone acetate does not inhibit follicular stimulating hormone, so follicular
growth continues, consequently, estrogen levels remain normal. 341
c. Non-Contraceptive Benefits of Contraceptives
Each of the abovementioned contraceptive methods has both positive and negative side
effects. Some argue that the negative side effects suffice for a wholesale rejection of these
methods for any beneficial use. This subsubsection highlights the clinical side effects of each of
the abovementioned methods, focusing especially on the positive. In particular, it focuses on the
use of these medications to treat amenorrhea and pain associated with endometriosis.
In his medical glossary in Contraceptive Risk: The FDA, Depo-Provera, and the Politics
of Experimental Medicine, William Green defines endometriosis as a painful condition in which
the tissue that lines the inside of the uterus grows outside of it. 342 Like ordinary endometrial
tissue, it thickens, breaks down, and bleeds with each menstrual cycle; with nowhere to go, it
irritates surrounding tissue and eventually gives rise to cysts. 343 Although there is no generally
accepted explanation for the pathogenesis of endometriosis there are several working theories.
John Sampson, the first gynecologist to use the term to describe cysts associated with
endometriosis, 344 develops the first theory to explain its pathogenesis called retrograde
menstruation and implantation. 345 Essentially, he argues that during menstruation endometrial
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tissue transfers through the Fallopian tubes into the peritoneal cavity, where it implants on pelvic
organs.346 The coelomic metaplasia theory holds that coelomic epithelial cells in the peritoneum
and the pleura that differentiate into mesothelial cells experience spontaneous metaplastic
change.347 The induction theory holds that such change occurs because of exposure to menstrual
effluent.348 Although other theories exist, these constitute the most obvious explanations.
Immunologically, ectopic endometrial cells in women with endometriosis are less
vulnerable to macrophages-mediated immune surveillance and clearance. 349 In addition,
endometrial cells are resistant to apoptosis—gene-regulated programed cell death. 350 Estrogen
overproduction occurs in endometriotic—ectopic endometrial cells—stromal cells—cells
pertaining to connective tissue—because of the presence of steroidogenic factor 1, which
combines to induce the expression of steroidogenic acute regulatory protein and CYP19A1. 351
Women with endometriosis also seem to have resistance to progesterone, 352 which may be
attributable to progesterone receptor deficiency in endometrial and endometriotic stromal
cells.353 Progesterone activates the retinoic acid pathway in normal endometrial stromal cells,
which gives rise to differentiation and apoptosis. 354
Treatment for endometriosis depends largely on the extent of the disease and severity of
symptoms.355 Physicians treat more severe cases with surgery. 356 Medical treatment consists of
estrogen-progestin contraceptives, progestin, gonadotropin-releasing hormone agonists, danazol,
and aromatase inhibitors. 357 All of these treatments inhibit fertility insofar as they prevent
ovulation.358 Estrogen-progestin contraceptives mimic the hormonal environment of pregnancy
and may improve apoptosis in eutopic endometrial tissue. 359 At the same time, estrogen has been
shown to activate endometrial growth, exacerbating the condition and symptoms. 360 Moreover,
the withdrawal of estrogen reverses endometrial cell viability.361 Joon Song holds that estrogen
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acts as a survival factor inhibiting apoptosis. 362 Progesterone, on the other hand, induces
apoptosis.363 Hence many physicians find progestin-releasing contraceptives particularly
effective for treating endometriosis, which includes all of the methods in the first
subsubsection. 364 Unfortunately, in women with endometriosis, the endometrial and
endometriotic cells are more sensitive to estrogen and resistant to progesterone, limiting the
effectiveness of progestin-releasing contraceptives for treating endometriosis and its
symptoms.365
Gonadotropin-releasing hormone agonists induce pseudomenopause preventing the
ovaries from receiving gonadotropin stimulation, thereby depriving the body of estrogen support
and inducing amenorrhea—the absence of menstruation, which prevents further seeding in the
peritoneal.366 Unfortunately, gonadotropin-releasing hormone causes significant decrease in bone
density in patients with endometriosis. 367 Danazol, the first drug United States Food and Drug
Administration approved specifically to treat endometriosis prevents the luteinizing hormone
surge; therefore, inducing a state of indefinite anovulation. 368 Unfortunately, the many
androgenic and hypoestrogenic side effects limit its utility. 369 Finally, Aromatase inhibitors have
had very limited outcomes, but warrant further research, especially in combination with other
medications. 370
Another common condition that affects women is abnormal uterine bleeding sometimes
called menorrhagia, which may be associated with any number of underlying conditions
including: pregnancy, anovulation, uterine pathology, or coagulopathies. 371 Bleeding is common
with menses, that is, menstruation, which is part of the normal ovarian cycle. During the
follicular phase, estrogen levels rise in an exponential fashion causing the functional layer of the
endometrium to grow. 372 After ovulation—the release of a mature ovum—the remaining corpus
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luteum continues to produce estrogen, but also begins producing progesterone. 373 Both hormones
rise with the maturation of the corpus luteum, causing further development of the endometrium
in anticipation of implantation should fertilization occur.
If fertilization does not occur, then the corpus luteum spontaneously dies in apoptosis,
causing levels of both estrogen and progesterone to fall. 374 The steady decrease in these
hormones induces an inflammatory response, whereby lysosomes release enzymes into the
cytoplasm of epithelial, stromal, and endothelial cells of the endometrium and the intercellular
spaces, which, in turn, digest these cells and their constituents. 375 The enzymatic activity on the
endometrium eventually reaches the subsurface capillaries and veins causing interstitial
hemorrhaging, the components of which escape into the endometrial cavity. 376 Vasoconstrictors
halt menstrual bleeding in the exposed spiral arterioles of the basal layer endometrium. 377 Once
re-epithelialization concludes bleeding halts completely. 378
Since the presence or absence of estrogen and progesterone has such an important role in
regulating menstruation, these hormones are also instrumental in helping to reduce bleeding in
women with heavy bleeding during menses. At the same time, the exogenous addition or
subtraction of estrogen and progesterone (or progestin) can cause breakthrough bleeding—
bleeding before menses—or estrogen/progestogen withdrawal bleeding—primarily due to the
disproportionate presence of these hormones. 379 In spite of this risk, estrogen-progestin
contraceptive and levonorgestrel-releasing intrauterine system are common medicinal treatments
for heavy menstrual bleeding, since the progestin, the dominant hormone, inhibits menses. 380
In addition, these medications are effective at preventing anovulatory bleeding.
Anovulation amounts to a perpetual state of follicular phase, since ovulation does not occur. 381
Consequently, the body only releases estrogen, which causes the endometrium to grow without
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the limiting effect of progesterone. The endometrium lacks sufficient stromal support cells
giving rise to focal breakdowns that bleed. 382 For women with anovulatory bleeding, the addition
of exogenous progestin restores the natural mechanism whereby the endometrium sheds through
regular menses. 383
This subsection demonstrates that the physiological mechanisms of contraceptives have
positive effects on endometriosis and heavy bleeding. The following subsection delineates the
Moral Object of using contraceptives for non-contraceptive benefits.
ii. Object
This subsection analyzes the development of the Catholic Church’s teaching concerning
the use of contraceptives as a means of birth control, especially focusing on identifying its Moral
Object. Then, it identifies the Moral Object of utilizing the abovementioned contraceptive
methods for their non-contraceptive benefits.
a. Contraception, Casti Cannubii, and the Manualist
In Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists,
John T. Noonan, Jr. meticulously follows the precarious relationship between the Catholic
Church and contraception. 384 Noonan correlates the sharp decline in birth rate in Catholic France
during the nineteenth century to the increased use of contraception. 385 He attributes the
acceptability of contraception to the rationalist malaise that sets in after the Revolution. 386 In
direct opposition to Catholic teaching, the anti-clerical French embrace the individualistic and
radical ideals of rationalism, which instigates the Revolution. Consequently, they embrace the
concept that the human body is merely a machine, the parts of which one may manipulate to
achieve one’s ends. 387 Noonan adds that the prospect of economic success also motivates the
French working class to diminish their obligations, by reducing the number of progeny.388
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Noonan concludes that the initial motivation for the spread of contraception is irreligious,
calculating, and egoistic. 389
Noonan stresses that moral theology was at a nadir during the nineteenth century,
essentially amounting to seminary courses based on manuals, such as Jean Pierre Gury’s
Compendium of Moral Theology.390 In contrast to the rigidity of French Jansenism, Alphonsus
Liguori’s approach is more tolerant and guides Rome’s initial response to contraceptive acts,
which until the 1900s is indistinguishable from onanism or coitus interruptus.391 During the
second half of the nineteenth century, the use of contraception spreads as a social reform and
gains acceptance from medical, scientific, and religious authorities. 392 At the Lambeth
Conference of 1930, Anglican bishops adopt a resolution that permits couples to use
contraceptive methods where they deem it morally expedient to avoid pregnancy. 393
On December 31, 1930, Pope Pius XI responds with his encyclical Casti Connubii.394
Noonan describes this as an excellent distillation of past doctrinal statements. 395 After
recapitulating the goods of marriage according to the Augustinian triad—offspring, fidelity, and
sacrament396—Pius XI reaffirms the necessity of growth in chastity with recourse to God’s
grace; rather than, circumventing such efforts by means of biology. 397 Thus, Pius XI builds his
argument against contraception on two pillars: Natural Law and growth in chastity.
After enumerating several of the reasons couples give for avoiding children, Pius XI
argues that no reason justifies acts that are intrinsically contrary to nature, namely, anything
which frustrates the natural power for begetting children. 398 He, with recourse to Augustine and
Scripture—recalling Onan—solemnly defends the Catholic Church’s position that any frustration
of the natural power of matrimony to generate life not only offends God, but also nature. 399
Moreover, he chastises confessors who lead penitents into sin by approving of such acts, either
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by silence or in words. 400 For him, the chief obstacle to couples fulfilling the law of matrimony is
unbridled lust that one can only overcome by subjecting oneself to God. 401 Recourse to biology
and science to curb one’s carnal desires cannot establish chastity. 402 Pius XI recommends humble
reflection on the sound wisdom of Church teaching concerning marriage, a steadfast
determination of will to observe God’s sacred law, and recourse to the grace of the sacrament. 403
Until Paul VI publishes Humanae Vitae, Casti Cannubii constitutes the Church’s most
solemn pronouncement on contraception. 404 Much of the debate following Casti Cannubii
centers on the meaning of Natural Law, since this constitutes the foundation of Pius XI’s
philosophical objection. Pius XI focuses on physical acts that interfere with or frustrate the
generative potential of the marital act. At the same time, Pius XI’s words in Casti Cannubii
implicitly permit couples desiring to postpone or space children to reserve the marital act for
times of natural infertility, 405 even if this is not what he originally intends. 406 Of course, socalled rhythm methods lack the reliability of barrier methods at the time. Since so much of the
debate focuses on the physical frustration of the act, when birth control pills arise in the 1950s,
moral theologians lack unanimity in their response. In fact, one of the pioneer physicians
utilizing progesterone, John Rock, insists that it conforms well to the theological expectations of
Catholic morality. 407 In 1958, Louis Janssens writes “L’inhibition de l’ovulation, est-elle
moralement licite?,” in which he argues in favor of women taking progesterone to inhibit
ovulation.408 Progesterone appeals to Janssens because it only temporarily prevents ovulation and
does not kill any eggs. 409
For Thomas Petri, much of the opposition after Casti Cannubii centers on objections to
the methodology of moral theology, which overly focuses on physical action and strict obedience
to the law.410 These characteristics of the manualist approach, Petri, in accord with Servais
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Pinckaers,411 John Mahoney, 412 John A Gallagher, 413 and Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen
Toulmin,414 attributes more to the nominalism of William of Ockham, than to Thomas
Aquinas.415 Ockham’s nominalism begins with the denial that universal forms exist
independently of human reason. 416 Regarding morality, Ockham emphasizes freedom of
indifference over inclinations. 417 For him, freedom constitutes one’s ability to choose actions
without persuasion from inclinations. 418 Consequently, the sole cause of human action is selfdetermination.419 Moreover, just as no universal forms exist independently of the human mind,
so moral truths depend exclusively on divine command. 420 Hence, the morality of the manuals
emphasizes divine command and mere physical adherence to laws.
b. Proportionalistic Reformulation of the Moral Object
In turn, so-called proportionalists such as Louis Janssens attempt to retrieve the authentic
teaching of Aquinas to counter the impersonal and physicalistic inclinations of the manualist
tradition. In “Ontic Evil and Moral Evil,” Janssens attributes his distinction between ontic evil—
physical evil—and moral evil—the intending of physical evil in the world—to Aquinas. 421
According to Janssens’s interpretation of Aquinas, there is a distinction between the means and
the end of an action. The means corresponds to the external action or the material element of an
act.422 Alternatively, the end corresponds to the internal act of the will, which constitutes the
formal act.423 Just as Knauer uses his interpretation of Aquinas’s proportion criterion for Double
Effect to explain how a commensurate reason may justify one choosing a means that causes
physical evil in the world, 424 so Janssens argues that so long as the ends justify the means one
may indeed choose to cause ontic evil. 425
More precisely, the debita proportio must suffice to justify the means chosen. 426 Put
another way, Janssens argues that there must be no intrinsic contradiction between the means and
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the end.427 To illustrate, he uses the example of stealing. If one chooses to steal something from
another person as a means to affirming one’s right to ownership, the means do not justify the end
since one attempts to affirm the value of one’s own ownership at the cost of one’s neighbor’s
ownership.428 In this case, one is using a means that constituted as a value, contradicts the value
that one affirms as one’s end. Janssens applies this line of reasoning to responsible parenthood.
He argues that parents who know they do not have sufficient resources to raise more children sin
by engaging in the marital act during the fertile periods. 429 Therefore, insofar as both the socalled rhythm method and contraception do not obstruct conjugal love or responsible parenthood,
they constitute acceptable means of achieving responsible parenthood. 430
c. Keeping the Object of the Act in the Genus Naturae
For Rhonheimer and John Finnis, maintaining the distinction between the moral order
and the natural order is essential for any authentic ethical methodology and failure to do so
constitutes the Naturalistic Fallacy. 431 Hume first articulates the un-derivability of the moral
order from the natural order by asserting that one cannot derive ought-statements from isstatements.432 Put another way, there is an irreducible difference between practical and
speculative reason. For Aquinas, the same intellect acts by extension in practical knowing. 433
Although practical knowing of the self-evident principles of the Natural Law depends one first
knowing being speculatively, 434 contrary to what Ralph McInerny says in Aquinas on Human
Action: A Theory of Practice,435 this does not mean the former derives from the latter. Indeed,
the formulations of practical syllogisms versus speculative syllogisms demonstrate this.436
At the same time, this does not mean that one must sacrifice objectivity or universality in
Natural Law. 437 Finnis, in Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth, contends that
exceptionless moral norms do exist. 438 Ethicists call them intrinsically evil acts and formulate
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them as prohibitions. In Humanae Vitae, Pope Paul VI argues that contraception is an
intrinsically evil act. 439 An intrinsically evil act constitutes an act whose Moral Object is
immoral, that is, contrary to reason. 440 Intrinsically evil acts bear undue matter (indebitam
materiam).441 Unfortunately, as the above discussion demonstrates, manualism, under the
influence of nominalism, falls into the Naturalistic Fallacy insofar as it focuses on external
physical acts being in or out of conformity with the divine law, regardless of intent. John Paul II,
in Veritatis Splendor, insists that insofar as these acts are inherently contrary to reason, there is
no exception to their prohibition. 442 No amount of good intention or plight of circumstances
justifies one deliberately choosing such an act. Janssens, however, argues that intrinsically evil
acts do not exist; sufficient intention can justify any means. 443 While John Paul II’s argument
constitutes the traditional position of the Catholic Church against contraception, its methodology
is unique.
By refocusing the discussion of ethics on intention, proportionalists attempt to correct the
defective approach of the manualists; however, according to Rhonheimer, they fall victim to the
same Naturalistic Fallacy they rebuke. 444 Just as the manualists mistakenly identify the Moral
Object as the physical content of an act, so proportionalists do the same. For Knauer, as well as
Janssens, the Moral Object constitutes the causing of physical good or evil in the world. 445 In
method, this is no different than the manualist’s external conformity to divine law.
Janssens, Knauer, and Richard McCormick’s 446 Moral Object diverges from Aquinas.
Rhonheimer accuses McCormick of expanding the notion of the object by placing the sole source
of intentional content in the remote end. 447 Like McCormick, Janssens understands the external
act, which he and Aquinas equate with the Moral Object to be a material entity—completely
devoid of voluntariness. 448 In one respect this is true. For example, Janssens understands the act
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commanded by the will—the external act—to be the physical act. 449 This agrees with what
Aquinas says concerning the external act in On Evil.450
However, Aquinas also attributes intentional content to the external act, independent of
the remote end, what Rhonheimer calls intentional basic action. 451 Thus, the external act is part
of the moral order. 452 Regarding the will commanding (imperium) an act, Finnis insists that the
intellect constitutes the primary active faculty insofar as before one commands an action through
the will, one discerns and chooses a particular course of action as the means for achieving one’s
end.453 Moreover, insofar as one’s chosen means contain an intelligible content, they have an
aspect of an end, which is what Aquinas says multiple times regarding the Moral Object. 454
This, of course, is not to say that the will has nothing to do with commanding; rather, as
Rhonheimer says that the will commands an act that reason configures.455
In “‘Materia ex qua’ and ‘Materia circa quam’ in Aquinas,” Duarte Sousa-Lara shows
how Aquinas uses materia circa quam (matter concerning which) and materia ex qua (matter out
of which) to distinguish important elements of a human act. 456 Aquinas says that materia ex qua
is not the Moral Object, but materia circa quam is the Moral Object. 457 In “Aquinas on Interior
and Exterior Acts: Clarifying a Key Aspect of His Action Theory,” Sousa-Lara demonstrates that
Aquinas uses this distinction to differentiate when Aquinas is speaking of the external act
constitutive of the Moral Object versus the external act merely as the material, physical act
alone.458 Materia circa quam denotes the inherent voluntariness of the external act, which
constitutes it as the Moral Object (in the moral order). 459 Materia ex qua connotes the external
act prescinding from its voluntariness, thereby constituting it as part of the natural order. 460
Sousa-Lara illustrates the distinction between materia circa quam and materia ex qua
using the sexual act. 461 The physical act of sexual intercourse—whether it is adultery,
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fornication, or marital love—constitutes a single external act materia ex qua according to the
natural order. 462 In the moral order, the materia circa quam differs insofar as adultery and
fornication differ from marital love. 463 So, the materia circa quam corresponds to the Moral
Object in the moral order.
d. The Object of Contraception
In Humanae Vitae, Paul VI reaffirms the Church’s prohibition of contraceptive acts, that
is “any action which either before, at the moment of, or after sexual intercourse, is specifically
intended to prevent procreation.” 464 Contrary to the opinion of most critics, Rhonheimer insists
that Humanae Vitae is not merely a defense of Natural Law according to a naturalistic
understanding. 465 Rather, Paul VI’s argument conforms with a Thomistic articulation of Natural
Law that constitutes the Moral Object in the moral order, precisely because it places its
prohibition on the level of intention, not the physical or biological. 466 On the order of intention,
Rhonheimer defines the Moral Object of contraception. However, before doing so, he first
explains the principle that it violates and then situates it within the framework of virtue and vice.
Rhonheimer, in accord with Aquinas, and John Paul II in Veritatis Splendor, insists that
Natural Law is nothing but the light of reason aiding one in discernment of good and evil in
action.467 One derives statements of Natural Law through speculative reflection on natural reason
in action.468 Hence, ethicists often articulate the universal precepts of Natural Law as normative
statements such as “do good and avoid evil.” 469 However, the content of Natural Law is practical,
thus in concrete action it takes the form of a command or precept. 470 While Natural Law does not
constitute a law of nature, it nonetheless works within the metaphysical and physical confines of
nature, specifically human nature. 471 Consequently, Paul VI explains how contraception violates
the Inseparability Principle, which, in accord with human nature, holds that the unitive
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significance of the marital act is inseparable from its procreative significance. 472 However, the
violation of this principle does not suffice for an ethical argument against contraception. 473
Rhonheimer situates his definition of the Moral Object of contraception in the context of
virtue.474 First, he explains that the Moral Object of marital love consists of loving bodily union,
which as mutual self-giving is naturally open to procreation. 475 Insofar as marital love involves
self-donation, it presumes self-possession, which is constitutive of temperance regarding sexual
inclination, that is, chastity. 476 Indeed, for Paul VI, responsible parenthood is also an essential
component of marital love. 477 In fact, for Paul VI and Rhonheimer, procreative responsibility is a
means to growth in chastity, because it entails periodic continence, which is an expression of
love that maintains the inseparable connection between the procreative and unitive meaning. 478
Against the backdrop of this understanding of the Moral Object of the marital act in
reference to chastity, Rhonheimer explains that contraceptive acts eliminate the need to regulate
sexual behavior through periodic continence by dismantling its procreative potential. 479 It is a
choice against chastity, since one contracepts to avoid procreative responsibility, which
inherently entails the need for periodic continence. Consequently, Rhonheimer connects
contraceptive intention to the vice of lust, since it circumvents a couple’s means to growth in
chastity by eliminating the need for periodic continence.480 This formulation keeps Moral Object
on the level of intention and in the moral order.
e. The Object of Using Contraceptives for Non-Contraceptive Benefits
The above discussion demonstrates several key factors for determining the Moral Object.
First, the Moral Object is in the moral order, not the natural order. Consequently, one cannot
determine it merely by observing external, physical behavior. Just because a woman takes a
contraceptive pill or has an intrauterine device, does not necessarily mean that she intends to
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contracept. Without reducing the Moral Object to the remote end, one must enter the moral order
to determine it. As a proximate end, the Moral Object has intentional content, that is, an inherent
rationality that makes it a viable choice as a means to an end.
The above clinical analysis indicates that sufficient medical benefit exists to justify the
use of any of the abovementioned contraceptives solely for the purpose of their noncontraceptive benefits. Thus, just as one takes Tylenol or Advil for a headache, it is conceivable
to formulate a practical syllogism that involves one choosing a contraceptive method for its noncontraceptive benefit. 481 Accordingly, one may begin with the practical premise: “1) I want to
have good health.” Next, one may observe a theoretical truth that 2) “increasing progesterone
reduces bleeding for women with heavy bleeding during menses.” 482 Presuming that one
experiences heavy menstrual bleeding, one may conclude: “3) it is good for me to choose a
means to increase my exogenous progestin to reduce my bleeding.” One could make a similar
argument regarding the benefits of progestin for endometriosis.
This subsection identifies the Moral Object of using contraception for its non-contraceptive
benefits. The following subsection uses the Principle of Double Effect to further justify it.
iii. The Principle of Double Effect
Because of the negative side effects of the above-mentioned contraceptive methods—
especially sterilization, one must pursue further ethical analysis to determine its moral
permissibility. Simply determining that the Moral Object is licit does not necessarily justify its
use for non-contraceptive benefits. The Principle of Double Effect justifies acts with bad effects.
a. Thomistic Formulation of Double-Effect Reasoning
Aquinas, in the Summa Theologica, is the first to formulate criteria that eventually gives
rise to the Principle of Double Effect. 483 He devises these conditions concerning killing in self-
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defense. First, he observes that some actions have two effects, one good, and the other bad. 484
Moreover, one may not intend both effects. 485 For example, in self-defense, one may
unintentionally kill an assailant. 486 Here, there are two effects: self-protection and death of the
aggressor. One intends self-defense, not killing the assailant. Since one does not intend to kill the
attacker, it is praeter intentionem—beside the intention of the agent. 487
In contemporary formulations of Double Effect, the first two criteria concern intention.
Joseph T. Mangan, in “An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect,” says that the
first criterion is that the act itself must be good or indifferent. 488 For Edward Furton and Albert S.
Moraczewski in “Double Effect,” this first criterion excludes intrinsically evil acts, that is, any
act that has an immoral object. 489 The second criterion is that one must intend the good effect,
and not the bad. 490 While the first criterion addresses the proximate end, the second addresses the
ulterior end. Not only must the means chosen be good, but the purpose for choosing it must be
good as well.
Aquinas uses praeter intentionem to identify the unintended bad effect. 491 Cavanaugh,
explains that praeter intentionem conveys the notion of accidental in that it is outside the realm
of intention, even though one may foresee it. 492 Thus, knowing or foreseeing is not necessarily
intending. The defender may foresee that one’s act of self-defense will inexorably kill the
assailant. Similarly, a physician may foresee that removing a cancerous, gravid uterus results in
the death of the child. Foreseeing the invariable consequences does not change intention: selfdefense or the preservation of a mother’s life by removing a cancerous organ. Insofar as the bad
effect is praeter intentionem—foreseen, but unintended, it does not ethically preclude the act.
Aquinas does, however, introduce a proportionality criterion that may render an act
unjust.493 To illustrate, he insists that one ought not to use more force than necessary to ward off
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an assailant; otherwise, though one’s intention is good, the act may nonetheless be immoral. 494
Thus, in casuistic tradition, one must weigh the effects. 495 Regarding self-defense, one uses
deadly force only if the assailant attacks with deadly force. Concerning the removal of a
cancerous, gravid uterus, one weighs the life of the mother in relationship to the life of the child.
Under the influence of nominalism, manualists add a fourth physicalistic criterion: the
negative effect must not cause the good effect. 496 With due regard for the role of the Moral
Object as the proximate end, Furton and Moraczewski reword this criterion asserting that one
may not choose an evil means for a good end. 497 Put this way, one is just a restating the first
principle, that the Moral Object must be good. Arguably, this redundancy is why Aquinas does
not include it in his formulation of Double-Effect Reasoning.
b. Intention
Using the Principle of Double Effect as an instrument of ethical analysis, I further
elucidate intention concerning contraception for non-contraceptive benefits. Insofar as ethical
decision-making takes place from the perspective of the acting person, one must discern one’s
intention—as a proximate end and ulterior end—for using a contraceptive method. 498 In the
above analysis, I determine that the Moral Object of using contraceptive methods for noncontraceptive benefits is not immoral. Ethically, choosing to use a contraceptive method for its
contraceptive function is immoral according to its Moral Object—proximate end, because, as
Rhonheimer indicates, it not only violates the Inseparability Principle, but also constitutes a
choice to subvert one’s procreative responsibility to avoid periodic continence, a constitutive part
of responsible parenthood and a means for growth in chastity, which as a virtue concerns marital
love.499 Insofar as the Moral Object of contraception constitutes an intrinsically evil act, one
must not vacillate. For example, one should not say, “I take progestin for heavy menstrual
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bleeding, but I also like the contraceptive benefits.” In such a case, one clearly intends both,
regarding the proximate end.
Concerning the second criterion, one’s intention as ulterior end of avoiding pregnancy
may be bad or good. 500 A couple may exclude or limit the number of children for selfish reasons,
such as to have a luxurious lifestyle. Alternatively, for ethically sound reasons, a couple may
discern that they cannot afford to have more children or that pregnancy is too risky for the
mother.501 Even so, the Inseparability Principle demands that couples remain open to the
possibility of transmitting life in the marital act, which one can do by observing periodic
abstinence.502 Rhonheimer explains that periodic continence constitutes a form of birth control
that remains open to the procreative significance of the marital act, even though one avoids its
procreative function. 503 What separates this from a contraceptive act, however, is intention; thus
it is not merely a physical difference. 504 The use of a contraceptive method includes the intention
to render procreation impossible. 505 The above demonstrates the immorality of such an act
chosen as a proximate end, but one’s ulterior end also configures the morality of the act. Thus,
one must also have a good intention, as ulterior motive.
c. Proportionality and Abortifacient Risk
Next, one must use the proportionality criterion to weigh the non-contraceptive benefits
against the negative contraceptive effect. In Difficult Moral Questions, Germain Grisez provides
circumstances under which a physician may prescribe contraceptives for therapeutic reasons. 506
First, he highlights that for women who are sterile or fertile, but not engaging in the marital act,
prescribing a contraceptive for non-contraceptive benefits is no more controversial, ethically,
than prescribing any other medication. 507 For fertile women engaging in the marital act, Grisez’s
primary concern is the possible unfairness to an embryonic individual, should fertilization occur
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after an unlikely breakthrough ovulation and the method acts as an abortifacient by preventing
implantation.508
Mark Yavarone in “Do Anovulants and IUDs Kill Early Human Embryos?: A Question
of Conscience,” indicates that part of the ambiguity of classifying a drug’s effect as an
abortifacient depends on the divergent definition of pregnancy, which some argue only occurs
after implantation. 509 If true, Yavarone’s statistics concerning the number of unintended
intrauterine device or oral contraceptive-induced abortions is alarming.510 In light of the
abortifacient properties of contraceptive methods, Grisez insists that one must have significant
benefit to outweigh the possible risk to a third person embryo. 511
To remedy this, Grisez suggests that women who can estimate breakthrough ovulation
could practice periodic abstinence to minimize the risk of an unintended abortion. 512 At the same
time, Grisez advises physicians not to prescribe contraceptive for non-contraceptive benefits, if
withholding it does not constitute malpractice by omission. 513 He even recommends surgery over
using a contraceptive. 514 This, however, is problematic because it may mean forgoing medically
indicated treatment or choosing a more invasive procedure over a more conservative option.
Ethically, this violates the principle of beneficence and non-maleficence. 515 If one does not
inform the patient this violates respect for autonomy as a form of paternalism. 516
Regarding the question of levonorgestrel acting as an abortifacient, Edward J. Furton
observes that some authors, such as Ron Hamel, 517 have come to the conclusion that the debate is
settled and it does not act in such a way. 518 To the contrary, Furton indicates that it is not a
settled question; evidence points in both directions. 519 Thus, he cautiously counsels health care
workers to follow Marie T. Hilliard’s recommendation to perform a blood test checking for the
luteinizing hormone surge, which accompanies ovulation, before administering levonorgestrel as
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an emergency contraceptive. 520 According to Hilliard and Furton, only then does one have moral
certitude—as opposed to absolute certitude—that fertilization will not occur and that the
contraceptive does not act as an abortifacient. 521 This stipulation concurs with the bishops’
directive regarding the administration of emergency contraceptive for rape victims, that
appropriate testing rule out conception and that it “not interfere with the implantation of a
fertilized ovum.” 522
In 2009, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith publish Instruction Dignitas
Personae on Certain Bioethical Questions, in which they insist that anyone—patient or
clinician—who “seeks to prevent the implantation of an embryo which may possibly have been
conceived and who therefore either requests or prescribes such a pharmaceutical, generally
intends abortion.” 523 Thus, Kathleen Mary Raviele in “Levonorgestrel in Cases of Rape: How
Does It Work?” objects to the use of contraceptive methods such as levonorgestrel that may act
as an abortifacient, preventing implantation, should conception occur. 524
While there are similarities, using an emergency contraception, as a contraceptive is not
the same as using contraception as a medication for non-contraceptive benefits. The difference
centers on intention. Giving contraception to a rape victim is an act of defense, against
conception. Following Hilliard and Furton’s advice, ensures with moral certitude that it is not a
defense against implantation. Although the external act materia ex qua is the same—taking
levonorgestrel—the external act differs regarding its materia circa quam, that is, its proximate
end. As an emergency contraceptive it constitutes an act of defense against conception; however,
once fertilization occurs, or for Hilliard and Furton, could occur, it becomes an act of defense
against implantation, or an abortifacient.
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Regarding the use of contraception for non-contraceptive benefits, as long as one rules
out intention as the proximate end and ulterior end, one in no way intends the medication to act
as a contraceptive or an abortifacient. This may be easier said than done, however, because the
very same physical mechanisms that the medication induces, which make it a good
contraceptive, also make it a good remedy for endometriosis and heavy menstrual bleeding.525
Thus, on the level of the external act materia ex qua, it is impossible to differentiate. Moreover,
the better the drug is, as a contraceptive, the less likely breakthrough ovulation and fertilization
will occur. Thus, theoretically, the better the medication is at preventing conception, the less
likely unintended fertilization occurs.
It is important to remember that all medications have risks of side effects; sometimes
these risks include death. Just as it is important for a patient to work with the physician to
determine and weigh risks, so patients must do so regarding the unlikely and unintended risk of a
contraceptive taken for non-contraceptive benefits, acting as an abortifacient. Leaving this to the
deliberation of the conscience of the patient is not diminishing the seriousness of the side effect,
nor is it relativizing the ethical significance of a medication’s potential risk. Rather, it is referring
the decision to its proper place, the perspective of the acting person, concerning a side effect that
is praeter intentionem.526 Thus, insofar as one does not seek to prevent implantation, one does
not intend abortion. 527
The fourth condition of the Principle of Double Effect insists that the negative side effect
does not cause the positive effect. 528 In intentional terms, one must not will the negative effect as
a means to the good effect. 529 As I indicate above, insofar as the physiological mechanism of
action is the same, the external act materia ex qua is the same, but the intentionally, that is, the
external act materia circa quam differs. Thus, so long as one clearly uses the medication for non-

360

contraceptive benefits, one has a good proximate end and avoids any violation of the fourth
criteria.
After articulating the physiological mechanisms of various contraceptive medications,
both in terms of their contraceptive qualities and their non-contraceptive benefits, this section
differentiates the Moral Object for each, respectively. Then, it uses the Principle of Double
Effect to further justify the non-contraceptive benefits over the ethically negative side effects of
contraceptives, including their potentially abortifacient qualities.
This chapter identifies the Moral Object of sex reassignment surgery and using
contraceptives for non-contraceptive benefits and analyzes them further in light of the Principle
of Double Effect. The following chapter concludes the dissertation.
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CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSION
This dissertation elucidates the moral methodology for Catholic health care ethics,
focusing especially on the relationship between Natural Law, the Moral Object of an act, and the
ethical Principles of Double Effect and Cooperation. Although Augustine and Thomas Aquinas
introduce these concepts, Pope John Paul II not only identifies them as official teaching of the
Catholic Church, he also provides the most systematic articulation of them in his encyclical
Veritatis Splendor. This dissertation offers a methodological bridge between Veritatis Splendor
and the United States bishops’ Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services, and then applies these concepts to emerging issues in health care ethics.
Chapter two explicates the concepts of Natural Law and the Moral Object that Aquinas
first introduces in the Summa Theologica. Avoiding the Naturalistic Fallacy, which maintains
that the moral genus derives from the natural genus, this chapter demonstrates the former’s
unique origin. Moreover, defining the human person as a composite of body and soul, it dodges
two dualistic vulnerabilities of the Naturalistic Fallacy: physicalism and spiritualism. In turn, this
provides a conceptual framework for the Church’s prohibition on contraception.
Chapter three shows that a non-consequentialist understanding of Natural Law and the
Moral Object is consistent with Aquinas’s articulation of Double Effect Reasoning. After
discussing Aquinas’s use of Double Effect, this chapter further elucidates the interpretation of
subsequent commentators that culminates in Jean Pierre Gury’s manualist formulation. In an
effort to make moral theology more teachable, commentators externalize the Moral Object,
identifying it as positing external causes. Peter Knauer uses Gury’s version of Double Effect to
devise proportionalism, which contends that one may posit any cause to achieve a good end so
long as one has commensurate reason. Insofar as Gury’s Double Effect and Knauer’s
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proportionalism externalize the Moral Object, their theories fall victim to the same pitfalls of the
Naturalistic Fallacy discussed in the second chapter.
The third chapter also contrasts non-consequentialist versions of Double Effect. First, it
enunciates a defense of craniotomies by John Finnis, Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle. In
accord with T. A. Cavanaugh’s critique, however, it demonstrates that they too narrowly define
the Moral Object of craniotomy, such that it excludes an inexorable component, the direct killing
of the child. This highlights that physical consequences influence the definition of the Moral
Object, even if the latter is not constituted of the former. Finally, this chapter contrasts the Moral
Objects of three distinct applications: euthanasia/terminal sedation, terror bombing/tactical
bombing, and craniotomy/hysterectomy. It uses Cavanaugh’s distinction between intention and
foreseen to further illuminate the Principle of Double Effect.
Chapter four is the procedural bridge between the theoretical chapters two and three and
the applied chapters five and six. First, the chapter explains health care ethics consultations.
Then, it explicates the process in the context of the core principles of health care ethics:
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.
Foreseeing organizations with conflicting missions working together, the second section
illuminates the Principle of Cooperation, a related principle to Double Effect. This section
follows the development of the United States Catholic Bishops’ response to sterilization and
their articulation of Cooperation in succeeding editions of their Ethical and Religious Directives.
The third edition follows the consequentialist methodology of conflating the Moral Object with
the remote end. In addition, they permit mediate material cooperation, something that
Cooperation traditionally forbids. However, in future editions, they correct these mistakes.
Further analysis in this section reveals that such a conflation makes it difficult to explain why
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certain moral absolutes are inviolable. Finally, this section explicates the Principle of
Appropriation, a mirror principle to Cooperation that attempts to justify the use of or product of
another’s immoral act.
Using the above discussion regarding Natural Law, the Moral Object, and the Principle of
Double Effect, chapter five argues that given certain conditions one may legitimately choose a
procedure that are physically sterilizing or contraceptive. When one keeps the Moral Object in
the moral genus, one is no longer limited to defining the Moral Object of contraception or
sterilization in purely physical terms. The first section shows that the significant increased risk of
developing ovarian cancer in BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutation carriers justifies them choosing the
physically sterilizing procedure of a bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy, so long as they choose it
for its prophylactic benefits, not its sterilizing effect. Delimiting the Moral Object of
contraception to the moral genus, Martin Rhonheimer defines it as a choice against chastity,
insofar as one circumvents the need for periodic continence, a constitutive part of responsible
parenthood that provides a means to growth in chastity. Accordingly, the Moral Object of a
BRCA mutation carrier using a bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy is a choice to prevent cancer.
Insofar as the negative effect of sterilization is beyond intention—either as remote end or
proximate end—the Principle of Double Effect justifies one’s tolerance of it, especially in light
of the life-threatening risk of developing ovarian cancer.
The second section discusses the use of the contraceptive levonorgestrel to prevent
conception in victims of sexual assault. First, this section explicates the function of various
contraceptives in the context of the menstrual-ovulatory cycle. Although certain contraceptives
clearly have abortifacient properties, the literature remains inconclusive and heavily debated
regarding levonorgestrel’s role at preventing pregnancy by forestalling ovulation. There is,
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however, persuasive evidence that meloxicam does prevent ovulation. Presuming that one uses a
means that acts as an effective contraceptive, rather than an abortifacient, this section
demonstrates that a properly formulated Moral Object and a non-consequentialist understanding
of Double Effect dissolves any need for recourse to the latter principle. Avoiding a physical
definition of the Moral Object of using a contraceptive to prevent pregnancy in a victim of sexual
assault, one may understand it as an act of self-defense. Although the physiological mechanism
of action is the same, the Moral Object, defined according to the moral order, differs between an
act of contraception or an act of self-defense. Moreover, since the use of contraceptive is an act
of self-defense when a woman uses it to prevent conception after sexual assault, there is no
negative side effect justify using the Principle of Double Effect. Only a definition of the Moral
Object that fails to keep it in the moral order runs into the error of presuming the need to justify
the physically conceived evil of avoiding conception.
The sixth chapter further explicates the use of Double Effect applying it to sex
reassignment surgery and using contraception for non-contraceptive benefits. The first section
considers the justification of Double Effect to justify sex reassignment surgery. First, it
highlights the challenges of defining sex, gender, gender dysphoria, and sex reassignment
therapies. Next, building on Natural Law, this section elucidates three grounds by which the
Catholic Church objects to sex reassignment therapies: medical, philosophical, and theological.
Finally, this section shows that although some theologians use the Principle of Totality or
Double Effect to justify sex reassignment surgery, this is a non-sequitur, since Catholic
anthropology precludes the dualistic understanding of the human person.
The second section analyzes the use of physically contraceptive means for their noncontraceptive benefits. First, it examines the contraceptive function of intrauterine devices and
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long-acting contraceptive. Next, it explores their non-contraceptive benefits specifically
highlighting their treatment for endometriosis and menorrhagia. The next subsection traces the
historical development of consequentialist methodology of the manualists and the proportionalist
especially highlighting the influence of William of Ockham’s nominalism. The final subsection
uses Double Effect to justify the negative effect of sterilization when using long-acting
contraceptive methods. In particular, it emphasizes that Double Effect excludes intending
sterilization both as a Moral Object or a remote end. This subsection illuminates the debate on
the potential abortifacient properties of contraceptive, but contends that since this is beyond
intention—Moral Object and remote end—it, like sterilization, is an evil that one tolerates.
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